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Terrorist Activity

Russia: Federal Troops Under Fire in Groznyy

LD2102221796 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 21 Feb 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the past 24 hours gunmen opened fire on the Russian military subunits' positions 16 times, including 12 times in Groznyy. There are no casualties among the men of the Ministry of the Interior.

The Russian military unit deployed near the village of Tsentoroy was fired upon yesterday. Two servicemen were wounded. The command of the federal forces has made a resolute protest to the head of the village's administration.

Russia: Hostilities 'Continuing' in Novogroznenskiy

LD2102192696 Moscow NTV in Russian 1600 GMT 21 Feb 96

[From the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] They promised journalists working in Chechnya that they would be allowed through to the site of the three-day siege. But that did not happen. We have just received a report from our special correspondents.

[Correspondent] The reluctance of the military to inform journalists of any details appears strange, at the least, against the background of the claims by the Russian military command that the operation in Novogroznenskiy was completed successfully. They are refusing to speak not only of the losses on both sides, but also of those among the peaceful population, and about the destruction which there probably has been. Today, several correspondents, including our film crew, with the assistance of the military, succeeded in reaching just one of the areas on Novogroznenskiy's outskirts. No one was allowed to go any further on the grounds that it was still dangerous. At the same time the military claim that all troops are being withdrawn from Novogroznenskiy and the fighters have been ousted.

According to information which we received today from other nonmilitary sources, hostilities are continuing in the village and artillery is being actively used.

There is much destruction and many casualties in Novogroznenskiy and in the adjacent villages. If one supposes that there are still fighters in that district then it is obvious that the path to Novogroznenskiy will be closed to journalists again over the next few days.

Russia: Federal Troop Positions Shelled in Novogroznenskiy

LD2202112796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1100 GMT 22 Feb 96

[By Sergey Bazhenov, Sergey Trofimov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY February 22 (ITAR-TASS) — The positions of federal troops in the area of Novogroznenskiy settlement were shelled by militants last night. An armoured carrier and car of the Dudayev supporters were destroyed when the fire was returned. Abdula Bugayev, First Deputy Premier of the Chechen government, said this to ITAR-TASS on Thursday with a reference to the information received from General Tikhomirov, the commander the joint group of federal forces.

Bugayev said the shelling of federal positions was conducted from the northern outskirts of Tsentoroy village six kilometres away from Novogroznenskiy.

The situation in the area of Tsentoroy settlement has been complex for several days, the press bureau of the Russian interior forces in Chechnya reported on Thursday. The fire of militants who got entrenched in the settlement killed six and wounded eight servicemen of federal troops.

Hasan Taimaskhanov, the Chief of the Tsentoroy administration, was warned by the federal troops command about possible consequences of these bandit steps.

Federal troops positions near Novogroznenskiy also came under fire yesterday afternoon from the populated localities Bachi-Yurt and Khosi-Yurt, situated at a distance of five to six kilometres from Novogroznenskiy. Kharon Amirkhanov, Deputy Premier of the Chechen government, said this to the Chechen news agency Vainakhpress. The fire of militants was supressed. On the whole, the situation in the Novogroznenskiy area is being normalised and the seats of militants' resistance have virtually been supressed, Amirkhanov noted.

Russia: Novogroznenskiy 'Stand-off' Moves to Tsentoroy

LD2202064896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0621 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW February 22 (ITAR-TASS) — After Russian forces pushed Chechen militants away from the settlement of Novogroznenskiy, 40 kilometres east of Groznyy, the stand-off moved to the village of Tsentoroy, some 25 kilometres south of Novogroznenskiy, where federal troops sustained losses in two days of Chechen attacks.

A spokesman of the Interior ministry told Tass on Thursday that six Russian troops were killed and three wounded when Chechen militants used mortars, grenade launchers and small arms to fire on Russian positions outside Tsentoroy, some 60 kilometres south-east of Groznyy, late on Wednesday. Another serviceman was wounded in the second attack which took place three hours later.

The spokesman said Russian troops returned the fire.

On Tuesday four servicemen were wounded in similar attacks from Tsentoroy and the head of its administration, Khasan Taymaskhanov, was told by the Russian command to get the militants out of his settlement.

He was "warned by the federal troops command about possible consequences of the bandit raids from the settlement", according to the spokesman.

He said the Russian command believes that irreconcilable militants "intentionally aggravate the situation in the area of Tsentoroy to make the military fire back and thus cause discontent of the population with the actions of federal troops".

Russia: Chechnya-Dagestan Gas Pipeline Blown Up

LD2202101596 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0928 GMT 22 Feb 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sergey Bazhenov and Sergey Trofimov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 22 Feb (ITAR-TASS) — This morning at 0500 in Chechnya, unidentified persons blew up the Chechnya-Dagestan transit gas pipeline. Abdula Bugayev, first deputy prime minister of the republic's government, informed ITAR-TASS correspondents that the sabotage was carried out in the region of the village of Shelkovskaya.

Military Activity

Russia: Grachev Against Immediate Withdrawal From Chechnya

LD2102155596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1507 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 21 (INTERFAX) — Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has objected to immediate federal troops withdrawal from Chechnya.

"If we give up, be cowards and leave Chechnya, similar conflicts may begin in other Caucasian republics," Grachev told physicians at the Burdenko main military hospital in Moscow Wednesday.

Chechen rebel leader Dzhokhar "Dudayev is a small fry and Chechnya is a trial balloon of Russia's strategic enemies whose major goal is to disintegrate and separate part of Russian territory," said Grachev.

"The enemies of Russia are dreaming of a new state in the Caucasus. Their choice of the Caucasus was not accidental, because they can make use of religious and ethnic differences between regional peoples," said the minister.

"A part of the Northern Caucasus separated from Russia will block its access to the Black and Caspian seas. Russia may lose the status of a great maritime nation, because its only access left will be that to the Baltic sea," said Grachev.

"Chechnya has turned into a center of international terrorism and gangsterism," said the minister, urging the liquidation of the "criminal Dudayev regime."

"The gunmen's leaders must be found and destroyed," he said.

A number of foreign states continue their financial aid to Dudayev gunmen, said the minister. This money is used to buy guns and hire mercenaries, he added.

According to the minister, Dudayev gunmen are involved in contraband of petroleum products. He said the federal units had seized about ten amateur workshops which process oil.

When visiting the Burdenko hospital, Grachev came into the room of ex-commander of the federal troops in Chechnya Col. Gen. Anatoly Romanov, who received serious brain injuries in a terrorist act on October 6, 1995, in the Chechen capital Groznyy.

Grachev said the ex-commander has become thin and weighs only 63 kilos. "When I said hello to the general, it seemed to me that Romanov recognized me. I am not a doctor, but I think he feels better compared to my previous visit," said the minister.

Russia: Grachev: Novogroznenskiy Operation 'Completed'

LD2102190796 Moscow NTV in Russian 1600 GMT 21 Feb 96

[Passages in quotation marks are recorded; from the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The defense minister today developed the Chechen theme at the Burdenko hospital. Here is a report by Sergey Agaponov.

[Agaponov] Pavel Grachev visited the Burdenko military hospital today where he handed out orders, medals, and expensive presents to soldiers and officers wounded in Chechnya. During the ceremony the defense minister announced that the operation in Novogroznenskiy has been completed. [passage omitted]

Journalists reminded Grachev that, according to intelligence which was disclosed by the command of the grouping in Chechnya, there were up to 1,000 fighters in Novogroznenskiy, and they asked the minister to answer the question of where 800 of them had gone to if 200 of them had been killed. Pavel Grachev was surprised.

[Grachev] "I do not know what the information of intelligence is or who gave you that intelligence information. I get my information from my commanders. They report to me every morning. The picture I have of what is happening is more real than what is written about or spoken of. No, there were 250-300 fighters at the most."

[Agaponov] Pavel Grachev maintains that there are 2,500-3,000 irreconcilables left in Chechnya today.

[Grachev] "[Anatoliy] Kvashnin [commander of the North Caucasus military district] reported to me today that they had seized a Dudayev military hospital. The hospital consisted of three apartments. When they went into the hospital there were several dozen of Dudayev's sick or wounded men lying there. They had been all been shot dead. According to a radio intercept which we received today, Dudayev's men reported that: We are leaving. We cannot take our wounded and sick brothers with us so we have decided to send them to Allah. How can one talk to people like that?"

[Agaponov] Pavel Grachev was also in General [Anatoliy] Romanov's ward today.

[Grachev] "I think he recognized me. When I spoke to him, the doctors told me that, by his behavior, he had reacted to my being there. Well, the man's lying there with the equipment. He's lost a lot of weight. He weighs 63 kg now. But I saw him a few months ago and I can see now, not as a specialist, that his state of health is much better."

[Agaponov] A wounded soldier asked Pavel Grachev to visit more often. The minister promised he would. [video shows Grachev visiting men in hospital, Grachev speaking to media]

Russia: Kurskiy District Prepares for Dudayev Terrorism

LD2102221296 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT 21 Feb 96

[From the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lessons were cancelled in all schools in Kurskiy District in Stavropol Territory today. Kindergartens were closed.

According to information from the Federal Security Service, Dudayev's supporters are planning to carry out terrorists acts in Kurskiy District in the next few days and the local authorities decided to send the children home.

Practically all the roads around and through the town have been partitioned off with reinforced concrete blocs or with newly felled trees. Only the main highways controlled by reinforced militia detachments are free thoroughfares.

The hospital is guarded by servicemen from Interior Ministry subunits. Armed soldiers are not only in the courtyard and inside the building but even on the roof. Military reinforcements are arriving in the district.

This is not the first time that a telephoned telegram about impending acts of terrorism has been received. However, such extraordinary security measures have not been taken until today.

The situation has been tense in Kurskiy District since the beginning of hostilities in Chechnya. Its borders with the Chechen Republic run for 127 km; therefore, unpleasant things are always expected here and after the events in Budennovsk, Kizlyar, and Pervomayskoye the grounds for concern increased.

People call their place of residence nothing other than a frontline zone. They are very suspicious of strangers and inform the Federal Security Service as soon as they see them.

The special regime will remain in force until the end of February. Children will go to school and kindergartens in March. However, reinforced militia posts and also the guard at hospitals will remain. [video shows militia guarding premises, roadblocks]

Russia: Authorities Seeking To Prevent Unsanctioned Rallies

LD2102220796 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT 21 Feb 96

[From the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our special correspondents who were returning from Novogroznenskiy — you have seen their report already — found out some new details which concerns everyone who is in Groznyy. Aleksandr Abramenko is on the air.

[Abramenko] As of today, there are tight restrictions on travel around Groznyy and also on travel into and out of the town. All passes issued previously by the military commandant's office of the Chechen Republic, including to journalists, have been revoked.

The OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] men at this checkpoint explained to us that you could only enter or leave the town with the personal permission of the military commandant, which is practically not given to anyone.

Thus, the federal military command in Chechnya is trying evidently to prevent infiltration into the town by Dudayev supporters, who despite the ban by the official authorities, intend to hold unsanctioned rallies in Groznyy on 23 February, the anniversary of the deportation of Chechens and Ingushis.

Military spokesmen of the official authorities in Chechnya are confident that they will not succeed in this. Groznyy inhabitants think somewhat differently. Many of them who spoke to us assured us that such an obstacle would not stop Dudayev's men and that they undoubtedly would carry out acts of provocation. Therefore many people were trying to keep off the streets of the town as far as possible so as not to endanger their lives. People are very wary in the town despite the fact that no serious incidents were registered in Groznyy today, but the military think that this does not yet mean that there will not be any incidents tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. [video shows checkpoints, people and vehicles being checked]

Political Reaction

Russia: Yeltsin Views Possible Solutions to Chechen Problem

LD2102151896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1507 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 21 (INTERFAX) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin says discussion is now under way of eight possible options for resolving the Chechen problem, one of them offered by himself, he told a meeting of leaders of the Russian mass media in Moscow on Wednesday.

All of the seven options for resolving the Chechen crisis offered by experts contain contradictory points, Yeltsin said. "For example, some provide for the withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya, others categorically oppose this."

At the end of a national security council meeting two weeks ago, Yeltsin ordered the creation of a commission with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in charge to prepare proposals on settling the Chechen crisis.

He also instructed to set up a committee of experts headed by leading political scientist Emil Payin after a meeting by the presidential council two days later. This is expected to come up with recommendations on how to defuse the regional conflict.

The president warned that Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev was planning to take control of the entire Caucasus region and set up a South Islamic Republic as his final goal. This is expected to comprise Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkar Republic and other republics and regions in the North Caucasus.

Russia: Moscow Ready To Grant Chechnya 'Special Status'

LD2102225396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1952 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, Feb 21 (INTERFAX) — Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov said that the Russian leadership is prepared to grant Chechnya a special status inside Russia but cannot encourage separatism. He was speaking in response to an INTERFAX question at a news conference in Almaty.

The Chechen conflict could be easier to resolve if the other side did not insist on full independence, Primakov said.

Peace talks leading to the disarmament of gangs and the withdrawal of federal troops with simultaneous neutralization of terrorist groups could be the road to settlement, he believes.

Russia: Khasbulatov: OSCE Must Oversee Negotiations

AU2102125096 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Feb 96 p 12

[Article by Ruslan Khasbulatov, honorary chairman of the People's Union for the Rebirth of the Chechen Republic: "Russian Cynicism in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian-Chechen war has been raging for more than a year. The negotiations last summer, which promised considerable success as a result of the agreement of 30 July, were broken off by the Russian side. Moscow considered the agreement as not having enough advantages for itself. Instead, falsified elections took place under the Army's control, which forced upon the republic a regime of former party leaders who were driven out in 1991 because of corruption and their work in the CPSU. This created new tensions and led to the well-known armed conflicts: in Gudermes, in Kislyar, and in Pervomayskoye, and, most recently, to constant demonstrations in Groznyy.

The Chechen resistance fighters recognize the cynicism of the Russian policy, which, on the one hand, declares a special status with far-reaching rights for the republic, and, at the same time, with the puppet regime in Groznyy, gives the people fewer rights than any Russian district, where at least the administrative head is freely elected without interference from the center.

This war has long stopped serving the preservation of "Russia's territorial unity." It weakens the state and strengthens separatism. Instead, the regime in Moscow is flourishing. The president's apparatus of power has inflated enormously and has freed itself from social and state control. The special military and police structures are gaining power and are no longer monitored by the legislator. One quarter of the entire Army is stationed in the area of fighting and its surroundings. Financial funds and military materiel are going there in amounts that are inconceivable for peace time. The generals are now influencing strategic political decisions in a way as they did not even do it during World War II. The politicians constantly demand "strengthening the Army." Obviously, they do not realize that their appeals are listened to. However, it is not the Army that becomes stronger, but the leadership of the generals. Neither under the tsar nor in the Soviet Union were issues of war and peace decided by the military. All Russian rulers understood that such questions are too important to leave to the generals. In Yeltsin's Russia today, the military decides on war and peace to a certain extent, which is a lethal danger for society.

Therefore, the war in Chechnya is raging to the joy of the military, to the misery of the people, and in violation of Russia's interests. The Russian-Chechen conflict has become an organic part of the political regime, which can also be used for domestic purposes at a suitable moment. If this war continues, if Chechen settlements continue to be bombarded, and if civilians continue to be killed day by day, no Russian general can guarantee that there will not be analogous attacks on Russian towns, with other means, which will immediately be branded as terrorist. In this situation, the pressure of migration from Russia on Europe is growing. A total of 2 or 3 million refugees would not be an exaggeration. Are the European countries prepared for that? This disaster is taking place in Europe's immediate neighborhood, as a result of European "non-interference" in allegedly foreign "internal affairs." One cannot combat terrorism if one creates terrorism with one's actions.

Ending the war requires the withdrawal of the Army and negotiations — but not negotiations as between master and servant, but honest, open, responsible negotiations with international guarantees for their results. The OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observer group in Groznyy must be given the right to organize the negotiations and must act as the guarantor of the agreement. The elections of December would have to be declared null and void and a coalition government would have to be formed for a transition period. The withdrawal of the Russian Army and the dissolution of the units of Chechen resistance would have to be ensured. Elections should be held under OSCE aegis. In order to determine the republic's status, one might hold a referendum.

However, the military establishment is urging action by force all the more strongly the more their own failure becomes obvious. It will hardly be possible to persuade them to end the war sensibly. The development of new internal conflicts seems to be programmed. Therefore, one needs a legal basis for the internationalization of the so-called "internal conflicts." Many of them could be prevented or ended rapidly if the principle of non-interference were replaced with the principle of banning military "solutions."

Russia: Russian Serviceman Swapped for Chechen Rebel

LD2202120896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1123 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, February 22 (ITAR-TASS) — The temporary administration of the Russian Interior Ministry in Chechnya swapped one serviceman who was captured by Chechen gunmen on February 7, for one rebel on Thursday, ITAR-TASS learnt by telephone at the press centre of the administration.

According to the press centre, rebels fired seven times on positions of Interior Ministry troops on February 21 and last night. They fired with grenade launchers and submachine-guns.

Bandits' firing emplacements were quashed with return fire. Rebels killed one serviceman and wounded three.

Eight Chechens were detained on suspicion of being members of illegal armed detachments.

Russia: Novogroznenskiy Seen as Possible Second Gudermes

MM2202123096 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 96 p 1

[Report by Anatoliy Stasovskiy: "Novogroznenskiy: Elimination of Gang Nearing Completion"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] By all accounts, the settlement of Novogroznenskiy, where active combat operations have now been under way for four days, could become a second Gudermes, which became a stumbling block to the Chechen Republic Government, federal troops, and the illegal armed formations last December, on the very eve of the elections there. A situation is being repeated whereby the settlement process, which has, albeit slowly, gotten under way, is being shattered by Dudayev's supporters; and the efforts of the Chechen Republic leadership, which is doing all it can to seize the initiative, are being nullified.

The center of tension at Novogroznenskiy arose at the very moment when the inhabitants of many rayons of Chechnya were expressing their desire to transform their population centers into peace zones. A number of protocols on peace and accord were signed. Such agreements were reached between Doku Zavgayev's government and the Gudermes rayons. On 18 February the elders and religious figures of Urus-Martan also told the authorities of their readiness to sign a protocol on peace and accord envisaging the voluntary surrender of illegally held weapons, the departure of gunmen, and the withdrawal of federal troops from the rayon's territory. Clearly, no one thought that the settlement process would immediately go smoothly and advance without problems. The gunmen make every effort to wreck the implementation of accords. This time Dudayev's men have chosen armed confrontation around Novogroznenskiy as their main destabilization effort. [passage omitted]

Colonel General Anatoliy Kvashin, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, has reported at a Chechen government session that the federal troops surrounding the Dudayev gang (around 800 gunmen) in Novogroznenskiy will complete the operation to eliminate it very soon. [passage omitted]

CIS: Russia, Ukraine Reject Georgian Claim on Black Sea Fleet

LD2102124996 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1130 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 21 Feb — An IBERIA correspondent has been told at the Georgian Ministry of Defense that the Ukrainian Defense Ministry issued a statement 19 February saying that Georgia's claims on part of the Black Sea Fleet are without foundation because Ukraine and Russia have already concluded an agreement on the division of the part of the Black Sea Fleet based on Ukrainian territory. As for Georgia, it can only claim ships based at Poti although those ships were transferred to Russian territory a long time ago.

A Russian Defense Ministry statement says that Russia cannot accept Georgia's claims as regards the division of the Black Sea Fleet because, the statement alleges, Georgia used force to gain possession of the Black Sea Fleet infrastructure when it occupied the naval base in Poti.

CIS: Defense Ministers Secretary Details Peacekeeping Blueprint

MM2102165796 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 13

[Report by Aleksandr Shinkin on interview with Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Defense Ministers' Council; place and date not given: "Common Security by Joint Efforts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Defense Ministers' Council, comments on the Blueprint for the Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts and on other documents pertaining to peacekeeping operations on the territory of CIS member states published in this issue of the newspaper.

The session of the CIS Heads of States Council in Moscow January was dominated to some extent by peacemaking. At least, the six questions discussed there relate directly to this sphere. And the documents adopted at the Council session are, I would say, a breakthrough in the settlement of conflicts. They make it possible to raise peacemaking activity in the CIS to a qualitatively new level.

The Blueprint for the Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts on the Territory of the CIS Member States is the fundamental link in these documents. It defines the possibility of joint steps to resolve disputes and disagreements that are emerging, including the performance of peacemaking operations.

The Blueprint summarizes peacemaking experience in the CIS. All the positive aspects have been taken into account and merged into a common system. The main emphasis is placed not on the settlement of a conflict but on a system of measures designed to prevent it because conflicts rarely occur suddenly. There are inevitably preconditions. The Blueprint thus envisages a series of measures to settle disagreements in the pre-conflict situation itself.

Preventive diplomacy, as is clear from the document, can include a range of measures aimed at clarifying the reasons for and averting disputes between sides and preventing their development into conflicts: These measures include good offices and mediation in the organization of consultations and talks between the parties to a dispute, and assisting them in the search for mutual understanding and accord in the settlement of disagreements.

But in some cases the police or militia civilian and military personnel of CIS member states may be deployed as a preventive measure in a region of potential confrontation. In this way it will be possible to prevent the escalation of tension and the development of disputes, disagreements, and crises into armed conflict. Furthermore, the decision on preventive deployment and sanctions is made by the CIS Heads of States Council at the request of the states whose security and sovereignty are being threatened and with the consent of the parties to the dispute. The CIS Heads of States Council determines the character and duration of the sanctions, approves the mandate for the deployment of the Collective Peacemaking Forces, and stipulates their powers and tasks.

There is another important aspect to the Blueprint. It is not enough simply to stop a conflict. It is also necessary to adopt measures to prevent a recurrence of the conflict and to ensure that its smoldering embers are extinguished once and for all. That is why the Blueprint includes measures on the post-conflict building of peace which envisages support in restoring an atmosphere of trust.

They include measures aimed at helping to restore the institutions of state power and ensure the return of refugees and misplaced persons, help in mine clearance operations and the restoration of the major elements of the states' infrastructures, and ensuring conditions for the holding of free elections to the representative organs of civilian power and for the protection of human rights. Furthermore, with the sides' consent military observers or separate subunits of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces may be stationed temporarily in specified conflict zones.

The Blueprint also resolves the question of CIS interaction with the United Nations and the OSCE in peacemaking activities. This question provoked a stormy debate at the Heads of States Council, as far as one can judge. It was even suggested that all peacekeeping operations in the CIS be held under the auspices of those international organizations. Perhaps there was an economic purpose behind this proposal: If the peacemaking operations are conducted under the auspices of, say, the United Nations, the latter will accordingly finance them either in full or in part. But experience shows that no one has received a single dollar so far for any peacemaking operation in the CIS.

In addition, the UN Charter not only does not forbid but conversely allows and even encourages regional peacemaking efforts. After all, the CIS is able to adopt rapid, prompt measures to avert a conflict on its own territory whereas UN and OSCE operations in this regard are not marked by promptness. At the same time we are not obliged to await the international organizations' approval before resolving disputes. Our only obligation is to notify them of this, a matter which, indeed, is reflected in detail in the Blueprint. According to articles 39-42 of the UN Charter, it is only when measures of compulsion are adopted against the parties to a conflict that the CIS heads of states are obliged to obtain the UN Security Council's approval.

In addition to the Blueprint the CIS Heads of States' Council also adopted the Statute on the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces. It has been drawn up in accordance with the UN and CIS charters as well as with agreements governing the creation and use of these peacekeeping forces.

On the basis of various documents from international organizations and the CIS this statute summarizes and concretizes the Collective Peacemaking Forces' composition, tasks, functions, the bases of their use, and principles of recruitment, as well as their status and social and legal protection.

The agreement on the preparation and training of peacekeeping forces also resolves a whole series of questions. After all, the joint forces must have a level of training commensurate with the tasks of a peacemaking mission, be able to understand a complex sociopolitical situation, and make well-founded decisions. They also need a certain community of views and experience in cooperation.

With the adoption of these and other documents it may now be said that a mechanism has been created for the prevention and settlement of conflicts on CIS territory. Furthermore, it is based on peaceful political and diplomatic methods of resolving conflicts.

However, this work may encounter a number of problems. The first problem is whether the heads of states and the parliaments have the political will to agree to preventive measures if there is a threat of a conflict. Either they will take resolute actions or they will indulge in empty rhetoric until the conflict erupts, causing a multitude of disasters.

The second problem is undoubtedly economic. That is easy to see from existing conflicts. Let us take the Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation, for example. It sometimes seems that there are five states signatory to the conflict settlement document, sometimes more. But only Russia is taking part. And it bears the whole burden of the material cost, a considerable cost furthermore.

However, the Blueprint for the Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts contains a defect. Namely, the requirement to take account of the opposing sides' agreement to preventive measures. According to this logic, we would not be able to undertake the peacemaking operation in Tajikistan. In such instances, of course, you can only count on the political will of the CIS heads of state who are able to adopt practical measures regardless of what is theoretically allowed.

CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 22 Feb

LD2202064296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0622 GMT 22 Feb 96

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW February 22 (ITAR-TASS) — Follows a review of Thursday's Moscow-based Russian newspapers dated February 22.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on President Yeltsin's meeting with media people.

"Social problems have now come to the fore in Presidential agenda," Yeltsin pointed out. He said he intends to keep under day-to-day control all matters concerning the payment of wages, pensions, social, maternity and child welfare benefits and other allowances in assistance to the socially vulnerable people in Russia.

This is not just "election campaign-determined activities" and not "populist techniques", Yeltsin emphasised.

The President categorically dismissed conjectures about a possible postponement of a Presidential election date. "I intend to act strictly within the Constitutional field and abide by democratic procedures," he stated.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on monitoring of compliance with Presidential wage payment-related decisions.

The newspaper reports that all the four fax machines at the Federal Labour Inspectorate operate round the clock, receiving information from all regions of Russia where the payment of wages on time is being checked.

The recently-adopted Decree "On the verification of compliance with the legislation on the remuneration of labour" introduces tough penalties for those who fail to comply. If the payment of wages is delayed, all measures provided for by Article 138 of the Penal Code will be applied to culprits — the measures range from a fine of an equivalent of 500 minimum wages to dismissal if decided by a law-court.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on a privatisation strategy.

The newspaper carries an interview with First Vice-Premier Vladimir Kadannikov. He said privatisation is the only thing that he did not inherit from Anatoliy Chubays. He added that he had formed an opinion as to how to privatisation should be carried on.

"Privatisation should evolve from grass-roots level, not from above. The State should act so that it would be beneficial for work collectives to buy out State packages of shares," Kadannikov said.

"Meanwhile, State property is almost not regulated in any way so far. This must be handled by experts who can judge which State-run enterprises can make profits and which should be wound up as hopeless. Mortgage auctions held at the end of 1995 did not and could not produce the desired results. The outcome of those auctions should be looked into on a strictly individual basis in each specific case. No sweeping measures to revise the auctions' results are contemplated."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the situation in Chechnya.

The newspaper reports that after three days of bloody fighting the army seized the last populated area controlled by Dudayev militants along the Rostov-Baku road.

"The fall of Novogroznenskiy became yet another landmark in the war in Chechnya but this event, apparently, cannot be referred to as a turning-point, the newspaper observes.

"The officially announced losses — several Russian soldiers and up to 200 militants — are probably true to the facts. Advantages which the defenders had over the attacking forces were swept away by the Federal troops's fire from heavy types of armaments. The troops acted so as to "clear" an area from militants after shelling, neutralising the remaining isolated weapon emplacements".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the same subject.

The newspaper writes that in Novogroznenskiy Federal troops were confronted by a group of formations that are stationed in eastern and southern areas of Chechnya. The overall number of militants was about 1,000. They were armed with several armoured vehicles, various artillery systems, mortars, various small arms and did not experience any shortages of ammunition.

Hence a fierce street fighting in Novogroznenskiy. Militants managed to consolidate their positions well, set up strongpoints in houses, and used basements as a reliable protection against shelling, the newspaper's correspondents report.

The several-days-long troop operation in the area of Novogroznenskiy ended on February 20 with complete freeing of the populated area from militants who lost about 200 men killed. There was loss of life among Federal troops, although casualties among servicemen could have been avoided, the newspaper adds.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the introduction of new 100-dollar banknotes.

The newspaper reports that, according to preliminary data, new 100-dollar banknotes are to be brought into circulation in March this year, but a specific date may not be mentioned so far, William Murden, a spokesman for the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has told a briefing.

The spokesman assured journalists that a respective information would appear two weeks before the X-hour. At the same time he denied reports about a large number of fake 100-dollar banknotes circulated in Russia. He said there are only about 300 fakes per million dollars in the Russian Federation.

Russia: Yeltsin Reaffirms NATO Expansion Stance to Clinton

LD2102184896 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1725 GMT 21 Feb 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 21 Feb — In a telephone conversation with U.S. President Bill Clinton today Russian President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed Russia's well-known position with regard to plans for NATO's eastward expansion. The ITAR-TASS correspondent was told this by presidential press secretary Sergey Medvedev.

During the 40-minute-long conversation Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton stressed the need to continue the policy of developing equal cooperation with a view to stabilizing the international situation, Medvedev said. He said that the heads of state had discussed bilateral relations and world problems, including the situation in Bosnia and European security.

Russia: Outstanding Issues Remain as IMF Visit Begins

MM2102154996 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by Mikhail Berger: "Russia Expecting $12 Billion From IMF"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Michel Camdessus, head of the IMF, arrives in Moscow Wednesday. He is expected to sign an agreement coordinated with the IMF for the granting to Russia of three-year loans worth $9-12 billion.

IMF protocol practice states that a prepared visit by the head of the Fund relating to the signing of certain documents usually does end with the signing of those documents. But Russia is a special country, and Camdessus' visit may end in nothing. And that nothing, in turn, could have the gravest economic consequences for Russia.

Admittedly, meeting with journalists, Central Bank chief Sergey Dubinin, who replaced Anatoliy Chubays as head of the Russian delegation in the talks with the IMF, considers the likelihood of a "zero" outcome to the visit to be very low. But it cannot be ruled out either. All the more so as three or four issues, Dubinin reported, remain to be resolved at the political level. This means that agreement has simply not been reached on them.

It is natural that the most fundamental issues for each side — such as, for instance, the regulation of oil and gas exports — remain uncoordinated. The IMF is insisting on the abolition of customs export tariffs. Russia, naturally, is trying to explain why it is impossible to do this immediately. Sergey Dubinin expressed the hope that it would ultimately be possible to reach a compromise acceptable to both sides. Dubinin is also not ruling out the possibility that one or two points will be "finalized" outside of the framework of the Camdessus visit with a corresponding preliminary statement by the sides.

On the one hand, the situation is favorable for a successful completion of the talks — Russia has virtually carried out its 1995 program and will receive the outstanding tranche of the so-called standby credit in full. On the other hand, there is no getting away from the current political context — the coming elections — which introduces a sense of uncertainty about future economic policy and could encourage ill-conceived steps in current policy. Nor is confidence boosted by the "new economic initiatives" taken by certain government members. In short, as Dubinin himself admitted, such talks are always difficult in the run-up to an election.

But what if an agreement is not signed? It has to be said that relations with international financial organizations have recently been of less and less interest to ordinary Russians (the voters). The fashion for talking about Western aid has passed and even something akin to the opposite sentiment — we will get by without their billions — is becoming prevalent....

Even the crudest calculations show that Russia is in no position to get by "without their billions." It is not even a question of the amount which the IMF will or will not allocate. The breakdown of relations with the Fund automatically alters our relations with foreign creditors — which, in that instance, would not grant deferments on their foreign debt. This would mean that this year Russia would have to pay an extra $16 billion — and that is simply beyond us. People who cannot pay are bankrupt, and theoretically there is the option of the country being declared insolvent, having its foreign assets seized, and other consequences. And that is something that every voter would feel personally.

Russia: Government Committee Approves Strategy Toward CIS

LD2102181996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1625 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, February 21 (Interfax) — Russian Government's CIS Committee has approved Russia's strategy vis-a-vis the CIS member countries in the course of its current meeting in Moscow on Tuesday [20 February].

Aleksey Bolshakov, Russian Vice Premier, believes that this programme is a reflection of the basic aspects in the development of Russia's economic ties with the CIS member countries and this will make it possible to elevate relations with the CIS partners to a civilized level.

The government Committee has also decided to recommend that the Government find out funds in the federal budget to finance training CIS citizens at Russian military schools. In the opinion of the participants in the meeting, the resolution of this problem is of strategic importance for Russia. The debt of the CIS member countries to the Russian Defence Ministry for training their citizens has reached $6.72 thousand million. Yet, the meeting noted that if this issue is not settled, Russia may lose in the future weapon markets in the CIS member countries.

Russia: Primakov Favors Extension of CIS Peacekeepers' Mandate

LD2102225996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1952 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, Feb 21 (Interfax) — Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov believes that the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan should be extended. He was speaking in his private capacity when he answered an Interfax question about this at a news conference in Almaty Wednesday [21 February] at the end of his sojourn in Kazakhstan.

Primakov explained that the CIS units must stay in Tajikistan because they prevent what he described as "external forces based in Afghanistan" from throwing the country into chaos. He explained that the Tajik opposition units "abuse the instability in Afghanistan, cross the border and disturb the balance in Tajikistan."

"Everybody, Russia, Kazakhstan and, above all, the Tajik people want the Tajik situation to stabilize," said Primakov, who had discussed the outlook for a settlement in Tajikistan with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev Wednesday.

Primakov believes that the Tajik government and opposition should continue the dialogue, extend the ceasefire and abide by it.

The Tajik government has recently made numerous constructive steps in the talks but the opposition stopped the Ashgabat talks, Primakov said.

Extremes should be avoided, he thinks. It is wrong to ignore the opposition, which represents a share of public opinion, but everybody should understand that the Tajik people do not want an Islamic model of statehood imposed on them.

Russia: Council of Europe Program for Russia Detailed

MM2202100696 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 20 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by Yuriy Nikolayev: "Russia Will Receive 1.2 Million ECU's From Council of Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Wednesday [14 February] the editorial office received a fax from Strasbourg — home of the Council of Europe — containing a short but extremely important piece of news for Russia: On 14 February at the Palace of Europe, the headquarters of the Council of Europe, Secretary General Daniel Tarschys and European Commissioner Hans van den Broek are to sign an agreement regarding the aid program for the Russian Federation. It is designed to cover the period 1996-1997 and is funded by the Council of Europe and the European Community to the tune of 1.2 million ECU's.

What is the nature of the program? How was it conceived? What will we gain? For a few years the Russian Federation has been cooperating with the Council in very different fields. This cooperation aimed to do one thing — prepare for our admission to this prestigious European organization. Russia's representatives took an active part in intergovernmental ties and there were intensive exchanges of information and appraisals of draft laws being prepared in Russia. This lively cooperation was designed to harmonize legal procedure in the country with the Council's statutory requirements and ensure that this procedure matched the principles of a rule-of-law state and the legal individual. These problems have gradually come to the fore in our cooperation.

Needless to say, such activity must rest on a solid financial base. The Council of Europe asked the European Community for aid. As a result of talks they prepared a joint program. We are not a party to the agreement. However, when it was being compiled the wishes of the Russian Federation Presidential Staff, both chambers of our parliament, ministries, and departments were naturally taken into account. Thus, highly influential Russian institutions have an interest in its implementation. The program envisages strengthening federal structures, creating mechanisms to defend human rights, and promoting reform of the legal system. It includes improving the activity of certain sectors of the state administration by speeding up reforms and cadre training. In the broader context it will help ensure Russia's ratification of the Convention on Human Rights, which it promised to do on admission to the Council of Europe.

To go into somewhat greater detail the document comprises six projects. They all envisage two main areas

— constitutional law and order and the strengthening of legal institutions, on the one hand, and legal reform, on the other. Each project has its own objective: to help improve the activity of federal organs of power; to promote the activity of local self-government organs and train locally elected representatives; to support institutions defending human rights in the Russian Federation; to encourage the teaching of legal disciplines and study of the law and improve the activity of institutions within the legal system; to develop Russian legislation and its practical application in order to ensure that the legislation corresponds to the European Convention on Human Rights and prepare a methodological basis for codification; and to promote reform of the penitentiary system and crime-fighting.

It is very important that the program will be implemented at a time when the Russian Federation is a full-fledged member of the Council and will be able to use it to primarily perform tasks in its national interests. The very existence of the program confirms that those European forces which advocated the Russian Federation's admission to the Council of Europe were correct. "Last year," Council of Europe Secretary General Daniel Tarschys said recently, "Russia's president, prime minister, and parliamentary leaders made a written pledge to the Council of Europe to speed up reforms and thus eliminate the deficiencies in the sphere of democracy and state law discovered by legal specialists. Needless to say, you could claim on formal grounds that Russia today still does not fully meet the requirements made of Council of Europe members. But how far had democratic order been established in the young Federal Republic of Germany when it was admitted to the Council of Europe in 1950? And when Portugal and Spain were admitted to this organization in the seventies there was no constitutional order at all in those countries. A risk was taken then, and that choice proved to be the correct one."

We should not lose sight of another important aspect of this agreement either: Russia's regions will play a key role in its implementation.

News agencies have reported that the agreement was signed, as planned, last Thursday [15 February].

Russia: St. Petersburg Mayor, Kohl Discuss Election Situation

LD2102150896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1450 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] St. Petersburg February 21 (Itar-Tass) — German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak who had a meeting here on Wednesday, discussed the pre-election situation in Russia and cooperation between Germany and St. Petersburg.

They examined future and present joint projects in the economy, culture and public health.

Germany now holds second place, after Finland, in foreign trade turnover of St. Petersburg. Over one-third of all joint ventures and firms with 100 percent foreign capital, which produce industrial goods in St.Petersburg, are also owned by German partners.

Sobchak informed the federal chancellor of prospects for regional cooperation between St. Petersburg and several German states, especially pointing to firm relations which developed with the twin city of Hamburg.

Kohl was presented with a bronze sculpture of Peter the Great, the founder of the city, in memory of his St. Petersburg visit.

Following the meeting with the mayor, the chancellor went for a meeting with Yuriy Kravtsov, chairman of the St. Petersburg legislative assembly.

There is an extensive cultural programme in store for the chancellor after the meeting with Kravtsov: visits to the St. Isaac's Cathedral, the Peter and Paul Fortress and the Russian Museum.

Russia: Kohl Seen as Russia's 'Good Friend'

MM2202104996 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 96 p 7

[Article by Vladimir Lapskiy under the "Event of the Week" rubric: "They Have Been on First-Name Terms for a Long Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This was the 14th meeting between the Russian and FRG leaders. The Russian president probably does not have such close contacts with any other Western politician as with "his friend Helmut"; he talks with him most often on the international telephone.

As for Russian-German interstate relations in general, they still have plenty of room for development both in breadth and in depth: A past overshadowed by the "Cold War," different economic levels, different political mentalities, and other factors play their part.

The discussion with Yeltsin, Kohl said at a press conference in Moscow's Balchug-Kempinski Hotel, was "very intensive and very frank."

In recent years this bloc [NATO] has undergone what I would call an inconceivable transformation: It has become almost "transparent." Pictures that a couple of years ago would have been beyond the worst nightmares of NATO officers have today become routine. Thus, every morning at 0830 the Russian General Leontiy Shevtsov and four aides approach the strictly guarded gates of NATO headquarters near the Belgian city of Mons, the officers show their pass to the man on duty, and he gallantly raises his hand to his cap. And thus for three months now Russians have been working together with the NATO military to plan the operations of the international forces implementing the agreement on Bosnia. In the "Cold War" years these same NATO military men used to discuss plans for the defense of West Berlin, but now from a window at the headquarters a piece of the Berlin Wall can be seen, brought from the banks of the Spree.

Alas, many questions still have to be resolved with NATO. Chief among them, as is well known, is the bloc's eastward expansion and its possible incorporation of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic republics. At the talks in Moscow Chancellor Helmut Kohl adopted a position that was flexible on the one hand, adamant on the other.

Our viewpoint is this: In the event that NATO's boundaries come substantially closer to Russia's borders and NATO bases appear on the territory of what were until recently the "fraternal" republics, then logic dictates that the entire balance and distribution of military forces in Europe will change, and certain agreements — on air defense, for instance — will lose their meaning (the flight time of missiles will be reduced substantially). Russia will be forced to adopt countermeasures, up to and including the creation of some kind of new Eastern bloc.

In Moscow, Helmut Kohl reiterated his position: Whether or not to join NATO is a personal matter for each individual sovereign country. The bloc is not directed against anyone, it has a purely defensive function. As for Russia, the chancellor believes that the military-political cooperation that has begun successfully in former Yugoslavia should be turned into a "special relationship between NATO and Moscow which could form the nucleus of the future security architecture in Europe."

In the West, there is no single opinion on this point. Some people say that the wild beast in the East must not be awoken; by the wild beast they mean, naturally, the Russian bear. They say: New dividing trenches will appear in Europe, and then, in no time at all, the needle on the political barometer will fall to "getting colder." Furthermore, moving NATO's eastern borders will exacerbate the situation for the already besieged Russian democrats.

We have elections soon. The wise Chancellor Kohl undoubtedly grasps the delicacy of the situation in which "his good friend Boris" has been placed in connection with NATO. If the West is adamant, then Yeltsin will lose votes. Kohl's solution is worthy of Solomon — no discussion of admitting new members to the bloc before the elections; after the elections, we shall see. With that, he left Moscow.

At Kohl's meetings with Yeltsin and other Moscow politicians there was much talk of economic cooperation. For Russia, Germany is the number one trade and economic partner. Last year our trade turnover totaled 24 billion German marks, the volume of German investments in Russia reached half a billion marks, and two thousand joint enterprises are in operation in our country. Nonetheless this cooperation does not correspond fully to the economic potential of Russia and Germany.

The Russian president emphasized this at his meeting with the chancellor. Why is it? Journalists put that same question to Kohl. They knew, of course, what Kohl's reply would be: the crime that permeates every pore of Russian society, the clumsy tax system, insufficiently developed framework conditions for foreign capital. Then there are, first, the misgivings that have arisen among business people after the Communists' victory in the Duma elections, and, second, the uncertain future, six months before the presidential elections in a country where people have not acquired the habit of repaying debts.

It was clear from Kohl's remarks that it will be possible to come back to the question of expanding economic cooperation nearer to the fall, when the fog of political uncertainty is dispersed from Russia's boundless spaces.

Observers following Kohl's trip also pointed out that in his three-day visit, out of all the Russian presidential candidates, he met only with Yeltsin. At the press conference cautious inquiries were made about this fact, and the chancellor replied diplomatically that he had only planned to meet with the present head of Russia, and anyway time was short. Meanwhile the conclusion was drawn that the chancellor had sided unequivocally with "Germany's tried and tested friend, who has assured us that he will not deviate by a single centimeter from the path of market reforms." (The chancellor was asked whether he would cooperate with Gennadiy Zyuganov in the event of his being elected president. Big problems would arise with Zyuganov, the chancellor replied.)

And one last point. To a large extent, relations between Russia and Germany make the political weather in Europe. Helmut Kohl's visit showed that Germany is still a reliable partner of our country, which is living through one of the most dramatic periods in its history. Understanding the situation and looking ahead, Kohl warns the Western allies that you cannot treat Russia the way a rich uncle treats a poor relation. Russia is a great and strong country. Speaking of Russia's admission to the Council of Europe, he said: "...I know one thing for sure: Unless we offer Russia help, unless we extend a hand to it and say 'Welcome!', then everything really will go haywire." Helmut really is our good friend.

Russia: Yeltsin Orders on Demarcation of Russo-Chinese Border

LD2202103796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1012 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, February 22 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin has signed an order on steps to complete the demarcation of the eastern part of the Russo-Chinese state border.

The Presidential Press Service reported today that Yeltsin has ordered the Russian delegation on the Joint Russo-Chinese Demarcation Commission to complete all the work on the eastern sector of the Russo-Chinese state border in strict accordance with the Soviet-Chinese Agreement on the eastern part of the state border between the two countries, signed on May 16, 1991, without any serious deviations from the fixed timelimits.

The President ordered the Administration Heads of the Maritime and Khabarovsk Territories, the Jewish Autonomous Region, and the Amur and Chita Regions to render all-out assistance to the federal executive authorities and the Russian delegation in their effort to complete the demarcation, to conduct explanatory work among the local population concerning the need and perspectives of the demarcation.

Russia: Moscow Paper Views 'Yuzhmash' Spy Story

MM2202091296 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 96 p 6

[Article by Yanina Sokolovskaya: "No Need To Focus Search for Chinese Spies Away From Dnipropetrovsk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — The venue for the meeting with the spy was the "Yuzhmash" Plant in Dnipropetrovsk. Foreign intelligence officers have long been sought here by both professional operatives and by journalists. The Ukrainian press features periodical reports about Western station chiefs being caught in the city. It was no accident that the focus for this spy- mania has been "Yuzhmash" — the top-secret "Yuzhnoye" Design Bureau, which works on original new missile developments, operates at the plant (the flagship of the Ukrainian defense industry and previously headed by President Kuchma). In order to protect these developments from interested foreigners, the enterprise has special security arrangements monitored by the special services.

Anyone who has read any spy fiction knows that when security is this tight it is easier to steal secrets outside rather than inside a plant. For instance, from people who have recently been dismissed from the enterprise. Xu Huaeng, Ma Guobao, and Wen Miaoshen, specialists from the Shanghai Institute of Power Generation Machine Building, who had visited "Yuzhmash" as part of a delegation to "carry out cooperation programs," used this ruse successfully. It took them a matter of days to obtain documents on engine developments for ICBM's.

Clearly, a person who had formerly worked at the "Yuzhnoye" Design Bureau and was able to provide the necessary documents found the Chinese comrades himself. Ukrainian Security Service documents state that he had long "nurtured the intention of selling to a foreign power information and services relating to the development of space rocket technologies with military applications." This "nurturing" process was probably pretty noticeable — the Ukrainian Security Service took an interest in this unreliable citizen. When the security men noticed that the Chinese were spending their spare time not in sightseeing but in meetings with the suspect comrade and other former plant workers, they started monitoring the delegation closely.

"The operational information was clearly worrying," Slavomir Ivanov, deputy chief of the Dnipropetrovsk Ukrainian Security Service Oblast Administration, told me.

The Chinese achieved their aim — "during these meetings an unsanctioned transfer to the foreigners of verbal and written information on a number of 'Yuzhnoye' Design Bureau developments took place," Andriy Khomych, acting head of the Ukrainian Security Service and the man personally in charge of the counterespionage operation, noted.

Khomych reported the affairs in Dnipropetrovsk to the country's president, the Foreign Ministry stated. Meanwhile the local authorities instituted criminal proceedings, and asked for and obtained leave from the oblast prosecutor to search the Chinese guests' hotel rooms.

A lot of interesting and "important material for the investigation," confirming the agents' worst suspicions were found in the rooms occupied by the Shanghainese, who had been staying in the best hotel in Dnipropetrovsk. The head of the Dnipropetrovsk Ukrainian Security Service Administration, having consulted his bosses in

Kiev, decided that the missile developments found on the Chinese would be confiscated, and that they would be expelled from the country forthwith and banned from returning for five years.

An international scandal started blowing up. The PRC Embassy immediately stated that "none of the PRC citizens' activities during their stay in Ukraine went beyond the framework envisaged by the relevant agreements." The Ukrainian Security Service insisted that the three Chinese citizens had "violated the Missile Technology Control Regime." The embassy demanded that the confiscated material be returned as quickly as possible to the Shanghainese specialists, and hinted that the resolution of this matter could affect "cooperation between China and Ukraine."

The Ukrainian Security Service had to give in — the day after the search the PRC citizens quietly left for home — admittedly, without the confiscated missile documents.

That was not the end of the episode of the Chinese adventures in Ukraine. A few days after the scandal Volodymyr Horbulyn, secretary of the Ukrainian National Security Council, addressed journalists and announced that Andriy Khomych had been dismissed, since representatives of the Ukrainian Security Service under his command had provoked an "international incident, forgetting that they are not the final authority in Ukraine — there is the political leadership of the state, and it is up to the leadership to make the decisions." Following Khomych, a presidential edict dismissed Lieutenant General V. Slobodenyuk, chief of the Dnipropetrovsk Ukrainian Security Service Oblast Administration. Many of the law-enforcement officers who were involved in the "Chinese affair" are said to have been reprimanded. Even statements from Andriy Khomych that under Ukrainian law the Ukrainian Security Service does not have to coordinate its decisions to expel foreigners from the country with the state authorities proved to be no help.

The investigation against the "private individuals" who passed on the secret Ukrainian developments is continuing. Charges have been brought under the article specifying liability for illegally taking raw materials, other materials, weapons development equipment, or military and specialized technology out of the country — they face long sentences.

"Yuzhmash" is expecting foreign guests again. I was told by Volodymyr Romanyukha, chief of the enterprise's international relations department, that the plant is currently working actively with firms and scientific research institutes in Russia, Poland, Cuba, Germany, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Japan, and the United States. Who knows where the next "spy fervor" will come from.

Russia: Bolshakov Discusses Caspian Sea With Iran's Va'ezi

LD2102182196 Tehran IRNA in English 1730 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb. 21, IRNA — Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Aleksey Bolshakov here on Wednesday emphasized the need for formation of the co-operation council of the Caspian nations.

In a meeting with the visiting Iranian deputy foreign minister, Mahmoud Va'ezi, Bolshakov said the organization of the Caspian Sea littoral states would serve to promote cooperation and coordination among the governments of the region.

The two officials exchanged views on the areas of cooperation between the two countries especially in the Caspian Sea.

Bolshakov said the common resources in the Caspian Sea and the complication arising from the rise of the level of the Caspian Sea makes it necessary that the littoral states form such a co-operation council which is beneficial to all those nations.

Va'ezi said the process of development of Tehran-Moscow relations is positive and added that formation of such an organization could serve to resolve problems among the Caspian states.

Va'ezi said in the meantime drawing up the legal status of the Caspian Sea with participation of five littoral states should be placed among the top priorities in this respect.

The two officials also studied the possibility of the creation of facilities for transportation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russian Federation.

Russia: Moscow, Belgrade Prepared To Fully Restore Trade Ties

LD2102164596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1514 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 21 (Interfax) — Moscow and Belgrade intend to resume their trade relations shortly at the level that existed before international sanctions were imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Viktor Sokol, an expert in the Europe and North America Department of the Russian Foreign Economic Relations Ministry, told Interfax Wednesday [21 February].

Sokol recalled that before the disintegration of the former USSR and the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (FSRY) the trade between the two countries totaled $7 billion a year, of which modern Serbia and Montenegro (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) accounted for nearly $3 billion.

Once the sanctions imposed in 1992 are lifted (this is a realistic proposition following the Dayton accords), Moscow and Belgrade will go ahead with what they agreed on in 1994-95, in particular, start trade in a wide variety of goods. In particular, Yugoslavia needs Russian fuels, power equipment and certain engineering and chemical products while Russia is prepared to purchase Yugoslav clothing, footwear and other light industry products, foodstuffs and technological equipment.

At a later stage, Sokol said, Moscow and Belgrade will launch numerous joint projects estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars, such as the construction of gas pipelines in Yugoslavia and a Budapest, Hungary - Novi Sad, northern Serbia oil pipeline.

Sokol admitted that restoring the pre-sanction level of trade between the two countries would not be easy because, as he put it, the economic sanctions have bled Yugoslavia white materially and morally. The direct and indirect damage done by the sanctions was estimated at $35 billion back at the end of 1994.

Russia as the successor of the USSR owes the former FSRY about $2 billion in clearing debt. As soon as the former Yugoslav republics agree among themselves what amount is due each of them, Russia is prepared to pay the debt with supplies of fuel and machinery.

Russia: Yekaterinburg Mafia Said Controlling Belgian Firm

MM2102141996 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Sorokin under "Criminal Zone" rubric: "'Manna' From a Criminal Heaven"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels — Belgium is becoming one of the major international centers for laundering "dirty" money — this conclusion can be drawn on familiarizing yourself with the conclusions of the second report by the Group for Processing Financial Information. This was set up in December 1993 to gather and check information on financial intrigues.

The group's second report covers the period from 1 July 1994 through 30 June 1995. The figures cited in it attest that 42 billion Belgian francs [Fr] of suspect origin were brought to light in Belgium in the space of less than two years. In the opinion of specialists, however, even this colossal sum represents merely the tip of the iceberg. Well-informed sources maintain that at least Fr450 billion (approximately $15 billion) is laundered every year in Belgium, and between $500 billion and $1 trillion in the world.

Whereas previously such a phenomenon was observed mainly in the financial sphere, money laundering operations have now spread also to trade in real estate and to attorney and notary practice. The statistics accumulated by the Group for Processing Financial Information attest that 70 percent of all "dirty" money has its origin in circles connected with the drugs trade, while other kinds of organized crime account for the rest.

The list drawn up by the group includes 12,000 people suspected of involvement in intrigues.

Citizens from the Netherlands, Belgium, Morocco, and Germany mainly figure in the files forwarded to investigative organs by the Group for Processing Financial Information. But this is in official documents, so to speak. The press very frequently speaks of the Russian mafia's money. A recent example of this is provided by an article in the magazine LE VIF/L'EXPRESS. It claims that since 1992 one of Yekaterinburg's leading criminal groupings has penetrated Belgium and established control over the "Ural Trade" import-export company.

An investigation into "Ural Trade's" activities is continuing, and so the details of this case are still to be learned.

Russia: Directive on Space Launch Technology Cooperation With U.S.

MM2202093696 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 4

[Russian Federation Government Directive No. 159 under the general heading "Special Mission: Help the Americans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. The proposal of the Russian Space Agency and Russian Defense Ministry, coordinated with the relevant federal executive organs, on the participation of the Transport Machine Building Design Bureau (Moscow) in the work of developing (modernizing) launch sites for U.S. space rockets and on its supply to U.S. design bureaus of land-based technological equipment for the preparation and implementation of commercial U.S. space launches is to be adopted.

2. The Russian Space Agency and the Transport Machine Building Design Bureau are to hold talks with U.S. space companies guided by the requirements of existing legislation on the procedure for monitoring the export from the Russian Federation of equipment, materials, and technologies used in the development of rocket equipment.

After an accord has been reached the Transport Machine Building Design Bureau, in coordination with the Russian Federal Service for Currency and Export Controls, is to sign the corresponding contract documents, identify subcontracting enterprises, and carry out the work envisaged by the contract commitments.

3. The Russian Defense Ministry, under contract with the Transport Machine Building Design Bureau, is to monitor and attend upon [soprovozhdeniye] the work envisaged by this directive.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government.

Political Issues

Russia: Yeltsin: Chubays To Work on Election Campaign Team

LD2102131296 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1217 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (ITAR-TASS) — "Anatoliy Chubays will work in my election campaign team" said Boris Yeltsin today at a meeting with media leaders. He said that he had met Chubays today to work out the tactics of the election campaign and to discuss the problems of new Russian business. "I respect him highly, he is a very decent person," said the president.

Touching upon the firing of Oleg Poptsov from the post of chairman of the All-Russia State TV and Radio Company [VGTRK], Yeltsin noted that appointments to that post are a prerogative of the president. It in no way follows, said the president, that the staff change that has taken place meant a change in his stand. Yeltsin stressed that he remains a supporter of a free press. The head of state added that he had always supported Oleg Poptsov, but explained that the VGTRK chairman "had been making mistakes." The president believed that changing the leadership would allow to strengthen the second TV channel, in a purely professional sense as well.

Addressing the journalists, Yeltsin stressed that their work and an objective coverage of the election campaign is of special importance at this period of time which is so important for Russia. He also confirmed that he remained the constitutional guarantor of freedom of speech and the safety of journalists, and invited them to appeal to the president in every case where there were threats or persecution.

Russia: Yegorov Hails Yeltsin's Achievements

MM2002142896 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 20 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Nikolay Yegorov, chief of the Russian Federation Presidential Staff: "Today the Ideology of Power Is Made Not by the Kremlin, But by the People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We can confidently state that Russia has passed worthily through the most difficult period of reforms and is entering a new historical stage. In summing up the results of the development of Russian statehood in the five years of B.N. Yeltsin's presidency, it is necessary to stress that the most significant result has been the preservation of the unity and integrity of the Russian Federation. It is thanks to vigorous activity by the head of state and organs of executive power that it has been possible to protect the state organism from stagnation and disintegration and to lay the foundations of a renewed Russian state. The process of developing federal relations is proceeding not without difficulties, but successfully on the whole. The mechanisms, forms, and methods whereby the president, government, and other components of the executive hierarchy exercise their powers are being constantly improved.

The adoption of the new Russian Constitution in December 1993 on the initiative and with the active participation of the president was indeed a most important event in the life of Russian society. For the first time in the country's history, essentially revolutionary transformations were commenced without civil war, terror, and violence, through the Russians' free expression of their will.

The institutions and organs of power stipulated in the new Constitution have been created. In December 1993 free elections were held to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly — the first supreme organ of legislative power in the 90-year history of Russian parliamentarianism to have a real influence on the course of processes in vitally important spheres of society's life.

In two years of work the State Duma and the Federation Council have adopted, and the president has signed, more than 300 federal laws, including the federal constitutional laws "On the Russian Federation Constitutional Court," "On Courts of Arbitration in the Russian Federation," and "On the Referendum." Also adopted were the Civil Code, which is described as the economic constitution, and laws on elections of State Duma deputies and the president, on the formation of the Federation Council, on guarantees of citizens' electoral rights, and a number of others that form the legislative basis for the continuation, deepening, and improvement of the transformations of Russian society.

The 1995 parliamentary elections to the second State Duma and the formation of the new Federation Council demonstrated the authorities' ability and will to observe the Constitution, which has become the country's real Fundamental Law in the time that has elapsed.

The Constitutional Court has commenced work. As a result the judicial authority in Russia is fully functioning, as envisaged by the country's Constitution.

A law has been adopted and real work has begun on building the foundation of true people's power — local self-government.

Treaties have been signed on the demarcation of powers between the federal center and the authorities in the Russian Federation components. Whereas in the initial stage these treaties were signed with the leadership of republics, Russia's krays and oblasts have now also joined in this process.

Collaboration among all branches of power at the federal and regional levels is already producing positive results, in particular in the resolution of the most acute socioeconomic problems.

All the aforesaid testifies to the establishment of the principle of separation of powers as a fundamental principle in the country's political practice.

The successful course of reforms in the domestic political sphere is indirectly recognized by the president's most intransigent opponents: The neo-communist forces, recognizing the impossibility of changing the direction of the reforms for their own revanchist purposes, have been forced to proclaim a course of adopting a new Constitution reviving the system of soviets and outlawing the principle of separation of powers.

Worldwide experience shows and confirms that wherever the principle of separation of powers is flouted, dictatorship and tyranny prevail and social decline, economic degeneration, and deterioration in living conditions are inevitable.

History cannot show a single example of a totalitarian system ensuring stable prosperity, the flourishing of the individual and society, or the management of power in the people's interests.

There are highly dynamic processes in the sphere of the creation of the institutions and structures of a civil society. This is graphically demonstrated by the following two figures: 259 parties and public organizations had the right to participate in the second parliamentary election; 43 electoral associations and blocs received the necessary support from Russians to participate in the elections (let me remind you that there were only 13 participants in the first parliamentary election). The formation of a civil society is particularly important for our homeland, given that a number of influential parties and politicians that are active in the political arena are dictatorial in terms of their genesis.

That is why the executive must regard the activity of parties and sociopolitical organizations as the most effective instrument for preventing the usurpation of power by a totalitarian force.

In the past five years a legal and institutional base has been created to ensure the observance and defense of human and civil rights and freedoms. At present the priority avenues in the state's activity are to provide material support for the citizen's social rights and freedoms, and also to boost the effectiveness of the work of executive organs, on which the maintenance of the rule of law, order, and Russians' personal safety depends.

Thus today we are no longer facing questions of the survival of the country and the nation; the task on the agenda is to ensure stabilization and the progressive development of processes in all spheres of the life of society and the state.

History has willed that the second presidential election should take place at a complex transitional stage, when the prerequisites have been created for a normalization of the situation in Russian society but many Russians have lost faith in the authorities' ability to curb negative trends in the sphere of social protection of the population and the timely payment of wages, pensions, allowances, and grants and to impose proper public order.

We must admit that despite a number of objective causes of this state of affairs, a significant share of the responsibility rests with the executive branch of power. Thus, in a situation in which virtually all the leading political parties are engaging widely in antipresidential and antigovernmental criticism, the organs of executive power have chosen defensive tactics, while even the undisputed and obvious achievements of the past five years recede into the background.

It appears that one reason for this is connected with the underestimation, by workers in the executive power, of the role and significance of daily, painstaking work with the population through the press, the electronic mass media, public organizations, and so forth. The lack, during the transitional period, of campaigning and propaganda work with the aim of explaining to Russians the peculiar characteristics of the present situation and the meaning of presidential edicts, government decrees, and the steps taken by the executive generally, has led to the widespread view of the ineffectiveness and even paralysis of the executive power.

Along with the need to expand and improve the practice of collaboration with the population, the executive organs face the task of boosting the effectiveness of their own activity. There is an urgent need to strengthen the presidential hierarchy, put in good order the activity of the structures of organs of administration, and boost the prestige of the state service and attract skilled cadres into it. Furthermore, the struggle against corruption, bureaucracy, and slack labor and performance discipline remain serious problems.

In the context of the developing presidential election campaign, we are bound to look at the main lessons of 1995.

In the parliamentary elections, 32 percent of voters voted for the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] and other pro-communist associations. A further 15 percent of votes were given to various national radicals. In total, that makes 47 percent of voters. The vote was the same at the first elections to the State Duma in 1993. That is to say, **even with a significant increase in turnout, the proportion of votes against the reforms, on the one hand, and votes cast for reformist and centrist forces, on the other hand, remains the same.** The problem lies elsewhere. The democrats and centrists were terribly fragmented and disunited. As a result the majority of votes cast by voters with democratic and centrist inclinations were wasted; these voters are not represented in the State Duma.

Whereas for pro-communist and national radical forces the wasted votes amounted to less than one-third, for the "democrats" and centrists the figure was between half and two-thirds. That is the main lesson of the last elections. **It is necessary to rally the forces of all citizens who are in favor of civil peace, constitutional order, and progressive development for Russia.**

On the eve of the presidential elections, the executive power centrally and in the regions must take into account and rectify the mistakes made in the State Duma elections. The electoral experience of the NDR ["Russia Is Our Home"] can hardly be deemed a success. It should be recalled that in 1993 12 million votes were cast for the reformist parties "Russia's Choice" and PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord]. The NDR association collected only 7 million votes in the last election. Thus, the NDR was unable to realize its electoral potential. These facts must be taken into account by all of us in our future work.

Let me come back to the start of our discussion and remind you that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, guided by the considerations which he voiced in Yekaterinburg, has unequivocally confirmed his intention to run for a second term as Russian president. I also wish to put forward a few considerations concerning the necessity and expediency of this step.

First, Boris Yeltsin is a politician and person of the center. All our presidential candidates are people who reflect their parties' interests. For a long time the president has been reproached for not creating his own party and actively urged to take that step. But Boris Yeltsin has remained above parties. Now too, he is above the fray and has the opportunity to assess everything that is happening in the country not through party eyes, but through the eyes of a nationwide leader and guide of the country. It must be remembered that only 1 million Russians belong to parties, while there are 150 million altogether. So the president must take into account the majority opinion, not party interests. Such are the realities of life.

Second. Before Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, real power was always in the hands of a small ruling elite. While having the opportunity to preserve this tempting idea of omnipotence, he took a very important and honorable step. In democratic society today, the **ideology** is made not by the Kremlin, but by the people, as it should be in a rule-of-law state. The Federal Assembly adopts laws, the courts make rulings, and the press has the opportunity to give its own independent assessment of everything that happens in the country. **Finances** are managed not only by the government, but also by private capital. **Power** really is divided up, not only in the Constitution but in daily life.

Thus, the only person who can run the country in these conditions is a person who belongs to the people, not to a party, and that is an integral part of Boris Nikolayevich's personality both as a man and as a statesman. B.N. Yeltsin was the first to erect a barrier in the path of the concentration of power in one pair of hands by implementing substantial reforms within the power structure itself.

Any attempt once again to unite in one pair of hands all the power, ideology, and finances will lead our country to ruin and inevitable upheavals. Is that what our people want today?

Third, Boris Yeltsin has demonstrated in practice that he will not crush democracy. We can and should doubt every presidential candidate, but not Boris Yeltsin. Why not? Because he is prepared to change ministers at the opposition's request; he is sometimes laughed at and sometimes mocked for this, but it is a guarantee that a president who is above parties is capable of taking into account the opinion of the party that won victory in the elections to the legislative assembly.

Fourth, Boris Yeltsin is a man of rigorous moral demands. He has never shifted the blame onto others. You remember the president's words about the difficult but necessary decision that he made in signing the Belovezhskaya Forest agreements, staking his own political career and all his prestige for the sake of saving Russia from inevitable collapse.

Fifth, for the first time, the idea of real national pride is linked with the name of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. He says to the whole Western world, so to speak: We do not live, think, and manage our affairs the same way you do, but we are not the same as you! Respect us as we are!

And, **last**, if people decide to elect a communist president they will be voting for one-party thinking in the country. A communist as head of the Duma plus a communist as president — there you have a one-party system in our country. The consequences of a one-party system in Russia are common knowledge. Which of us does not remember that?

Russia: Democrats Urged Not To Nominate Chernomyrdin

964F1090B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Feb 96 p 2

[ITAR-TASS political observer Tamara Nikolayevna Zamyatina report: "Viktor Chernomyrdin Could Be Strangled in the Embrace: Democrats Should Look After the Premier"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sponsors of the nomination of Viktor Chernomyrdin as a candidate for president of Russia are putting the prime minister in a difficult position. Not only throughout 1995 but in the new year also Viktor Chernomyrdin has continually had to repeat statements to the effect that he has no intention of running for the office of leader of the state.

On Thursday, before leaving for the United States, the prime minister confirmed once again in an interview with ITAR-TASS that he was not playing election games and had not given his consent to the action committees in St. Petersburg and Orenburg which had nominated him for the presidency.

On the one hand, as a man of his word, Viktor Chernomyrdin is confirming the invariability of his position. On the other, he cannot fail to understand that the polls constantly appearing in the press predicting for Chernomyrdin the solid support of the electorate at the elections for president of Russia cannot fail to evoke feelings of envy in the structures that regard the premier's growing authority with suspicion. Remarks concerning "imaginary peacemakers," who after the freeing of the hostages in Budennovsk in June 1995 "can sleep easy at night," have already been heard from these structures. Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, who in an ORT television program was gently advised not to lay claim to federal office (before the year 2000, at least), had earlier received a warning from the special services to "butt out."

The contrast between the relatively bloodless operation in Budennovsk and the recent bloody events in the Dagestani village of Pervomayskoye prompted Boris Yeltsin to issue a statement last week to the effect that "the same gangsters we let out of Budennovsk had come to Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye." This statement could have been a warning to the action committees that are nominating Viktor Chernomyrdin as presidential candidate. If the future fortunes of Viktor Chernomyrdin are not a matter of indifference to the democratic community, he should be protected in the post of chairman of the government. The specifics of the present political situation in Russia are such that an ardent embrace could simply strangle one is being hugged against his wishes.

Russia: Yavlinskiy Ready To Join Non-Communist Coalition

LD2102225896 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 2200 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader of the Yabloko democratic reform movement, has confirmed his readiness to create a broad coalition with non-communist forces at the Russian presidential elections on 16 June.

Meanwhile, Boris Fedorov, leader of the Forward Russia movement, has said that, given the democrats' current lack of unity, the wisest thing would be to support Boris Yeltsin at the presidential elections. He said that none of the democratic leaders, including Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, stand any chance of getting through to the second round.

Russia: Zyuganov Interviewed on Presidential Election

LD1602225396 Moscow NTV in Russian 1635 GMT 16 Feb 96

[Studio interview with Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, by Yevgeniy Kiselev, in the "Hero of the Day" program — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kiselev] Here is the Hero of the Day program on the air. I am Yevgeniy Kiselev, good evening. The fight for the Russian presidential post has reached a qualitatively new stage. Two main candidates for the presidency yesterday declared officially that they were officially launching their election campaigns. The president said in Sverdlovsk [Yekaterinburg] that he would stand for reelection, and simultaneously a conference of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] held in Moscow officially nominated Gennadiy Zyuganov as its candidate for the presidency.

Keeping our promise of yesterday, here is Gennadiy Zyuganov live in the studio of the Hero of the Day program. Gennadiy Andreyevich, good evening. Thank you for having found time to come here. I would like to ask you something right now. Many have noticed that your nomination as the CPRF candidate for the presidency was announced virtually the same minute as the president announced his decision in Yekaterinburg-Sverdlovsk. Is that a coincidence or did you arrange that beforehand?

[Zyuganov] We discussed the issue at a plenum in early January, when we examined the outcome of the December elections. It was there that we fixed 15 February as the date of a party conference. So I have the impression that Boris Nikolayevich timed his visit to Sverdlovsk and the announcement of his decision to coincide with our party conference. He seems to take us into consideration.

[Kiselev] You see, I don't mean the date — the date of 15 February. I mean the time. You see, the agencies — we receive their information on computers, and the time of an item is shown there — the time coincided minute by minute. I think, the time was 1505 when we received the news about your appointment and Boris Nikolayevich's statement.

[Zyuganov] No, that was not our goal. The conference was very well organized. There were many guests, and the interest [in the conference] was huge. And a lot of work had been done before the conference.

[Kiselev] So, none of you was linked to Sverdlovsk, no one was telling you what was going on there...

[Zyuganov, interrupting]...We had a rough idea of what would happen in Sverdlovsk. Therefore we worked calmly. To be honest, a month before the conference a question was raised in open discussions at party meetings attended by our allies: Who is to be nominated? The meetings discussed many nominations: me, Tuleyev, Viktor Ilyukhin, and Svetlana Goryacheva. And about 95 percent of our organizations favored the chairman of the party. It was announced officially yesterday. Many of our allies supported the decision. The decision has been made.

[Kiselev] So the decision has been made. Are you sure that — as many believe — it will be Yeltsin you will have to compete with in the second round of the election? For instance, you told journalists something different yesterday before the beginning of the conference. You said Yeltsin was a weak rival.

[Zyuganov] When I said weak I meant he has failed to keep any of the promises he gave the voters last time. I watched a CNN full relay of his address very carefully yesterday. I expected him to report on his achievements in the past five years, on problems that have emerged, and on our prospects. But our 70-year history was discussed there once again, not his real work. There were promises again. A man who started war in Chechnya and failed to keep his promises can hardly count on a success in the elections.

On the other hand, we are perfectly aware of the fact that he has real power, that they have large funds and that the media will be working for him. The fate of Viktor Poptsov is a vivid demonstration of that. We are aware of their possibilities. At the same time, we do realize that any person, when he goes out, can see that almost all lower floors in the buildings have bars on their windows, he realizes that 1,000 rubles is not enough even to pay a bus fare and that an absolute majority have lost not only their social guarantees, but also their jobs. So this person will think twice before voting for someone who, strictly speaking, is responsible for all that.

[Kiselev] Well, does that mean that, in principle, you agree that most likely you will have to contend against Boris Yeltsin, above all, and probably he will be your opponent in the second round when the decisive contest begins?

[Zyuganov] The struggle is really going on between two forces: One is what I call the party of power. We contended against it in December. The other is the party of responsible opposition. We see it as our main task to form a wide bloc of popular patriotic forces that will include those who realize that this policy has gone bust and that a fundamentally new policy is needed. Forming such a bloc is the main condition for candidate nomination. We...

[Kiselev, interrupting] Excuse me, Gennadiy Andreyevich, I asked you about something else, perhaps I did not make it clear in my question: Still, do you expect, relying on this bloc you were talking about, that you will have to fight for the presidential chair with Yeltsin or with someone else?

[Zyuganov] I still do not rule out that, instead of Yeltsin, another candidate may appear from the party of power at the last minute.

[Kiselev] Who, for example?

[Zyuganov] There are preconditions for that. For example, an action group to nominate Viktor Chernomyrdin has been set up. Another group has appeared to nominate Boris Nemtsov, governor of Nizhniy Novgorod. So the party of power will probably have to think again and weigh everything, even more so after they saw for themselves what was happening yesterday.

There might be even a third candidate. But real competition will be between the party of power and the party of responsible opposition.

[Kiselev] Talking about the representatives of the party of power, who is a more convenient and who is an inconvenient opponent for you? Will it be more convenient for you if the current president stood against you from the party of power, or will it be a new figure, Chernomyrdin, Nemtsov, or somebody else?

[Zyuganov] It is up to the party of power to decide.

[Kiselev] How can they decide for you?

[Zyuganov] No, I mean they should decide whom to nominate as their candidate. As for our point of view, anyone who in real honesty became mixed up with this policy, with this power, and this practice has no real chance, providing that the elections are held honestly and according to the rules, providing that, on the basis of the law, various forces are given an opportunity to be on air and providing that votes are counted honestly.

[Kiselev] As far as Boris Nemtsov is concerned, one can argue with you here. Recently, during the December elections he was reelected as governor by a popular vote in his region. He has not compromised himself by anything. And you will probably agree that things are going much better in his region than...

[Zyuganov, interrupting] Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, you are a professional and you know that Nemtsov is a candidate who has only local impact. No matter how hard you try to portray him in the framework of the whole of Russia, in many regions he is very little known. In this respect, to form the image of a serious and solid politician capable of resolving the problems facing Russia and the one who knows these problems, is a very difficult task. I have been in politics for a long time now and have crossed the country from the Pacific to the Baltics more than once. And I can see a difference between, for example, the situation in the Kuzbass where miners are on hunger strike and in the Northern fleet where the situation is also very dramatic at present, in Chechnya or, for example, the problems of the eastern Siberia.

Therefore, in order to lay claims to this role, one must see and experience everything personally. And people will feel it as soon as he enters the all-Russian arena and begins discussing problems as applied to any particular region or industry.

[Kiselev] According to opinion polls — I am perfectly aware that one can look at their results differently but, as far as you are concerned, in my opinion, they are not far from the truth. They show that you were leading during the Duma election campaign and continue to show that you are ahead of other candidates in the presidential campaign. Anyway, apart from you, there is Yeltsin and three other candidates who have a more or less significant percentage of votes: [Grigoriy] Yavlinskiy [leader of the Yabloko movement], General [Aleksandr] Lebed [one of the leaders of the Congress of Russian Communities], and [Vladimir] Zhirinovskiy [leader of Liberal Democratic Party of Russia]. What can you say about them? What do you think about Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy as your opponent in the presidential elections?

[Zyuganov] I think that Russia will not accept his radicalism. Russia is tired of confrontation, of the banging of fists and the roar of guns. Russia is tired of all that. Therefore, people will have a very weighted approach. It seems to me that he has already reached his ceiling and he is unlikely to gain more votes in the presidential elections.

[Kiselev] What about General Lebed?

[Zyuganov] I would not want to give characteristics to everyone. We will hold consultations with Aleksandr Ivanovich [Lebed]. We have an interesting idea and I think it will be listened to.

[Kiselev] Do you not rule out that you can form an union of some sort or a bloc with him, that you will persuade him to take the side of the Communist Party?

[Zyuganov] It is not only the party that we are talking about here. It is not that we do not rule out, we see it as our main task to form a wide public state council which will include representatives of various movements. This council can consider all the programs. There could even be a government of popular trust. This council can work out the election strategy and implement its program based on a wide and solid coalition. We are ready to propose that such a coalition should be formed. The party conference yesterday adopted a special appeal. Last week, preliminary consultations were held with a very wide spectrum of forces. These consultations were held behind closed doors.

[Kiselev] Did Lebed also take part in them?

[Zyuganov] We had very serious preliminary talks with Lebed. They will continue in the very near future.

[Kiselev] Well, what about Yavlinskiy, to follow the scenario — since I mentioned him as well? What can you say about him and his chances, or about a possible coalition with him in one form or another?

[Zyuganov] Lately, we have been working with him very closely. In the Duma, we discussed laws that are required. Their parliamentary faction has people who are well prepared and sensible.

Yavlinskiy has a difficult dilemma at present. On the one hand, he must look back at this government and the power he was supporting until recently. On the other hand, he can see that the government's and

Zhirinovskiy's parliamentary factions are voting like a single party in the Duma at present. It seems that such a prospect does not quite suit him. Therefore, we will continue a dialogue with him and we will see what proposals they make in the near future.

[Kiselev] Don't you think that by speaking of Mr. Yavlinskiy in a very complimentary way you are seriously compromising him in the eyes of his electorate?

[Zyuganov] [laughs] I don't think so. I am not talking about him in a complimentary way. Recently we held discussions with him in Davos — you were there and could see it yourself. On a whole number of issues, including NATO and others, our positions do not coincide. And you know that. On the other hand, there are real liberal democrats who understand what democracy is and who are ready for a dialogue.

[Kiselev] You don't mean Zhirinovskiy-type liberal democrats?

[Zyuganov] I mean normal liberal democrats.

[Kiselev] I just want to clarify it so that we are understood correctly.

[Zyuganov] Zhirinovskiy's is just an one-man party.

[Kiselev] You know I mean certain people in our society have a peculiar perception. For example, if Zyuganov does not use the most abusive language talking about Yavlinskiy, that is very bad and that is regarded as a hidden compliment.

[Zyuganov] Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, the mood has been changing a lot recently, especially after the elections. People who used to sack me three times in one year now say hello from across the road. So don't rush with your conclusions.

[Kiselev] Is that true?

[Zyuganov] At least, people begin to realize what real political forces and serious teams are, and to recognize them.

[Kiselev] You know, I wanted to ask about the following: Yesterday a statement made by Anatoliy Vasilyevich Lukyanov attracted the attention of many people. He said that shortly before the elections, a potential cabinet of ministers which may be formed if you win, the whole team, will be presented to society. You have already touched on this subject yourself. [Vasiliy] Starodubtsev was named as agricultural minister, [Sergey] Baburin, it was said, is to be responsible for relations with the territories and for inter-ethnic issues. If one were to continue the list, who would occupy the posts of power ministers, for example, or become foreign minister? Could you name some candidates, if only hypothetically?

[Zyuganov] I think this will be the task of the public state council I mentioned earlier. It will have to consider everything very carefully. The council may include some well-known professionals who have realistic programs. The programs, possibilities for their implementation and availability of a team capable of doing that — I think these problems and these issues must be resolved. I think that we must not rush with announcing the team. We must tell everyone who can work well and efficiently, be it in the Far East, Siberia, or the Urals, that the assessment of their work will not depend on whether they have a party membership card in their pockets. If they are good doctors, or can organize communal services or the efficient work of transport — all of them will be supported.

[Kiselev] So you do not rule out, Gennadiy Andreyevich, that your government will have no party affiliation to a certain extent, that it will be a government based not on the ideological principle but a government based on attracting professionals with no party affiliation, especially in the economic sphere: the prime minister, economics and finance ministers, chairman of the Central Bank — the so-called "bourgeois specialists"?

[Zyuganov] This is not a matter of bourgeois specialists. People who hold different views spoke at the party conference yesterday — I liked that very much. But one idea dominated: There must be a nationwide state program; the main task must be to guarantee peace, constructive work and support for everything talented, irrespective of the form of ownership. Public order must be ensured, banditry must be suppressed, and corruption must be combated in a normal way. Everyone must be guided not by expediency but by law. Reliable public and people's control must be provided through people's elects and representatives, be it a deputy or the president. I fully share this point of view. If, again, we are going to be guided by party interests alone, it will be impossible to create a wide coalition and no one can resolve a lot of problems single-handedly.

[Kiselev] Going back to Anatoliy Lukyanov's words which I already quoted, he also mentioned vice-president. He said it was not ruled out that, if you win, you will raise the question of restoring the post of vice-president and that this post will be offered to Aman Tuleyev [ex-chairman of Kemerovo Region Soviet of People's Deputies]. Do you share this point of view?

[Zyuganov] I believe presidential powers must be put under normal legal supervision. There are several forms of supervision. For instance, the president's regular address — not only information, but also a report of the outcome of the work done — is one of them. Such reports should be submitted to representatives of an assembly attended by all heads of administrations, representatives of legislatures and all religions, the government and the security council. But such an assembly should be authorized by the constitution to supervise and assess the president's actions.

[Kiselev] A constitutional assembly. That is to say you are going to change the constitution again...

[Zyuganov, interrupting] It is not a constitutional assembly. This is going without saying. I think that the post of vice president could become the most important tool of supervision. Aman Gumirovich Tuleyev, who is a talented man, one of the people, a very interesting person, who commands deep respect from everyone, is a good possible candidate. I also think a special medical commission should be set up that will be authorized to check up any civil servant. This is a pressing question. We can now see...

[Kiselev, interrupting] Including you?

[Zyuganov] Without fail. Not only me. I stand for the dictatorship of law. I wish everyone to abide by the law and the president to set an example of observing laws. At the same time I would like to introduce the system of recalling those deputies who fail to do their duties. They also should regularly give account of their work to the voters.

[Kiselev] I would like to clarify one matter. To be honest, I cannot clear up this question. There have been many statements. After the [December] elections Gennadiy Seleznev [Duma chairman] spoke in the Itogi program on NTV Moscow television and he said the Communist Party would take part in the presidential election so that in the event of their victory it would start the process of abolishing the institute of presidency. I remember you speaking in Davos. You showed more restraint there. You said the president's powers should be substantially reduced and real powers should be redistributed between the executive and the legislature to the benefit of parliament. And now speaking about the possibility of establishing the institution of vice president you...[changes thought]...if you are talking about a vice president, the president stays, doesn't he? Can you clarify the matter? Are you going to abolish the institution of presidency completely or will we have a president after all?

[Zyuganov] What is the real situation at the moment? All the structures and systems of power have been destroyed. We have one vertical of the executive — a very flimsy one, whose instructions, as a rule, are being implemented rather poorly.

Therefore, our main task is, first, to restrict the president's absolute powers. If you look at all his powers, you will realize that even the most healthy, the most sensible and intelligent person is not able to carry out all these duties. He appoints and sacks everyone and cannot be held responsible for anything.

[Kiselev] Well, the fact that the president's powers are huge is beside the point.

[Zyuganov] Therefore, our task is to restrict and redistribute his powers in favor of a strong government — the executive which will be responsible for the economy. We want to give it such powers which will make it able to normalize the economy and put the criminal situation under control. On the other hand, we want the executive to be supervised by the legislature so that the government gives regular accounts, has a feasible program, and receives everything necessary to implement that program. But at the same time, it should give regular accounts to the legislature on the process of the program's implementation. And at the same time, the role and authority of the legislature should be enhanced by putting it under the voters' supervision. So, this system will make it possible to enhance the status and powers of all those who influence the work of the executive and the legislature and, on the other hand, will make them accountable to the public and ensure public supervision of the voters and of those whom they have elected to their legislative assemblies, Dumas, or administrations.

[Kiselev] Gennadiy Andreyevich, many French presidents, who took part in presidential elections, also wanted to redistribute huge powers enjoyed by the institute of presidency in the Fifth Republic. It is an open secret that our constitution was created in the image of the French constitution. They also wanted to redistribute powers. But Mitterrand, for example, a socialist and your ideological brother in some respects, was in no hurry to keep his election promises. Will this happen to us?

[Zyuganov] Our experts have compared the constitutions of France, the United States, and Russia regarding the president's powers. Our president has double the powers of the French president and four times the powers of the U.S. President. The U.S. President cannot make 2,000 appointments unless they are cleared by the relevant committees of Congress. Our president can appoint and sack everyone without consulting anyone. Well, the French have imposed serious restrictions, too, and the legislature now has enough powers.

[Kiselev] Another question, Gennadiy Andreyevich. The tactics chosen by the president's team and by the president himself seem to be quite transparent. They are in a hurry to deliver things laid down in your program: to pay off wage debts, to index-link people's savings that have been devalued by unfreezing the prices in 1992, to compensate investors for the loss of money due to the bankruptcies of banks and financial pyramids. Let us assume that the government makes an effort, finds the money, goes for inflationary methods — God knows when the newly printed money will affect the economy. In short, assuming that the government delivers these things, which are the most pressing concern for the people at the moment — you will agree with me — if that happens, what are you going to appeal to?

[Zyuganov] We have already been through all of this before. The electorate can remember it all. This is the third time he has changed his coat in the past three years. The same thing happened before the referendum, you may recall.

[Kiselev] But the president won the referendum.

[Zyuganov] I know, but then he did not fulfill anything. The same thing happened again and nothing was fulfilled. They promised everyone two Volga cars for their [privatization] vouchers but they have now forgotten all about that. They promised to pay the peasants. They totally forgot.

But in order to fulfill these obligations, the law is immediately crudely violated. A second purse is created under the president's control, a second budget. If some people bangs their fist somewhere they get paid. He plays the role of beneficent tsar. But, you know, people have been deceived so many times that I do not think this will work in the near future.

On the other hand, while they continue to conduct this economic course, nothing will come of it. Indeed, the only way is to turn on the printing press. But they should be thinking about how to fill up the revenue side of the budget in order to pay everyone on time. Speaking in the Duma two months I said to Chubays: Well, we are adopting this budget but even in January you are not paying anyone. The vote was passed. Our political group did not vote. Already in January the teachers are going hungry, the members of the academy are on strike and even the militiamen are going hungry. Even people with guns are going hungry.

[Kiselev] The president promises that in March he will pay everyone their money. So an important trump card is being taken out of your hands and the president on his charger has eliminated the wage debt.

[Zyuganov] It is not a question of trumps. This whole policy has totally failed. They are obliged to pay up on time and settle accounts.

[Kiselev] Well, from March they start paying on time. And in April, May, and in June they will pay.

[Zyuganov] Until the economy is working normally no one will be paid sensibly. Well, something will be paid, they will get into debt, they will print more money. But this will be purely populism and the citizens will not get any benefit from this.

[Kiselev] Populist promises, especially when they are fulfilled, get politicians into power. Are you not worried that something else...

[Zyuganov interrupts] I am very worried about something quite different. Why is this happening in the first month, after the budget has been confirmed? Why, when pressure is applied somewhere, is money immediately found? Where do they find it and why are they getting involved in places where they should not be doing so? And a whole range of other things.

I am worried that the Duma adopted a decision on minimum wages and minimum benefits but this decision was blocked. It adopted a decision on combating corruption and banditry. It was blocked and his emasculated decree is now in preparation. Why does the president not fulfill elementary laws? How can one rule in this way, when the budget law has been passed but he creates a second budget which should cover almost a month's wages for the whole country? What is this?

[Kiselev] I see. I understand your concerns as you express them. We have only a little time left until the end of our interview. So, very briefly, Gennadiy Arkadiyevich, are you worried about the possibility of the postponement of the presidential elections?

[Zyuganov] Everyone is worried about this. There are several possibilities. There is the possibility of an emergency situation, the nonpayment of wages, an exacerbation of the situation in Chechnya, some terrorist action or operation such as in Budennovsk. All of this could lead to the elections' being called off.

[Kiselev] How would you act in this event?

[Zyuganov] I have already said several times and today I state authoritatively that there is no way out other than holding the elections in a normal manner and an evolutionary, calm, and assured change of course. It is not possible to hold down the country by military means.

[Kiselev] How will you and your supporters act if such an attempt is made?

[Zyuganov] We are already acting at the present time. We are preparing a draft law on the mechanism for the transfer of power and on the protection of the parliamentary system. We sent a special note to all power-wielding departments in which we show that if this variant occurs they will not simply fail to carry it out but they will put the country on the verge of total war and final collapse.

They have the means to hold power inside the Moscow orbital highway. But such a policy will not be able to hold a single republic or a single economic region. Those who may bring this in should know that they do not have the means to provide people with work, they do not have the funds to support them, and all the strategic reserves which used to exist in the country have been squandered. There is not a single element for bringing in such a policy.

One can open the text books and read how this has been done in many countries at various times. But there are conditions when this is practicable. But on the other hand they do not have anything — no team and no real program to stabilize the situation.

Therefore, it is in the interests of everyone — those to whom these orders and commands are given — for the elections to be held normally and for the country to be gradually extricated from the crisis by peaceful and calm methods, that is, to act strictly in accordance with the laws.

[Kiselev] Well, we have one minute left and I would like to put the final question to you. The possibility that you might come to power as a result of the presidential elections in June 1996 is undoubtedly a result of the democratic choice and the democratic changes which have taken place in our country in recent years. Can you guarantee that in four years time the same electors will be able to reelect you?

[Zyuganov] All the democratic changes were begun in the time of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. Yeltsin spoke in the Manezh and called for...

[Kiselev interrupts] You have 30 seconds left. I asked you a specific question: In four years time will it be possible...

[Zyuganov interrupts] We absolutely guarantee that the law will be strictly observed and that the elections will be conducted normally. The country cannot develop without competition among parties.

[Kiselev] Thank you Gennadiy Andreyevich. With us in the studio has been Gennadiy Zyuganov, CPRF candidate for president of Russia. We shall be on the air again with the "Hero of the Day" program on Monday at 1935. Thank you.

[Zyuganov] Thank you.

Russia: Columnist Views Speeches at CPRF Conference

MM2002144496 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by Zhanna Kasyanenko: "Four Months to the Finish"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Clearly it was a pure coincidence — exactly four months before a decisive day for Russia, two nominations were made simultaneously. One in Yekaterinburg, the other in Moscow. The current president was trying to jump into the same river twice, to start the second term of his presidency from the place where he had first entered the Russian political arena. Who knows, perhaps it was out of superstition or a desire to once again dance to the same tune as before. But it was probably not worthwhile for an elderly and — judging by his appearance — very tired man to fly so far in order to promise that all Russia will now be putting itself at risk. At ris, needless to say, if Yeltsin is not elected for a second term.

But, after all, one term has been enough to bring the country to its knees. The Moscow conference delegates talked very eloquently about this. Perhaps the current president simply does not know about it. Otherwise, how are we to interpret what, for instance, Aman Tuleyev told the delegates: An enterprise in Kemerovo Oblast that, by all indications, is "down and out" has received the certificate "Leader of the Russian Economy." Either the president has a sense of humor, or the national economy has in general fallen so far that there are no leaders to be chosen and so certificates have to be awarded at random. Incidentally, the facts and figures about the general chaos and collapse were, as you will understand, not the main item on the conference agenda. The issue was different: Who will be able to overcome this, who is capable of uniting all left-wing and patriotic forces for a single goal — saving the fatherland?

Since the time of the ban on the CPSU, meetings of Communists have not seen such a large press presence as on this occasion. There were a particularly large number of foreign journalists. The main object of their interest was, understandably, Gennadiy Zyuganov. Aman Tuleyev was clearly something of a disappointment with his calm and unsensational tactics — yes, he said, I will put my name forward as a candidate, but at the right time I will withdraw my candidacy in favor of

Zyuganov, since I see him as the only man capable of running the country. Many people drew attention to the fact that Stanislav Govorukhin, Mikhail Lapshin, chairman of the Agrarian Party of Russia; and Vasiliy Starodubtsev, chairman of the Agrarian Union of Russia, were taking part in the conference. L. Grach, secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, expressed warm support and his wishes for victory.

The report by Valentin Kuptsov, secretary of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] Central Committee, convincingly proved that the so-called "democratic" wing in politics was not only exhausted but was wholly discredited, and there could be no hope for progress and development for as long as it was in power. This is already obvious to everyone. Arich Arichev, chairman of the Makhachkala Soviet of Workers, Peasants, and Working Intelligentsia, told us how a signature collection campaign was carried out in support of two contenders for the presidency in his city. As far as Yeltsin was concerned, things were placed on a strict, hierarchical administrative footing. Railroad and communications workers made particular efforts. Both the administration and the executive leadership found it hard going — it was not so easy to force people to sign up once again for those whose leadership had brought so much pain and suffering to the Caucasus. Zyuganov was a different story. More than 60,000 signatures nominating him were collected without any extra administrative effort. The recent congress of the republic's workers, peasants, and working intelligentsia, Arich Tagirovich said, expressed warm wishes and even called on the opposition to unite to save the country, to abandon their political ambitions and their star-struck leaders, to make a real assessment of who is capable of winning, and to work jointly for one candidate.

In general, delegates from the localities constantly stressed that there is no sharp confrontation in the backwoods between different left-wing and patriotic parties and movements, and that people cannot understand the position of those leaders who stake a claim to exclusivity. They stressed that all the regime's attempts to amend its policy, bring about stabilization, play up to the people, and steal socialist slogans are a smokescreen which will produce nothing for the people. There is nowhere to retreat to.

Incidentally, the conference, although called the CPRF conference, was effectively a large opposition council. A council of an opposition that had finally come together for the sake of a common goal. It was well-put by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov: "If the CPRF goes into the election isolated, it will not win. The main task today is a coalition. We need to work bit by bit, with each movement and with each individual. Then, after the 16th [date of presidential election], we will take stock. There is no time for that now. We need to work on creating a broad popular patriotic bloc, and the CPRF will be the backbone of that bloc."

The delegates prepared with great interest and, quite honestly, excitement to listen to Viktor Anpilov, leader of "Working Russia." This was understandable — a representative of the radical wing of the left-wing movement, he had repeatedly criticized Zyuganov and expressed intolerance. Now too he remained true to himself, but he found the courage to say that the need for unity was dictated by the time and that Zyuganov was the most realistic candidate and would have the support of "Working Russia." Yuriy Terentyev, secretary of the Russian Communist Workers' Party, spoke in the same vein.

Gennadiy Zyuganov was supported as the single opposition candidate by the public associations "Russian Socialist Scientists," "Spiritual Heritage," and the Armed Forces Veterans Council.

Needless to say, the breakdown of forces differs in different regions. For instance, there can be no doubt that the administration of oblasts in the "Red belt" will be exerting pressure and engaging in gerrymandering in the course of the vote and the entire election campaign. In other areas forces that at first glance are entirely unexpected could become opposition allies. For instance, the Cossacks, who are currently being worked on in Rostov Oblast. There are examples of industrialists, entrepreneurs, and Communists speaking with one voice. It was stressed at the conference that the full responsibility and burden of unification work at local level will lie with primary organizations and ordinary Communists. This work will be difficult but it and it alone will produce results. Ordinary people will understand because it is being done selflessly. The primary organizations have experience — that has been shown by the parliamentary elections. It now needs to be augmented and developed.

The debates continued for a long time. There were many speakers. Tactical issues were discussed. Svetlana Goryacheva, who was one of the last to speak, summed up, as it were, the results of the work: "It is a good thing that the opposition is managing to avoid being star-struck, and that everyone is imbued with an awareness of the importance and crucial nature of the moment. It is clear that Zyuganov is the most realistic and reliable candidate. I personally think he is a man you can depend on. But we have to realize that victory for Zyuganov would be a road to Calvary. His team should include everyone who is concerned about Russia and ready to give their strength, health, and even their life to save our fatherland."

Russia: Number of Presidential Nominees Reaches 54

MK2202071896 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by Ivan Rodin: "Rescuers and Chechens Nominate Candidates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Less than two weeks remain before 2 March, the Central Electoral Commission's [TsIK] deadline for the registration of initiative groups of citizens which nominate their candidates for president of Russia. The number of such groups is continuing to grow each week by five on the average. At the moment, the number of the so-called "candidates for candidates" (with at least one million signatures in support of each having been either not collected yet or collected but not submitted to the TsIK) stands at 54. As few as six of them have been nominated by political parties or movements. Two men have been nominated more than once: They are State Duma deputy Aleksandr Lebed (twice) and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin (eight times).

Incidentally, the very first initiative group to have nominated Mr. Yeltsin also registered 52 campaign managers in the latest TsIK session, held Monday [19 February] evening. This group was organized by the incumbent president's longtime supporters, among whom, for example, is PREZIDENT newspaper chief editor Lev Shemayev, former Duma deputy Viktor Mironov, and Boris Yeltsin's representative in Moscow Vladimir Komchatov. That this group should have registered more than 50 campaign managers above all indicates that it has either already won the contest for the title of official initiator of nominating the president for a second term or is extremely close to winning this title, hence, considerable financial resources.

The same TsIK session registered three initiative groups. Slightly more than 100 residents of Sunzha, Urus-Martan, and Naurskiy Rayons of Chechnya have nominated as their candidate for the post of president the editor of the MIROVOY DEMOKRATICHESKIY SOYUZ [World Democratic Union] newspaper, Mavsar Aduyev. Citizens of Russia in several oblasts, for their part, have registered in order to nominate Nikolay Maslov, chairman of the Party of National Accord (former chief of the Moscow housing department). However, the most outstanding legitimized initiative group is obviously that which nominates for president Vladimir Borovkov, deputy chairman of the Central Council of the All-Russia Society of Rescuing on Water.

Naturally, the list of contenders will become substantially shorter after 16 April, the deadline for submitting the requisite number of signatures in support of candidates, while by 16 June it will only contain realistic personages. Thus, the voters will not have to wade through huge lists in order to find their favorites. In some regions, however, voters will have to divide their attention between two, three, or even four elections because concurrently with the election for president of the Federation there will perhaps be elections for either local governors, local legislators, agencies of local self-government or all at once. According to preliminary data, voters in Arkhangelsk, Ivanovo, and Tambov Oblasts and Koryak Autonomous Okrug may have to go to such a trouble.

It is quite possible that concurrently with the presidential election there will be a change of the legislative and executive authority in, for example, Kaliningrad, Samara, Sakhalin, and Chita Oblasts. In principle, it is not ruled out that 25 regions in Russia will combine on 16 June the federal election with their own local elections, whatever they may be.

Russia: Postal Director Fired for Misuse of Pension Fund

LD2202083696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0813 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, February 22 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree releasing director of the Federal Postal Service Vyacheslav Polyakov from his post "for crude violations of office duties, which resulted in using resources of the pension fund for other ends", the Russian president's press service reported on Thursday.

The Russian president's assistant for economic affairs Aleksandr Livshits, describing the situation at Polyakov's service at a briefing on Wednesday, said that each next postal office illegally used resources of the pension fund.

It was found out during inspections that one billion roubles, allocated for pensions in the Voronezh Region, was loaned to commercial firms to net profits.

Russia: Duma Urges Finance Minister Panskov's Resignation

LD2102165996 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1600 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Duma today called for the resignation of Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov. On a proposal by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the Duma will send to the president an appeal for the replacement of the finance minister. The deputies said the reason for their proposal was that in many regions of Russia people have not received their wages in a long time.

Russia: Deputy Foreign Minister Kolokolov Retires

LD2102150096 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1315 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (ITAR-TASS) — By decree, Russian President Boris Yeltsin has relieved Boris Kolokolov of his duties as Russian deputy foreign minister in connection with his retirement, the press service of the head of Russian state announced today.

Russia: Livshits Names Officials Dismissed for Pay Delays

LD2102215996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1905 GMT 21 Feb 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [no dateline as received] Presidential aide Aleksandr Livshits at a news conference on Wednesday [21 February] disclosed the names of officials on all level dismissed by the president on charges of pay and pension delays.

These include Aleksandr Smirnov, head of the chief department of the finance ministry's federal treasury; Vyacheslav Polyakov, general director of the communications ministry's postal department; Pavel Balakshin, Governor of Arkhangelsk Region; Yuriy Belykh, Governor of Saratov Region; and Vladimir Golovachev, presidential representative in Saratov Region.

IF NOTE: Yeltsin's press office said Belykh's dismissal follows the misuse of budget allocations for salaries to public sector workers and social security benefits while Balakhkshin was sacked on charges of gross violations in the use of credits allocated for imports to the regions in the Far North. For his part, Golovachev was dismissed on charges of negligence of duty.

Leonid Vashenkov and Valentin Vlasov were appointed as Governors of Saratov and Arkhangelsk Regions respectively.

Livshits said the president also proposed that director of Gazprom's Astrakhan branch Viktor Shugayev be sacked and Gazprom Chief Rem Vyakhirev reprimanded for slackening control over duly payment of wages and pensions.

One other official on Yeltsin's hit list is Sergey Semenov, head of the Magadanenergo energy company.

The prosecutor general is recommended to investigate into the recent dismissals to see if their actions were crime-related.

The aide gave a number of examples of financial irregularities including the failure by the federal treasury's department for Krasnoyarsk territory to remit 21 billion rubles worth of funds intended as wages last December and this January. He said the money was deliberately delayed for a month at a time when tensions run at an all time high in the region over the pay issue.

One in two plants inspected laid its hands on the pension fund, with about one billion rubles worth of pensions being delayed in the southern Voronezh region alone.

The aide said that as rule the money was there but it was misused. "Such irregularities are widespread," Livshits said.

On pay delays, he said the Astrakhangazprom company which had delayed wages for several months had hard currency and ruble deposits five times over its debt in back wages.

In an interview with INTERFAX, Livshits did not rule out that more presidential decrees may follow. But the question is not one of massive purges or campaigns, he said adding tough controls could help the country rid of stumbling blocks in the way of reforms.

"The president has done what the people expected him to for a long time and what no one has done before," he said.

However, the aide was doubtful about the effect such measures could bring, but has no illusions that these could be foregone. With the budgetary discipline such as it is, he said, any injections into the social sphere or the economy make no sense at all.

The aide spoke of a report being sent to the president dealing with the problem of social security benefits to children. He described as appalling the facts of theft of funds intended for orphans and large families. Livshits said the report gave the concrete addresses and a concrete decision would follow.

The aide said the president was in permanent control of the pay and pension situation. Tough measures will be taken against those who resell budget allocations, he said.

Russia: Seleznev Discusses Political, Personal Life

MM2102161696 Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Feb 96 pp 1, 2

[Interview with State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev by Vladimir Loktev; place and date not given: "Gennadiy Seleznev: 'I Have Learned To Bear the Pain of Insults'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Many people remember Georgiy Seleznev as the chief editor of major newspapers. He proved himself, in my opinion, to be a true professional in that occupation. I say "in my opinion" because I had the opportunity to work with him. It is too early to say what kind of chairman of the State Duma he will be. It is clear only that he establishes contact with people easily and knows all the ins and outs of the newspaper world.

"How long is it since we last met, then? — was my ex-boss' gambit. "It must certainly be something like four years, mustn't it?" Seleznev placed a pack of cigarettes on the table, took out a cigarette-holder, and glanced at his watch. "Can we begin...."

[Loktev] You have been elected to high state office at a difficult time: The country is going through a protracted crisis and tens of millions of Russians can barely make ends meet because they do not receive their wages on time. People are tired of upheavals. Do you see the link in the chain of difficult problems, as people used to say, which we must seize if the situation is to change for the better?

[Seleznev] The first part of your question obviates the need for me to scotch the thesis that economic stability is already under way. In real life it does not exist yet. It is not only the budget-financed sector but manufacturers, miners, metallurgy workers, and textile workers too who are having a bad time today. In the countryside they put one tractor or combine together out of bits and pieces from three old ones. This year, according to the farmers, they have nothing left to cannibalize — all the equipment is worn out. Spring and the sowing season are near at hand, and they have nothing to plow with. Today it is appropriate to talk not about mythical stabilization or even crisis but about the continuing danger of catastrophe in the economy. Reciprocal nonpayments and wages arrears are phenomena which have, unfortunately, become chronic. In my opinion, you do not have to be a specialist to understand the axiom that you cannot overcome the crisis properly until the country's industry starts working.

I am deeply convinced that the country will start "getting on its feet" when the state program for the regulation of base (I stress, only the base) sectors of the economy has been considered in detail and put into practice. Other forms of effective socioeconomic "medicine" which help clear the financial thromboses that have essentially blocked the channels of economic relations between producers and consumers of goods must be sought at the same time. But as soon as the question of sensible regulation is broached, certain reformers start leveling the naive charges that this is a reversion to socialism and old methods of leadership. During periods of crisis the United States, Germany, and France have made extensive use of levers of state management of key sectors, and it is only thanks to them that they overcame economic depression.

[Loktev] It is well known that many deputies, you included, speak of the need to make modifications to the 1996 state budget. This is no doubt explained in part by the desire to eliminate the nonpayments problem. But the government maintains that there is money, nonbudget money at that, to clear the arrears. How you set up a reliable monitoring system to ensure that the money is received in the regions on time is another matter....

[Seleznev] There are, of course, opportunities for removing the social tension caused by the late payment of wages. But it is not always understandable why the appropriate structures do not use them. Moreover, the people who put into bank deposit accounts money intended for paying the wages of, say, teachers could have been sorted out long ago. There is the Presidential Control Administration, the Finance Ministry, and other structures which are duty-bound to monitor this process. Officials of all ranks must be held strictly accountable for the work entrusted to them, there will then be fewer violations.... It is a good thing that the president has taken personal control of the resolution of the nonpayments problem.

[Loktev] You recently met with Boris Nikolayevich. Was this a purely formal contact or did you manage to have a heart-to-heart, as it were?

[Seleznev] My talk with the president was very frank and dealt with the most acute issues. Boris Nikolayevich was interested in the Duma's reaction to certain of his edicts and proposals. He has representatives in both chambers of the legislative assembly, but I do not think that they always supply full information on the deputies' feelings. I did not express my personal standpoint on any acute issue — the president did not ask for that. The main thing I felt during our conversation was that Boris Nikolayevich is ready to hear people out, not just people from his immediate entourage but those with whom he finds himself in political and ideological disagreements, as it were. I formed the impression that he suffers to some extent from a lack of information from the left, that is to say, from the opposition.

[Loktev] Chechnya is probably our greatest misfortune. On the whole, judging by the polls, Russians favor the cessation of military operations there. On the other hand, even someone who is not well versed in big-league politics realizes that a troop withdrawal that is not underpinned by clear agreements between Moscow and Groznyy could intensify separatist feelings in the North Caucasian and "Muslim" regions of Russia. The territorial integrity of the state is essentially at stake. What do you think about this?

[Seleznev] The president has stated that there are several options for the solution of the "Chechen crisis." On his directive, a commission headed by the premier has been set up which includes authoritative representatives of various ministries and departments plus deputies. I do not think that its work will be wasted. As far as my personal opinion is concerned, I think that the stress should be placed on constructive dialogue between the various political forces of the republic. Influential Muslim figures from Bashkortostan, Tatarstan...should be actively involved in it. Restoration work should be urgently undertaken in those regions of Chechnya where the war has abated — give ordinary Chechens the construction materials and tools they need and they will build their own houses and stop running around in gangs. Any scenario there which rules out combat operations and the republic's secession from Russia is acceptable, in my view.

[Loktev] Unlike your predecessor in the post of leader of the State Duma, you experienced no yen to "freeze" your membership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF]. Are you not afraid of becoming a hostage of the hard-line opposition represented by a certain section of Communist deputies?

[Seleznev] No, I am not. The post of chairman of the State Duma places me above factional interests. My party obligations have been removed from me and no decisions by the CPRF faction are imposed on me....

[Loktev] You once said that you were impressed by the "Swedish model" of socialism. What precisely do you see it holding for us?

[Seleznev] Sweden has a mixed economy. The CPRF is also in favor of this. We recognize private ownership, albeit not of everything. If, for example, you are talking about Lake Baykal, we are against; but that is not at all the case when a store or bakery is concerned. Capitalist Sweden possesses a powerful social welfare system: state guarantees for education, medical services, and so forth. The state creates good conditions for working people there, and they value that....

[Loktev] Do you regret having left journalism?

[Seleznev] That's the way life has turned out. I admit that I was sorry to leave journalism, but I regard this as temporary. My character and view of the world were formed in newspapers, and I acquired quite a lot of friends there. None of my former colleagues has cast stones at me, although we did have conflicts. But which chief editor enjoys a conflict-free existence? Wherever I worked, the task was the same: To create a team of like-minded people and make the newspaper more interesting. Those I worked with must judge how successful I was. I have retained old friends from Leningrad. Unfortunately, we see each other rarely, we basically keep in touch by telephone now. My private life has, unfortunately, gone downhill. Strictly speaking, the post of chairman of the State Duma condemns you to a certain isolation. Official business and meetings with politicians and foreign visitors.... You do not have enough time for your family. I find it tough getting used to my new status, but I have already learned to bear the pain of insults. Otherwise, it is impossible. As the saying goes, you finish what you start.

[Loktev] Friends don't swamp you with requests?

[Seleznev] No, they realize that I am not all-powerful, and I have never encouraged string-pulling. I usually offer help myself when I know that a friend really needs it....

[Loktev] But even the busiest man has some hobbies?

[Seleznev] If the opportunity presents itself, I like to go rambling in the countryside — this distracts you from your worries for a while. Before, I used to love to ski and swim. I used to ride before I went into the Army. I try to read books, but in the main I only have enough time for newspapers and magazines....

[Loktev] What qualities do you value in people?

[Seleznev] I loathe all treachery and shoddy behavior. I respect people to whom you would trust your life.

[Loktev] But do you, Gennadiy Seleznev, have any weaknesses yourself, any bad habits?

[Seleznev] I'm a normal guy. Weaknesses? Of course, I have them, but I do not want to talk about them. I have a bad habit typical of many journalists — I smoke a lot, up to two packs a day sometimes.

[Loktev] Gennadiy Seleznev, TRUD celebrated its 75th birthday on 19 February. Could you wish our readers and journalists something in this regard?

[Seleznev] I respect TRUD and all the old newspapers. I consider that they have withstood the difficult ordeals of recent years with dignity. May TRUD continue to enjoy a long life and please its readers, particularly as it has many of them. And by way of wishes: Be even more socially incisive. TRUD is known by everyone as the defender of ordinary people. And in our time they need support more than ever, particularly the support of the newspaper which bears the beautiful name of TRUD. [Seleznev ends]

PS: During our 40-minute conversation we smoked three cigarettes apiece and agreed that this was quite a lot. It's time to kick the habit.

Russia: Foreign Ministry, SVR To 'Cooperate More Actively'

LD2102191496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1752 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 21 (INTERFAX) — The nomination of ex-head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR] Yevgeniy Primakov as Foreign Minister will not increase the number of intelligence agents working in the Foreign Ministry, newly-appointed Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Zubakov told INTERFAX.

Back in the Foreign Intelligence Service, Zubakov was Primakov's deputy in charge of personnel and in his new post he will also deal with personnel issues.

According to Zubakov, the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Intelligence Service will cooperate more actively, primarily in exchange of information.

Commenting on the Foreign Ministry's personnel, Zubakov said they are highly-skilled and experienced professionals.

"This does not mean the ministry has no personnel problems. Discipline should be improved and social position of ministry staffers should be upgraded. The ministry has a shortage of young diplomats and middle-aged staffers," said the official. "The young diplomats will have to wait a little, and the Foreign Ministry will do its best to settle their housing problems."

He called for the ministry's employment of "talented young people from whole Russia."

In his opinion, Russian embassies in the CIS member-states should have better personnel. "Bearing in mind relations with the Commonwealth republics are a priority of Russia, its embassies should employ the best diplomats, who are experienced and care a lot about their work," said Zubakov.

These very "merited and authoritative diplomats" will soon be sent to Russian embassies in the Commonwealth, he noted. "They are well aware of this need and will have clear prospects."

Zubakov called for special attention to Russian diplomatic missions in hotspots, including former Yugoslavia, and countries "which pose problems for diplomats' health, primarily those African."

As for other problems of the Foreign Ministry, they include the small pensions for retired ministry staffers. "The maximum pension of an ambassador, who worked for the Foreign Ministry for years, does not exceed 300,000 rubles," said Zubakov. He thinks it necessary to increase salaries of ministry staffers working in Moscow and several countries where salaries of Russian diplomats have been frozen for a long time. "It is not normal when our diplomats in some countries have salaries equal to those of local shop assistants," said the official.

The Ministry Board will work to "inform President Boris Yeltsin, his staff and the government of the most topical problems in order to have them solved."

A draft law on diplomatic service, which is being prepared for submission to the parliament and signing by the president, will also help to improve the situation, noted Zubakov.

When asked by INTERFAX to describe Yevgeniy Primakov, with whom he has been working since 1989, Zubakov said "this is a human computer, a professional with the highest skills, who knows all the details and cares for his work."

"Primakov values honesty and professionalism most. He is an expert in finding talented people and forming his working team. The Foreign Ministry will learn about this pretty soon," he said.

Media Issues

Russia: Yeltsin 'Still an Advocate of Free Press'

MM2102155696 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Boris Yeltsin Conceals Nothing From the Press"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Social problems have today risen to the top of the agenda for the Russian president," Boris Yeltsin stressed at yesterday's meeting with leaders of a number of mass media organs. According to the president, he intends day by day to monitor questions of the payment of wages, pensions, social allowances, mother and child subsidies, and other types of aid to Russians with little social protection. And this, the president stressed, "is not electioneering" and "not populist tactics."

The president categorically rejected speculation about the possible postponement of the election of the head of state. "I intend to act strictly within the constitutional field and to adhere undeviatingly to democratic procedures," he stated.

The head of state's meeting with leaders of the mass media lasted two and a half hours and was tightly packed in terms of content.

The Russian president made it clear that he has every reason to go into the elections confidently: Even today, Boris Yeltsin said, 7 million voters' signatures have already been collected in his support. Touching on disagreements in the democratic camp, the president reported that he intends to hold meetings with Yegor Gaydar, Boris Fedorov, and Svyatoslav Fedorov in order to unite society's sound forces before the elections. At the same time Boris Yeltsin stressed that for him "all voters are equal," and so he intends to go into the elections as a "supra-party, nonideologized candidate."

Recognizing that the unabated Chechen crisis is alienating a considerable proportion of voters, the Russian president told journalists that in the near future a "general peaceful option [obshchiy mirnyy variant] for resolving the problem" will be adopted.

Boris Yeltsin also shrugged aside rumors of the supposed disagreements between the head of state and the government chairman concerning the supposed possibility of Viktor Chernomyrdin's resignation. "Chernomyrdin and I will be together to the end, not only do we have good personal relations, our families are friends too," the president said.

The head of state reported that former First Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays will work on his "election team." Boris Yeltsin intends to meet with him to formulate the election campaign tactics.

Touching on his own health, the president noted that he fells very well and is working 12-14 hours a day. "The doctors criticize me for that, they say I have started off too quickly," he said.

Talking about his main concerns today, the president put social problems first. He said that he will monitor day by day questions of the payment of wages, pensions, social allowances, mother and child subsidies, and other types of aid to Russians with little social protection.

The recent resignation of Oleg Poptsov from the post of leader of the VGTRK [All-Russia State TV and Radio Company] was also touched on at the meeting. Boris Yeltsin stressed that he is still an advocate of free press. He added that he had always supported Oleg Poptsov, but explained that the VGTRK chairman had "been making mistakes." A change of leadership, in the president's opinion, will make it possible to strengthen the second TV channel.

Addressing the journalists, Boris Yeltsin stressed that their activity and objective coverage of the election campaign is of special significance in such an important period for Russia. He also confirmed that he remains the constitutional guarantor of freedom of speech and the safety of journalists.

Russia: Yeltsin Avoids Appealing for Media's Support

MM2202092396 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 96 p 1

["Own information" report: "The President Treated the Press to Brandy and Sensible Thoughts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin invited 14 leaders of Russian newspapers, television channels, and news agencies to his residence in the Kremlin yesterday.

"You might not believe this, but I am pleased to have this meeting. We certainly have mutual grudges and reproaches, but life is great and it is not worth storing them up" — with these words the president began the conversation which the editors had been awaiting in some trepidation. It was assumed that Yeltsin would appeal directly to the mass media for support in the election marathon, but the Russian press has had time to get out of the habit of oaths of loyalty. But the president must be given his due — he avoided such a gaffe. His statements were of a quite neutral nature, and B.N. behaved emphatically correctly toward rival aspirants, and it was only in questions to the press that there was at times a hint of sincere vexation. "Why, for example, launch 'canards' about the cancellation or postponement of the election? It will take place exactly at the time laid down in the constitution!" "Will you be able to keep out of the fray? Do the mass media have the instinct for self-preservation?" "Is it possible to so misrepresent things: to talk about pensioners' needs on television and accompany this with shots from a mental hospital?"

"It is not I but you who are creating Agitprop [Soviet era agitation and propaganda section of CPSU Central Committee]," the president remarked angrily in response to charges of having removed Oleg Poptsov.

Boris Yeltsin said that he personally keeps an eye daily on the schedule for the payment of withheld wages and pensions. At the same time, however hard it might be, B.N. gave an assurance that the government will not issue "wooden," i.e. unsecured rubles.

Dwelling on the Chechnya war, the president once again recognized the gravity of the problems: Each of the seven versions of a solution mentioned by him contains shortcomings, the consequences are being reckoned up, and there is less and less time remaining until the elections....

Yeltsin commented as follows on the latest rumors of Chernomyrdin's resignation: "I will support him to the end." This is both a political and a personal decision, B.N. emphasized.

Answering questions about his health, Boris Nikolayevich gave an assurance that he has taken up a full work regime: "I sleep for four hours and get up at 0430 hours. My aides grumble but put up with it...." At the meeting the editors were served a glass of brandy each, and the president a glass of mineral water.

Military & Space Issues

Russia: Kravchenko Appointed Black Sea Fleet Commander

LD2202070296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0655 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW February 22 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin appointed Vice-Admiral Viktor Kravchenko as the commander of the disputed Black sea fleet, the press service of the head of state told Tass on Thursday.

Kravchenko was first deputy commander of the Baltic fleet and will replace Eduard Baltin who was dismissed from his post in January.

Baltin was known as a radical opponent of the division of the fleet between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma commented on his dismissal saying that "the military should busy themselves with military issues and not politics."

Russia: Committee Discusses Long-Term Arms Program

MM2202111196 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 96 p 1

["Own information" report: "Defense Industry Development Results and Prospects Discussed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 19 February this year a session of the Russian Federation Goskomoboronprom [State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry] Collegium took place under the chairmanship of Zinoviy Pak, this committee's new leader. The collegium discussed the results of the defense industry's work in 1995 and the forecast for 1996.

Taking part in the session were Andrey Kokoshin, Russian Federation first deputy defense minister; Colonel General Anatoliy Sitnov, chief of Russian Federation Armed Forces Armaments; leading officials of the Atomic Energy Ministry, Science Ministry, Economy Ministry, and other departments; and a number of leaders of leading Russian defense industry enterprises, scientific research institutes, and design bureaus.

The participants in the session discussed, among other things, questions regarding the implementation of the long-term weapons program up to 2005 submitted to the Russian Federation Government jointly by the Defense Ministry, Goskomoboronprom, and the Economy Ministry. This program is subject to revision once the Russian Federation Security Council has determined the Russian Armed Forces long-term structure and composition and a number of provisions of Russian Federation military doctrine have been specified. Kokoshin noted that in the long-term weapons program emphasis has been placed on the maintenance of Russian nuclear deterrence potential at the proper level, on the development of information warfare systems and highly accurate weapons, on comprehensive interdisciplinary research and development and key military technology programs, and on other things.

Pak and Kokoshin also drew attention to the need for the comprehensive development of dual-purpose technologies and for targeted state support for a number of production facilities, including those at the second, third, and other levels of component supply and production sharing [komplektatsiya i kooperatsia]. The relevant proposals have been submitted to the Russian Federation Government jointly by the Defense Ministry and Goskomoboronprom. In his speech at the collegium Col. Gen. Sitnov stressed the need for joint efforts by the Defense Ministry and Goskomoboronprom to reduce the costs of producing weapons and military equipment and developing the defense industry's production infrastructure.

Russia: Soyuz Spacecraft Successfully Reaches Orbit

LD2102131396 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1241 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Soyuz TM-23 aircraft successfully reached its Earth orbit at 1243 GMT, 530 seconds into its flight, according to a Mayak radio correspondent at the flight control center. Applause from the flight control center could be heard as the orbit was reached. The correspondent reported that so far everything has gone to plan.

Mayak's reporter said the parameters of the orbit are 240 km apogee and 202 km perigee, taking 88.6 minutes for one orbit at an orbital inclination of 51.6 degrees. All systems are now being checked and the solar batteries are being deployed.

The docking with the Mir space station on 23 February should take place around 1700 [1400 GMT].

Russia: Communication Satellite Fails To Reach Orbit

LD2102153396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1357 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 21 (INTERFAX) — The press service of the Khrunichev Space Research and Production Center in Moscow told INTERFAX that in preliminary estimates, the Raduga communication satellite launched from the Baykonur cosmodrome Monday [19 February] failed to reach the target geostationary orbit due to the failure of the acceleration unit.

The same source said that the launch of the heavy booster Proton- K was normal and that its first three stages operated normally, too. However, the DM acceleration unit, produced by the research and production amalgamation Energiya, located in the Moscow suburb of Kaliningrad, failed to come into operation for the second time, as a result of which the satellite did not reach the designated altitude of 36,000 kilometers.

In 1987, six launches of the Proton booster were a failure, whereby the payload failed to reach the designated orbit. Four unsuccessful launches were due to the acceleration unit's failure.

Russian and Western experts believe, however, that Proton remains the most reliable booster rocket. Over thirty years, Protons have been launched 239 times with a reliability coefficient of 97 percent.

The research and production amalgamation Energiya has confirmed the failure of the launch but did not name the causes of the failure. A high-ranking representative from Energiya announced that a special commission had been set up to investigate the accident. The official cause of the accident is to be announced next week.

The 2,000 kilogram communication satellite Raduga was developed by the applied mechanics amalgamation in Krasnoyarsk. The satellite was to be controlled by the testing and monitoring center of Russia's military-space forces.

Seven Raduga satellites with a service life of three years are currently in operation. The latest Raduga launch was made on December 28, 1994.

Federal Assembly

Russia: Stroyev Discusses Legislation Shortcomings

LD2102195196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1838 GMT 21 Feb 96

[By Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, February 21 (ITAR-TASS) — "One of the serious obstacles on the way of reforms in Russia is the imperfection of legislation, especially the tax laws. This creates the situation, in particular, when banking capitals do not participate in an upsurge of production because it is not profitable for banks," Yegor Stroyev, the Chairman of the Federation Council, stated at today's meeting with President of the Association of Russian Banks Sergey Yegorov and Chairman of the Moscow Banking Union Vladimir Vinogradov. During the meeting they discussed the problem of interaction between the banking sphere and the general economic and political situation in the country.

According to Yegor Stroyev, the Federation Council intends to hold parliamentary hearings on a broad complex of economic issues connected with financial policy, credit and monetary regulation and the banking system.

Invited to take part in these hearings will be experts from the presidential and government structures of the State Duma, economists representing different schools and trends, the chairman of the Federation Council informed.

Participants in the meeting of the speaker of the upper house with bankers noted that the "obstacles on the way of the banking system, impede the further development of the economy as a whole."

"The main task for the Federation Council is to ensure the continuation of profound social and economic reforms in society," Yegor Stroyev stressed.

Russia: Duma Passes Bill on Election Control, Openness

LD2102223196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1952 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, 21 February (INTERFAX) — The Russian State Duma, parliament's lower chamber, today approved in the first reading the bill on public control over elections and referendums and the openness and glasnost regarding the summing up of the election results.

The previous State Duma several times rejected the draft law. However, the present Duma passed the bill in the first reading by 249 votes for. To pass, the bill needed approval from 226 deputies.

The State Duma approved the bill despite its critical assessment by the Russian Central Electoral Commission, which proposed that the bill be removed from the Duma's agenda "for a number of conceptual reasons."

One of those who initiated the bill's approval, member of the State Duma Committee on Legislation and

Judicial-Legal Reform Viktor Sheynis of the Yabloko faction said the bill was not politically motivated. "Those who want voters not to doubt the validity of election results" are interested in the bill's adoption, he said.

However, a conclusion on the bill signed by Central Electoral Commission Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Ivanchenko and circulated in the State Duma reads that "the approach of improving existing election legislation by adopting new independent laws is foundationless."

The Central Electoral Commission said it disagreed with the proposal that the observer corps be enlarged by adding to it observers from voters and that compulsory control calculation of votes at polling stations be introduced. The Central Electoral Commission also fails to agree with the proposal that courts be given the right to recognize election results as invalid in corresponding polling stations or constituencies.

Russia: Duma Issues Decree on Adoption of Black Sea Fleet Law

MM2202100996 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Feb 96 p 3

[State Duma Decree No. 77-II "On the Federal Law 'On Suspending the Unilateral Reduction and Guaranteeing the Upkeep of the Black Sea Fleet,'" signed by G.N. Seleznev, chairman of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma, in Moscow on 14 February 1996; from the "Documents" section]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma decrees that:

1. It disagrees with Russian Federation Federal Assembly Federation Council Decree No. 641-I of 25 October 1995 rejecting the Federal Law "On Suspending the Unilateral Reduction and Guaranteeing the Upkeep of the Black Sea Fleet."

2. The Federal Law "On Suspending the Unilateral Reduction and Guaranteeing the Upkeep of the Black Sea Fleet" is hereby adopted in accordance with Article 105, Section 5 of the Russian Federation Constitution.

3. The aforementioned Federal Law is to be sent to the Russian Federation president to be signed and made public.

[Signed] G.N. Seleznev, chairman of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma

[Dated] Moscow, 14 February 1996
No. 77-II

Russia: Duma Orders Probe Into Dismissals of Regional TV Heads

LD2102152996 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Duma has instructed the committee for information policy and communications to analyze the reasons for the increasingly frequent dismissal of the heads of television companies in Russia's regions. This move followed an allegation made by parliamentarian Anatoliy Greshnevikov at today's plenary session of the chamber that in certain regions of Russia the heads of local television centres were being replaced. He said these personnel reshuffles had something to do with preparations for the forthcoming presidential elections.

Russia: Duma Decides on Serbs' Arrest, Dniester, Privatization

MM2202112496 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "In the State Duma"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Arrest of Serbian Servicemen — Arbitrary and Lawless

The State Duma has adopted a statement on the arrest in Bosnia of Serbian servicemen General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic. In the statement, their arrest and escort to The Hague are deemed a provocative act capable of undermining the peace settlement process on the territory of former Yugoslavia. The attempt to give a one-sided bias to the judicial prosecution of persons responsible for the violation of international humanitarian law discredits the International Tribunal in The Hague. Effectively encouraging the Bosnian Muslims' unlawful actions is a dangerous relapse into double standards in the West's approach to the settlement of the situation in Yugoslavia, the statement stresses.

The State Duma resolutely condemns the arbitrary and lawless approach to the Serbian servicemen and demands their immediate release and an objective investigation of instances of war crimes in former Yugoslav territory in compliance with the principle of equal accountability of all sides for unlawful actions.

On the Status of the Dniester Region

Having discussed the 19 January 1996 joint statement of the Russian Federation president, the Republic of Moldova president, and the Ukrainian president, the State Duma, in a decree, has recommended that the Russian Federation president, in the course of talks with the Moldovan side on defining the status of the Dniester Region, take into account the opinion of the people of the Dniester; and that measures be adopted to open a Russian Federation consular establishment in the city of Tiraspol.

The Russian Federation Government is recommended to ensure timely funding, material support, and safeguarding of the status of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Operational Group of Forces in the Dniester Region, whose role is deemed to have a stabilizing effect.

The State Duma also believes that the participation of representatives of both the Russian Federation and the Dniester Region in the international talks on defining the status of the Dniester Region is necessary.

State Duma Interested in Results of Privatization

The State Duma has set up a commission for objective analysis of the privatization process in the Russian Federation and for ensuring public and parliamentary monitoring of its course. The main aim is to analyze the results of privatization in 1992-1996 and determine the accountability of officials for its negative results.

Russia: Duma's Plans To Slow Privatization Revealed

964F1122A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 4-11 Feb 96 No 5, p 19

[Article by Yelena Kolokoltseva: "The Communists Are Closing In on Privatization: The Duma Is Not Yet Freezing Prices But Is Getting Ready To Slow Down Privatization and Provide for Financial Independence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first weeks of the work of the new State Duma have passed relatively quietly. The forecasts that following the communist victory in the parliamentary elections the Duma would immediately start spitting out laws on nationalization, radically revise the budget, and pass decisions on repaying debts to enterprises and the population—in short, implement the program with which the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] went into the elections—so far have not come true. The proposal of a group of deputies to put into effect on 1 February a freeze on prices of basic foodstuffs and energy, sent to the Economic Policy Committee, was rejected by its chairman Yuriy Maslyukov, formerly chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], without any discussion "on the grounds of being unacceptable."

During six plenary sessions the deputies passed only one law (in the first reading)—on increasing compensatory allowances to pensioners by 20 percent beginning 1 February.

At the same time, the executive branch gave the impression that the "Zyuganov draft" made it to the Kremlin instead of the Duma. The demonstrative rejection of Anatoliy Chubays' services, write-off of enterprises' debts, "finding" additional trillions from unknown sources for the needs of various sectors indicated precisely that. And while the executive branch in its chase after the communist electorate lost its last supporters in the democratic camp, the Communists behaved calmly and confidently. One of the party leaders, Valentin Kuptsov, began negotiations with members of the presidential staff on taking the Duma apparat from direct financial and economic subordination to the president's KhOZU [Facilities and Operations Administration]. In other words, they are talking about setting up a CPRF Central Committee administration of affairs somewhere in Okhotnyy Row.

At the same time, the Communists began a series of maneuvers aimed at correcting the course of privatization. Former USSR Supreme Soviet Speaker Anatoliy Lukyanov proposed to form a parliamentary commission on analysis of the results of the 1992-95 privatization. The decision to create it was passed without much discussion. Privatization Committee Chairman Pavel Bunich (Russia Is Our Home) remarked that there was no need for the market in stocks of privatized enterprises to go dead, as it had done, and "everything will amount to passing some impotent decision that will not bring about any practical consequences."

The deputies, however, subsequently decided to expand the commission and include in it representatives of sectoral committees and the Accounting Chamber, which for the past two months had been auditing GKI [State Committee for the Administration of State Property] operations. By the time this issue of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI went to print we did not yet have the list of people by name who were to be added to the commission's ranks. However, one can already say with certainty that the CPRF and its allies will not fail to send its most distinguished members. Summoning to "government hour" Alfred Kokh, GKI first deputy chairman, with a report on the situation that has developed around the RAO [All-Russia Joint-Stock Company] Norilsk Nickel (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has reported on the conflict around Norilsk Nickel on numerous occasions) provided further proof that the Duma has decided to look into privatization closely and seriously.

It is rather difficult now to legally audit the privatization: Its second—post-voucher—stage was launched by the presidential edict, since in the summer of 1994 the previous Duma rejected the law proposed by the government. It is possible to send inquiries regarding the legality of "privatization" edicts (including the edict on the procedure of holding mortgage auctions) to the Constitutional Court. But even if the court accepts them for review, it will take a long time to prepare for the hearing on this case. Therefore, by starting an antiprivatization campaign the Communists are most likely setting a different task for themselves: to reveal as many violations in the conduct of privatization as possible, to "dig up" enough material to organize sensational trials, and so on, in order to use them as a powerful lever to put pressure on the executive branch.

Russia: Duma Committees' Roles, Power Assessed

964F1112A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 4-11 Feb 96 No 5, p 6

[Article by Yelena Kolokoltseva under the "Forecast" rubric: "Committees Jump Into the Game"]

[FBIS Translated Text] All the legislative activities of the current Duma will be governed by the "16 June factor." This explains the agitation around "organizational problems."

Last Wednesday the deputies managed to approve the membership of 28 Duma committees. Not everything went smoothly. The job of Legislative Committee deputy chairman stayed vacant: Tatyana Shubina, delegated to this post by the Agrarian Party, withdrew her nomination. And several persons announced their intention to leave the committees on whose roster their names were listed before the beginning of the vote.

Legislative Committee Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov attempted to keep the rebels in check by invoking Article 19 of the parliament rules. Its interpretation by the former speaker of the USSR Supreme Soviet proved quite unusual: A deputy allegedly does not have the right to choose to work in a particular committee at his discretion but instead must observe strict party discipline.

In the end, the Committee on Organization of Duma Work was instructed to resolve this and other controversies within a month.

What is driving the arguments on the subject of the Duma rules? Why, for instance, did Adrian Puzanovskiy (Agrarian faction) and Oleg Shinkarev (CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]) attempt to bring up in the course of discussion the question of the need to maintain strict proportional representation of factions and parties in the committees? It appears the left majority does not want to permit a concentration of its few opponents in any committee and is trying to "disperse" them, thus depriving them of the ability to influence decisionmaking on any issue. Yabloko, on the other hand, concentrated its main effort on several key committees, ignoring those over which control was obviously out of its reach.

In the course of deal-making over portfolios, Yabloko gained a qualitative advantage in the Committees on the Use of Natural Resources, on International Affairs, and on the Budget (and grabbed in passing control over the Committee on Ecology). In short, they concentrated precisely on those committees where they had already made serious advances. The NDR faction, by the way, turned out to be less farsighted. In chasing chairmanships, it managed to wrestle four committees from the Communists. However, only one of them—on defense, headed by General Rokhlin—will perhaps be effective. The remaining chairmanships the NDR managed to gain will play no practical role. For instance, Pavel Bunich, who became chairman of the Committee on Privatization, will hardly be able to implement his policy in an environment of the obvious domination of the communist faction.

As it was in the fifth Duma, in the sixth one committees occupy different ranks in the pecking order. Their rating depends first of all on their ability to make decisions capable of influencing the course of political and economic processes in the country.

The leading role of the Committee on Legislation is universally acknowledged. It is possible that the Communists will initiate constitutional amendments for passage in the Duma. First of all to Article 103, approved in the first reading by the previous Duma. This would oblige the president to get the approval of the parliament's lower house not only on the appointment of the prime minister but also on that of his deputies, enforcement ministers, and the minister of foreign affairs. All in all, there are more than 10 constitutional amendments in the committee's portfolio, put together by its former chairman Vladimir Isakov. Some of them (first and foremost those on strengthening the role of parliamentary commissions in overseeing the activities of the executive branch) have a good chance of passing through the parliament's upper chamber and being ratified by three-quarters of Federation components. Yegor Stroyev, Federation Council chairman, is a friend of Gennadiy Zyuganov since they worked together in Orel Oblast. Besides, the current senators, unlike their predecessors, are more independent of the RF president.

Most likely there will not be enough time before the presidential elections to complete the "amendment" process. However, the process itself plays out in the Communists' favor. Under any circumstances, it will enable them to demonstrate once again their strength. One way or another, the political weight of the Committee on Legislation will increase in the new Duma.

Among other "political" committees of particular significance are the Committee on Federation Affairs, now headed by former senator Leonid Ivanchenko (CPRF). In a situation where the separation of powers between the executive authority and Federation components is not completely worked out, its influence may turn out to be quite substantial. Most likely, the role of the Committee on Global Policy, which in the past was simply a joke, will change, too. In any case, one can clearly detect this trend in the comments of MGIMO [Moscow State Institute on International Relations] graduate Aleksandr Mitrofanov (LDPR) [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] on the questions of ratification of the START II treaty.

On the threshold of the presidential elections we probably should not expect of the Duma any dramatic decisions in the area of economic policy. The draft law on freezing prices for basic foodstuffs, energy, and so on, initiated by a group of deputies, was shot down by Yuriy Maslyukov (CPRF), chairman of the Committee on Economic Policy and former head of Gosplan [State Planning Committee]. Overall, all initiatives coming from this committee most likely will be a theoretical rather than practical exercise—as was the case in the previous Duma under Sergey Glazyev.

It would be a mistake to assume that the communist majority in the Committee on Privatization will immediately start nationalizing already privatized enterprises. The Duma most likely will limit itself to decisions on raising the minimum wage, pensions, etc. The only thing we can be certain of is that within the next two months changes will be made to the 1996 budget.

The leading position among the Duma economic committees will undoubtedly belong to the Committees on the Budget and on the Use of Natural Resources. Actually, the role of the Budget Committee will diminish somewhat compared to what it used to be. The committee will mainly busy itself with "unfinished business": polishing the law on insurance, and, perhaps, the law on mandatory insurance of citizens' savings, rejected by the Federation Council. (For more detail on Budget Committee activities, see MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI BIZNES-EKONOMIKA). The key positions gained by Yabloko in the Committee on the Use of Natural Resources—in the past practically inactive—apparently will accelerate the process of adoption of the long-awaited laws "On Concessions" and "On Mineral Resources," as well as amendments to the already adopted law "On Production-Sharing." This will help Yabloko gain points in the presidential campaign.

The position of the Committee on Conversion, created specifically for Voronezh "red director" Georgiy Kostin (People's Power group), is very strong. With his help the left may post on the asset side of its scoreboard the planned repayment of debts to the defense sector and increasing appropriations for the military-industrial complex (if this can be achieved).

As to the Agrarian Committee, by itself it will no longer play as crucial a role as in the past. The Communists delegated their representatives to the Agrarian group on strict terms of "no support for the provisional government." And although it is unlikely that the Agrarians' appetites could be moderated, they will not be able to bargain with the government equally effectively.

Russia: Security Tightened at State Duma

LD2102142496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1054 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, 21 February (INTERFAX) — The security regime has been tightened in the building of the Russian State Duma. From now on, the personal belongings of all those entering the building will be checked.

A leader of the State Duma security service told INTERFAX Wednesday that only the deputies, given their immunity status, would not be searched.

He said that the decision to tighten the security regime had been taken because a large amount of weapons, including knives and pistols, had been confiscated from individuals entering the building by permanent and one-off passes.

Russia: Legislative, Regulatory Documents 11-17 Feb

96P50051A

[FBIS Report] The following is a listing of Russian legislation recently published in the press of the Russian Federation compiled by FBIS. Numbers within parentheses indicate approximate wordage. Entries followed by the notation "Text" have been translated into English and are available in FBIS publications.

SECTION I: ECONOMIC LEGISLATION (EXPORT-IMPORT, BANKING, PRIVATIZATION, AUCTIONS, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT)

Government 25 November Directive No. 1524 Accepting Economy Ministry Proposal On Holding International Conference On Development Of Leasing In Russia 21-23 February 1996 In Moscow. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 5) (500)

Government 12 December Decree No. 1211 Ordering Inventory Of Russian Federation Property Abroad. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 5) (400)

Government 18 December Decree No. 1244 On Stabilization And Development Of Economy Of Kabardino-Balkar Republic And Creating Free Economic Zones On Its Territory. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (800) (Text)

Government 18 December Directive No. 1721 Opening Barnaul Airport To International Flights. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 6) (200)

Government 26 December Decree No. 1261 Extending Term Of Federal Ownership Of Maritime Transportation Joint-Stock Companies Shares Plus List Of Relevant Companies. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 4) (900)

Chernomyrdin 26 December Decree No. 1284 On Payment For Examining Petitions Envisaged By Antimonopoly Legislation. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (200)

Government 26 December Decree No. 1290 Setting Up Russkaya Metallurgiya Company [Russian Metallurgical Company], With Two Appendixes Listing Initial Stockholders. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 6) (700)

Government 27 December Directive No. 1765 Opening Kogalym Airport To International Flights. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 6) (200)

Government 31 December Directive No. 1788 Liquidating State Aircraft Enterprise In Ulan-Ude. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 6) (200)

Government 13 January Decree No. 22 On Russian Federation State Committee For Questions Of The North's Development. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 5) (1400)

Government 16 January Decree No. 32 On Retaining State's Golden Share In Privatized Military Industrial Enterprises. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 6) (200) (Text)

Government 16 January Decree No. 37 On Main Avenues For Structural Reorganization Of Industry. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 3) (800)

Yeltsin 27 January Decree No. 62 On Inclusion Of 'Soyuzgazprom' Financial-Industrial Group In Formation Of Federal Food Stocks. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 3) (500)

Government 27 January Decree No. 65 On Monitoring Production And Shipment Of General-Purpose Explosives. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 4) (150)

Government 27 January Decree No. 69 Approving Amendments To Baltic Sea Fisheries Convention. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 4) (400)

Yeltsin 27 January Edict No. 105 On 'Mobile Complex' Program To Support Oil And Gas Extraction Equipment Industry. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 3) (450)

Government 2 February Decree No. 79 On Offsetting Of Tax And Other Debts Owed By Enterprises Against Budget Subsidies Owed To Them. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 3) (250)

Government 2 February Decree No. 80 On Improving Access To Investment Information. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 3) (150) (Text)

Government 2 February Decree No. 82 Transferring RF's Share In Nef tyanik Sanatorium Complex To Transnef t Joint-Stock Company. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 3) (400)

Government 2 February Decree No. 88 On Procedure For Payment Of Profits Tax Due From Organizations Performing Basic Activities In Ministry Of Communications System. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 4) (700)

Chernomyrdin 2 February Decree No. 105 Approving Statute On Procedure For Establishing Land Use Limits In Development Of Cities And Other Settlements. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (250)

Government 2 February Directive No. 123 Approving Plans For 24 February Congress Of Agro-Industrial Complex Commodity Producers. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 3) (250) (Text)

Government 2 February Directive No. 132 Introducing Temporary Protection Measures Against Imports In Certain Sectors. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 3) (600) (Text)

Government 2 February Directive No. 133 On Measures For Implementing Federal Law On Road Traffic Safety. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 3) (300)

Government 2 February Directive No. 137 On Submission Of Law On Amendments And Additions To Law On Housing Stock Privatization For Duma's Consideration, Appointing Construction Minister Basin Government Spokesman. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 4) (150)

Yeltsin 2 February Edict No. 135 On Free Provision Of Land Parcels To Citizens Emigrating From Far North And Equivalent Localities Plus Sharov Commentary. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 3) (150/450) (Text)

Government 8 February Decree No. 131 On Measures To Ensure Stable Operations By Liquor And Vodka Industry. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 3) (850)

Government 8 February Decree No. 132 Increasing Tax Rates On Vodka, Other Spirits. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 3) (150)

Yeltsin 8 February Edict No. 165 On Federal Service For Ensuring State Monopoly Of Alcohol Production. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 3) (400)

Yeltsin 9 February Edict No. 168 On Measures To Further Improve The Structure Of Russian Federation Coal Industry. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 3) (1000)

Yeltsin 10 February Directive No. 60 Instructing Government To Dismiss Deputy Finance Minister Korolev. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 1) (100) (Text)

Yeltsin 10 February Directive No. 61 On 'Russian Financial And Fund Communications' Fund. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 3) (350)

Government 12 February Decree No. 139 On State Support For Structural Restructuring And Development Of KAMAZ Joint-Stock Company's Enterprises. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 4) (800)

Yeltsin 13 February Edict No. 191 Amending Edict No. 495 Of 18 May On Kaliningrad Oblast's Socioeconomic Development. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 4) (200)

Yeltsin 13 February Edict No. 192 Repealing Edict No. 918 Of 11 June 1993 On State Alcohol Monopoly. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 3) (100)

Yeltsin 14 February Edict No. 198 On Rights Of Citizens And Corporate Bodies To Own Land Parcels And Real Estate In Rural Localities. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Feb 96 p 3) (500)

SECTION II: POLITICAL (INTERNATIONAL AND CIS AFFAIRS, ELECTIONS, CRIME, POLLUTION)

Chernomyrdin 20 November Directive No. 1604 Accepting Proposal That Russia's Annual Contribution To UN Population Fund Be Set At $150,000. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (200)

Chernomyrdin 25 November Directives Nos. 1634, 1635, And 1636 On Russian Participation In Various International Exhibitions. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (700)

Chernomyrdin 4 December Directive No. 1675 On Creating Orenburg Air Cadet Corps Based On Special Boarding School. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (250)

Government 26 December Decree No. 1249 Ratifying Agreement On IBRD Loan. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 6) (450)

Chernomyrdin 26 December Decree No. 1259 On Setting Up Kaliningrad Military Polytechnical Institute And Kurgan Military Aviation Institute Of Federal Border Service. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (600)

Chernomyrdin 26 December Directive No. 1760 Ordering Various Ministries To Take Action To Implement Accords Reached During Chernomyrdin's 4-6 October Visit To Canada And 1st Session Of Russian-Canadian Economic Commission. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (1200)

Government 31 December Decree No. 1304 On Improving The Activity Of Coordination And Consultation Organs Set Up By The Russian Federation Government And Confirming That Government Decisions Contained In Appended List Are Deemed To Have Lapsed. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 5) (3000)

Government 31 December Decree No. 1307 On Federal Targeted Program To Assist People Near Semipalatinsk

Former Nuclear Test Range. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 6) (450) (Text)

Government 31 December Directive No. 1786 Sanctioning Support For 'Russian Soldiers' Brotherhood. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 6) (200)

Government 8 January Decree No. 6 Approving Appended 'Concept' For Improving Position Of Women In The Russian Federation. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 4) (400/5500)

Chernomyrdin 8 January Decree No. 7 Following Up Yeltsin Edict On Creating Ulyanovsk State University. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (450)

Chernomyrdin 8 January Directive No. 9 On Using Investment Credits From Germany And UK To Purchase Equipment To Apply Excise Duty Stamps To Liquor ($25.5 Million) And Tobacco Products ($26.7 Million). (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 5) (300)

Government 16 January Directive No. 55 On Monitoring Of Foreign Currency Earnings. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 14) (200)

Yeltsin 18 January Directive No. 24 Approving Initiative For Holding Federation Component Culture Days In Moscow And Appended (But Not Published) Composition Of Organizing Committee, Plus Molodtsova Commentary. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 4 (200/450)

Federation Council 24 January Resolution No. 37 On Local Government Amendment Bill. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 3) (450)

Government 27 January Decree No. 75 On Federal Postal Service Organization. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 3) (450)

Government 27 January Directive No. 86 Accepting Proposal To Attract Canadian Investment Credit Of Up To $20 Million For Purchase Of Equipment For Oncological Center In Samara Oblast. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 3) (250)

Yeltsin 27 January Edict No. 103 Rescinding May 92 Edict On Arms Trade In Favor Of Edict 95/1008. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 3) (150)

Government 2 February Decree No. 94 Amending Government Decree No. 1300 Of 25 November 1994 On Retraining Servicemen For Civilian Jobs. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 4) (300)

Chernomyrdin 2 February Decree No. 101 Approving Federal Targeted Program For Development Of Resorts Of Federal Significance, Plus Abbreviated Version Of Program In Question. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 6) (300/1600)

Government 2 February Directive No. 128 Approving Plans For March 1996 Opening Of Complex Of International Electronic Communications Facilities. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 3) (450)

Chernomyrdin 2 February Directive No. 129 Appointing Various Deputy Ministers Deputy Chairmen Of Russian Part Of Intergovernmental Trade Commission With Latvia. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 13) (150)

Yeltsin 5 February Directive No. 48 Ordering Foreign Ministry To Come Up With New System For Securing Duma Ratification Of Foreign Treaties By 15 February. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 3) (250)

Yeltsin 6 February Edict No. 152 Amending Edict 95/1208 On Membership Of Council On Presidential State Service. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 3) (250)

Government 8 February Decree No. 116 On Amendments And Additions To Rules Governing Circulation Of Service And Civilian Weapons And Ammunition. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 4) (350)

Chernomyrdin 8 February Decree No. 121 On Conclusion And Signing Of Military Agreements With Tajikistan. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 13) (250) (Text)

Government 8 February Directive No. 159 Accepting Proposal Concerning Transport Machine Building Design Bureau's Participation In Development And Modernization Of U.S. Space Launch Pads. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 4) (300) (Text)

Yeltsin 10 February Directive No. 57 Setting Up Commission Headed By Chernomyrdin To Study Chechen Settlement Proposals. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 1) (200) (Text)

Yeltsin 10 February Directive No. 59 On Events To Mark 500th Anniversary Of Use Of Twin-Headed Eagle

As Russia's State Symbol. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jan 96 p 3) (200)

Yeltsin 10 February Directive No. 62 Tasking Emil Pain With Formation Of Working Group To Sum Up And Analyze Proposals For Chechen Settlement. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 2) (100)

Yeltsin 10 February Edict No. 169 On President's Plenipotentiary Representatives To Federal Assembly Chambers, Appointing A.Ya. Sliva To Federation Council And A.A. Kotenkov To State Duma. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 3) (500)

Yeltsin 10 February Edict No. 173 Amending Name Of Republic Of Kalmykia In Article 65 Of Constitution. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jan 96 p 3) (150)

Yeltsin 13 February Directive No. 66 On Urgent Measures Associated With The Russian Federation's Entry Into Council Of Europe. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 4) (1000) (Text)

Yeltsin 14 February Edict No. 195 On Russian Armed Forces Contingent In Bosnia. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 4) (400) (Text)

SECTION III: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Government 25 November Decree No. 1158 Approving Appended Requirements As Regards Certification Of Noninfection By HIV For Foreigners Applying For Russian Visas For Visits In Excess Of Three Months. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 14) (400) (Text)

Chernomyrdin 27 December Directive No. 1741 Reorganizing State Scientific Test Range For Aviation Systems As State Treasury Enterprise. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 96 p 6) (400)

Government 20 January Directive No. 64 Allocating R170 Million For 23d International Symposium On Semiconductors In St. Petersburg. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 3) (50)

Chernomyrdin 2 February Decree No. 104 Approving Statute On Licensing Space Activity, Plus Statute In Question. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 6) (50/3100)

Regional Affairs

Russia: 'Thousands' Attend Economic Protest Rally in Cheboksary

MM2202123596 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 96 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Belov: "Workers' March in Cheboksary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Cheboksary — A protest of unprecedented scale against the authorities' economic policy has been held in Cheboksary. Thousands of workers from the industrial tractor plant took to the streets of the Chuvash capital. They had been driven to desperation by the innumerable holdups in their wages and the threat of mass dismissals. They were joined by representatives of other enterprises in the city.

Carrying red banners, the columns moved toward government house. But even the large square was unable to hold all the rally participants. The Republic's president, N. Fedorov, was induced to address those present by their persistent chanting. He caught the people's mood and called the current Moscow leadership's policy "anti-people" and "anti-Russian." But this gesture did not meet with a grateful response. It was decided to continue the strike at the industrial tractor plant until all the workers' demands are met in full.

The rally participants called for the resignation of the Russian government and the Chuvash Republic Cabinet of Ministers. The rally resolution also supported the single left-wing force candidate in the coming presidential election.

Russia: Irkutsk Poll Shows Favored Presidential Candidates

964F1110C Irkutsk SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 10 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Vasilyev: "Their Fellow Irkutskians 'Made Them Happy for a While': They Want Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the results of the first sociological "cross-section" of public opinion in Irkutsk Oblast, on the eve of the upcoming presidential elections, three leaders have been revealed. These are Zhirinovskiy (6.3 percent), Zyuganov (5.3 percent), and Yeltsin (5.2 percent). And only further behind them come Yavlinskiy (4.3 percent) and Lebed (3.4 percent).

In the poll, conducted by the sociological center under the administration, 1,200 residents of Irkutsk, Angarsk, Bratsk, and several rural population points took part. At this point, less than a third of them have become set in their sympathies. Some 34 percent have not yet made up their minds, and 20 percent "and change" respond that they do not see a worthy candidate.

As before, rural voters are setting their hopes on a "fresh" leader. Some 13 percent gave their preference to Zhirinovskiy, 6.5 percent to Zyuganov, and 4 percent to the current president. From the experience of the elections to the State Duma, it may be considered that the residents of small and medium-sized cities share these sentiments, and all in all, this is half, if not more, of the total number of the oblast's electorate.

Russia: Gorbachev Support in Novosibirsk Noted

964F1110B Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Because Many People Have Not Forgotten...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] A citizens' action group has begun energetic activity in Novosibirsk on collecting signatures in support of advancing the candidacy of Mikhail Gorbachev at the upcoming presidential elections. It is headed by a former deputy to the city council and one of the closest aides of the former senator Aleksey Manannikov, Boris Kadachigov. To this VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK correspondent's question "Why?"—Boris Kadachigov answered: "Because Gorbachev ended the war in Afghanistan, because most of the voters have not forgotten those times when the plants and scientific research and design institutes worked, when salaries were paid and housing was built on time. And many of us lived more freely then...."

In Novosibirsk, the collection of signatures is actively under way, while in Moscow Aleksey Manannikov is to all intents and purposes managing the election campaign of the former president of the USSR, although the creation of a "headquarters" has not yet officially been announced. Incidentally, in spite of reports by the mass media, "our man in Moscow" Vasiliy Lipitskiy and the party that he heads—the RSDNP [the Russian Social-Democratic People's Party]— are not at all engaged in Gorbachev's election campaign. Information of this kind is evidently based on the fact that Gorbachev and Lipitskiy are well acquainted and that both are adherents of the ideas of social-democracy....

Russia: Candidates for Novosibirsk Mayor's Post Increase

964F1110A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 13 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed article: "There Are Already Six Candidates for Mayor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Besides the current mayor of Novosibirsk, Viktor Tolokonskiy, and the previously registered senior instructor at the physical education department of the Siberian Commercial Academy, the self-nominated Anatoliy Gavrilov; the vice president of the joint-stock company Sibtekhpromstroy, Petr Lapkov; and the deputy general director of the open-type joint-stock company Novosibirsk Construction Machines Plant, Irina Emikh; two more candidates to the post of Novosibirsk administration head have been registered at the city electoral commission. These are the self-nominated general director of the design institute Novosibirskgrazhdanproyekt, Vladimir Zonov, and the general director of the Truck Plant No. 3, Aleksey Bobchenkov. The youngest among the candidates is the lady; she is 25 years old.

* * * *

The city electoral commission has arrived at an estimate for the expenditures for the Novosibirsk mayoral elections. For one round of voting, the city council is allocating R2.281 billion. If it comes to a second round, then R700 million more will be required. It would be better to get along with one round!

Russia: Customs Corridor To Be Created in Far East

LD2202101796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0900 GMT 22 Feb 96

[By Yevgeniy Lents]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, 22 February (ITAR-TASS) — The local authorities of the Primorye Region (the Russian Far East) are working out proposals on creating a customs corridor in the Russian 200-mile economic zone for the inspection of fishing boats in the areas of fishing. This is going to be done "because of the urgent necessity to curb the illegal export of fishing products, which has reached unprecedented scope of late," Igor Berkovich, head of the department for combat economic crimes of the regional Interior Department, told Tass today.

In the course of the Putina-95 (fishing season) operation the Russian services managed to prevent the illegal export of fishing products to a total sum of four billion roubles, Berkovich continued. Some 300 Russian fishing boats were inspected in the fishing zones, and 330 crimes were exposed, 80 percent of which were cases of misappropriation of fishing products. The largest number of crimes were conducted at fishing boats belonging to fishing collective farms of the Primorye Region and privately owned firms from Primorye, Magadan, Sakhalin and Kamchatka.

In the opinion of Berkovich, there are no restrictions now on the illegal export of fishing products, because the fishing is going on in the 200-mile economic zone, whose outside border is practically open. The only thing they have to do is to take on board red fish, crabs or caviar and sail directly to Japan or South Korea.

According to the unofficial data, the value of the 1995 illegal exports of fishing products from the Russian Far East to foreign countries is estimated at hundreds of billions of roubles. "It is absolutely necessary to create a border 'corridor' here, through which fishing boats will pass. A mobile customs post will be working in the fishing area for the declaration of cargoes. Law enforcement agencies believe that this is the only reliable way to put a barrier on the way of the plunder of Russian territorial waters," Berkovich said.

Russia: Illegal Alien Sweep in Far East Leads to Deportations

LD2202112496 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0855 GMT 22 Feb 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Savelyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Khabarovsk, 22 February (ITAR-TASS) — Over 200 foreign nationals have been deported from Khabarovsk Territory as part of Operation Rezhim, which has now been completed here. The passport and visa service and other Interior Ministry units jointly with border guards and migration service workers spent a month checking the legality of foreigners' presence in towns and villages in the Amur area. Over 4,000 places of legal and illegal residence of foreigners were checked and over 1,000 serious violations discovered, ITAR-TASS was told at the Territory's Interior Ministry office. The absolute majority of illegals were citizens of the People's Republic of China. They were not registered and many had forged papers or long-expired visas. A large group of Chinese nationals is being held at a detention camp in Khabarovsk and will be deported to China once the formalities have been completed.

Russia: Novgorod Refugee Program Needs More Money

LD2202104596 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2226 GMT 21 Feb 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Troyanovskiy]

[FBIS Translated Text] Novgorod, 22 February (ITAR-TASS) — Implementation of the "Migration as Development" program which has been drawn up here and endorsed by the Federal authorities will help to create better conditions for taking in refugees and forced migrants in Novgorod Region.

Anatoliy Kolodyazhniy, head of the region's migration service, told ITAR-TASS that Novgorod had already taken in more than 9,000 resettlers. This number is expected to increase by another 4,000 this year.

Kolodyazhniy said that a temporary hostel with 330 beds had opened for the migrants and at present is occupied by more than 200 refugees from Chechnya. Last year, 100 flats were built using Federal budget funds in Novgorod, Borovichi, Kholm and other towns in the region for the incomers. Another 44 flats are being built in Borovichi and Valday. The migration service and the employment service have organized around 200 jobs for the resettlers at timber mills, building materials factories and bakeries in Novgorod, Malaya Vishera and other district centers.

However, the head of the region's migration service stressed, insufficient Federal finance means that refugees and forced resettlers are being dealt with slowly and sometimes inefficiently. This is causing people dispossessed by the war in Chechnya dissatisfaction.

Economic Issues

Russia: Yeltsin, IMF Adopt Declaration on $10.2 Billion Credit

LD2202132796 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1319 GMT 22 Feb 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 22 February (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin and IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus today adopted a joint declaration that opens the way for Russia to receive an IMF credit worth $10.2 billion over three years. This was reported to ITAR-TASS by Sergey Medvedev, the Russian president's press secretary.

Russia: Government Decree To Settle USSR Debts to London Club

MM2102092696 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Feb 96 p 5

[Russian Federation Government Decree No. 113, signed by Premier Chernomyrdin and dated 7 February 1996, "On the Settlement of the Former USSR's Debt to the Foreign Commercial Banks United in the London Club of Creditors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Russian Federation Government Decree No. 191 of 28 February 1995: "On the Settlement of the Former USSR's Debt to the Foreign Commercial Banks United in the London Club of Creditors" and in connection with the reaching of agreements with the London Club of creditors on the main terms for rescheduling the former USSR's foreign debt to foreign commercial banks, the Russian Federation Government decrees that:

1. The Bank for Foreign Economic Activity [Vneshekonombank] together with the Russian Federation Finance Ministry shall hold talks with the Bank of England to coordinate and sign a draft agreement on a trust account.

2. The Russian Federation Finance Ministry shall give the Bank of England a Russian Federation Government guarantee on the payment by the Vneshekonombank of the commission charged for opening and servicing the trust account.

3. It shall be laid down that agreed payments of $1.5 billion to the London Club of creditors shall be made through the trust account following the signing of the agreement on the trust account and shall be used to pay the creditor banks only after the debt to each creditor has been verified and a corresponding document signed with each creditor.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government
[Dated] Moscow, 7 February 1996
No. 113

Russia: Soskovets Stresses Gravity of Indebtedness Problem

LD2102225796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2052 GMT 21 Feb 96

[By Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, 21 February (ITAR-TASS) - Solving the mutual indebtedness problem is a priority for the Russian government in 1996, First Vice-Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets said on Wednesday.

"We will be searching for a solution on a macroeconomic level, as the problem arose as a result of a clash of economic interests of various enterprises," Soskovets said.

The mutual indebtedness problem has acquired catastrophic proportions, he said. A further investment fall in the fuel and power sector may have adverse effects on electric power supplies for the whole country, he said.

Financial difficulties facing some enterprises of the fuel and power complex threaten them with bankruptcy.

The creation of the Federal Power System will "radically change the procedures of establishing electric power tariffs," he said.

He called on the Fuel and Power Ministry to boost activities aiming to create a wholesale fuel market "which will bring a quicker solution to the mutual indebtedness problem," he said.

Russia: Reactions to Kulikov Proposals Viewed

MM2102152596 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Article by military observer Anatoliy Makarov: "Anatoliy Kulikov Has Apparently Found Trillions for the Wages of the Defenders of Law and Order. Whom Did the General Scare?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a closed government session on 9 February Russian Minister of Internal Affairs Army General Anatoliy Kulikov put forward a number of proposals formulated by his department's experts and designed to increase income and improve government monitoring of the expenditure of budget funds. In particular, he proposed that unjustified expenditure be cut drastically, that control of the use of administrative buildings by commercial organizations be strengthened, that certain commercial banks and monopolist companies be partially nationalized, that oil export tariffs be reviewed, that the system of financing measures for the restoration of Chechnya be changed, and certain other measures.

"The ministry's experts and I analyzed the existing situation; our conclusions are by no means beyond dispute, but this is what strikes the eye," Anatoliy Kulikov stated after the government session. However, his idea provoked a storm of reactions among the Russian bureaucracy. Representatives of the structures of power set about trying to demonstrate the absurdity of the proposal and its dangers to democratic reforms.

Gen. Kulikov's idea of nationalizing a number of commercial banks, far from helping to rectify the economic situation, would, if implemented, lead to lamentable results. That view was expressed by Aleksandr Khandruyev, first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia. In his opinion, the question of nationalization can be raised only if a particular commercial bank goes bankrupt.

In Khandruyev's opinion, in the context of the transitional period it is expedient for the state to maintain its participation in a number of specialized banks — those where there is state participation at federal level or at the level of local administrations. As the experience of East European countries shows, the state plays quite an active part in normalizing its own banking system.

Concerning the activity of foreign banks, Aleksandr Khandruyev believes that rationing their access to the Russian market "is an asset, rather than a defect of our banking system." Here the Central Bank first deputy chairman stipulated that access "must be made strictly dependent on real contributions by way of attracting foreign investors into the Russian economy." At the same time he regards as promising the idea that when a license is issued to a foreign bank to conduct operations in Russia it should be advised to help out a particular loss-making Russian bank. This practice, he says, has long been used worldwide.

Sergey Dubinin, chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, stated that "I see no economic expediency in Gen. Kulikov's proposals for partial nationalization of commercial banks." "It is quite obvious that such measures will not bring additional funds into the budget," he stressed. The head of the Central Bank stipulated that "no doubt certain commercial banks would be glad to transfer their debts to the government."

Here Dubinin stated that he supports the Russian internal affairs minister's proposal on financing restoration work in Chechnya. "At the moment expenditures are taking place in Chechnya which it will be impossible to check on subsequently," he noted. "All funding should be deferred until the cessation of military operations in the republic. And only after that is it expedient to engage in restoration," he stressed.

At the same time the Central Bank chairman also shares Kulikov's concern about the "Ingushetia" free economic zone. He stressed particularly that "to allow any business to register within the country and yet not pay taxes seems nonsensical." As he put it, the central question today is the collection of taxes. "Improving funding for the budget-funded sectors depends on that," he noted. "The task today is to replenish the budget by all legal means."

The idea of nationalizing the commercial banks offers the state nothing positive, in the view of Vladimir Gusev, leader of the Russian State Tax Service. At the same time he believes that Gen. Kulikov's proposals contain "some good sense too." For instance, the need to adopt a law making it compulsory to declare costly purchases and the construction of houses and apartments. "In this respect the internal affairs minister is absolutely right," he stressed.

The Russian Government will examine Internal Affairs Minister Anatoliy Kulikov's initiatives, "not in the form in which the minister put them forward, but in terms of the problems raised," Russian head of government Viktor Chernomyrdin stated at a press conference at the end of the Russian-French talks. He had completely forgotten about his solemn election promises to extinguish last year's debts to the military. It was one-way traffic: The Army and Navy provided "Our Home" with 4.5 percent of the votes without receiving a penny in exchange.

According to the Russian premier, Anatoliy Kulikov's proposals "offer us nothing new, these are matters that the cabinet should be studying constantly." At the same time Viktor Chernomyrdin noted that Anatoliy Kulikov "really cares" about the problems of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the Armed Forces, and that explains the nature of the proposals he put forward. This disingenousness on the part of the "Our Home" chief can be explained largely by the fact that Kulikov is encroaching on the oil and gas vein which has long been a gold seam for a small circle of new Russians. It was no accident that one of the banners that greeted the leader in the Urals said "Vorkuta Is Our Home!"

Russian presidential aide Aleksandr Livshits regards MVD Minister Anatoliy Kulikov's proposals to nationalize certain commercial organizations and use foreign currency reserves for the payment of wages as unacceptable. "The nationalization of certain commercial banks and major monopoly organizations, which Kulikov proposes, can hardly be acceptable, since nowadays, under the law, nothing can be confiscated from property owners, you can only buy them out." "Buying out" shares in commercial organizations does not seem possible, because "they will be a burden on the state, and there will be even less money for the budget-funded sectors," he believes.

Aleksandr Livshits said that on the instructions of the head of state he had reported to Boris Yeltsin on what he agrees with and what he categorically disagrees with in Anatoliy Kulikov's position on supplementing the income side of the budget. "I do not share the proposal for inappropriate use of Central Bank currency reserves, since these reserves make it possible to maintain stability on the currency market. Nor do I agree with the frivolous attitude to emissions and inflation," Aleksandr Livshits said. In his opinion, "we can't play hide-and-seek with inflation, it will inevitably catch us and make us tackle once again problems that we have had before." "The president's line of combating inflation will remain unchanged," the head of state's aide stated. However, Livshits shares Kulikov's view on the inexpediency of funding the restoration of Chechnya's economy prior to the cessation of hostilities. In general he pays due credit to the MVD minister's desire to draw attention to the problem of supplementing the income side of the budget.

The Russian Federation MVD Internal Troops, including those carrying out missions in Chechnya, are experiencing an acute shortage of funding, Lieutenant General Stanislav Kavun, deputy commander of internal troops, stated. As of today, taking into account the debts for December last year and the needs for January of this year, the internal troops need R332.827 billion for pay and food alone. Thus far, only R94 billion has been allocated from the budget.

As Stanislav Kavun reported, from these funds it has proved possible, in the main, to extinguish last year's wage debts to servicemen in the internal troops carrying out missions in Chechnya, and in part to pay January's wages to those going to Chechnya to replace them. There is no possibility of paying last November's pay to some of the subunits of internal troops outside Chechnya.

According to the internal troops command, in the past year their expenditure on the operation in Chechnya totaled R670 billion, and only R88 billion has been repaid from the state budget. In principle this means that the events in Chechnya are forcing the troops to spend their internal reserves on this operation, to the detriment of general combat readiness.

In general the Russian Federation MVD Internal Troops budget for 1996 has been approved in a sum totaling some 32 percent of their needs. The railmen have already warned the military of their possible refusal to carry military shipments due to nonpayment of expenses. However, this problem is most likely insoluble. According to Stanislav Kavun's information, only 11 percent of the necessary sum for rail shipments for the internal troops has been allocated from the federal budget.

In the Russian MVD leadership's opinion, proposals by government officials on possible ways of extricating the military people from the monetary crisis appear bizarre. In particular, they recommend obtaining credits from commercial banks. But the banks give credit on the basis of securities and at huge interest rates. The state is hardly going to gain from the fact that the military's "security" is their level of combat readiness. Nor do Gen. Kulikov's subordinates see the expediency of feeding these basically parasitic banking structures at the treasury's expense. While soldiers and officers of the Russian Federation MVD in Chechnya cannot feed themselves properly according to the regular norm (not the front-line norm!), the "new Russians" are bathing their whores in champagne.

The situation regarding food supplies to the Russian Armed Forces was described as extremely difficult by Colonel General Vladimir Churanov, Russian Federation deputy defense minister and chief of the Armed Forces Rear Services. The funds stipulated in this year's budget for the purchase of food for the Army and Navy amount to 74 percent of what is needed, not counting extinguishing debts to suppliers for what was received last year or replenishing the stipulated food reserves, he stated at a press conference.

One of the main factors hampering food purchases and deliveries in the necessary quantities and on time, according to Vladimir Churanov, is the chronic underfunding of the Army. In last year's military budget expenditure on food supplies for servicemen was cut from R3.5 trillion to 1.7 trillion. But even that money arrived irregularly and without taking account of rising food prices.

In December 1995 the Russian Ministry of Finance did not allocate a single ruble for food supplies, the general reported. This January, only one-fifth of the requirement was received. As a result the Defense Ministry's debt to food suppliers came to more than R1 trillion. Now, according to his estimate, running food reserves in the districts and fleets have been reduced by 30-50 percent. "In certain cases, emergency reserves are having to be used," he stressed.

The attentive reader now has some idea of the situation, but he may ask: Why should Gen. Kulikov be the one to look for a way out of the crisis?

Kulikov is obliged to maneuver and assess the situation soberly. He knows that in the internal troops the "man with a gun" is increasingly frequently wondering: Who needs the war in Chechnya, who benefits from it, and why should Russian soldiers and officers die in the North Caucasus? Even since Yeltsin's announcement of his desire to become president again, 22 people have been killed and more than 40 wounded in clashes. In just a few days a fool company has been put out of action, and no end to the bloodshed is in sight. Kulikov has no desire to echo the fate of his predecessor V. Yerin, who after loyal service to the regime is now forced to busy himself with catching foreign intelligence agents and wait for the court's verdict.

The farsighted Kulikov knows that in any attempt to repeat the events of October 1993 the internal troops are not going to shoot at their own people. Furthermore, the Communist faction in the State Duma and the associated patriotic deputies have sent out warning letters to the power ministers on their personal accountability in the event of armed intervention in the resolution of political conflicts in Russia. In short, whichever way you turn, there is no way out! Whereas formerly you could count on the Army, now even it is no help to the regime. The Moscow-based formations (the Taman and Kantemir divisions) and units are demoralized, and the officers no longer have any desire to drive their tanks along the capital's main avenues. It is no use counting on the Airborne Troops either: After the discharge to the reserve of their commander Colonel General Yevgeniy Podkolzin which is expected in April, he will inevitably align himself with the disgraced Generals Vladislav Achalov and Aleksandr Lebed.

In the existing situation Gen. Kulikov sees the solution in changing the course of reforms, and as a military leader and a scientist, he is proposing to the government a very concrete solution. Unfortunately, his calls come as a voice crying in the "democratic" wilderness.

Russia: Aspects of Upcoming $100 Bill Exchange Eyed

MM2202100196 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Feb 96 p 1, 2

[Report by Aleksandr Anichkin: "Russia Becomes Leader in Importation of Dollars. Those Who Do Not Have Enough Will Be Given a Complaints Form"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The appearance in Russia of dollars of a new type is increasingly causing anxiety among our distrustful public. Bill Merden [name as transliterated], financial attache to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who is also the official representative of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is holding a routine meeting with journalists on this question today. It appears that interest in it is so great that the embassy has decided to hold such briefings on a weekly basis.

Meanwhile, according to IZVESTIYA's available information, which has not yet been confirmed through official channels, the Duma intends this week to invite Central Bank Chairman Sergey Dubinin to the House to provide explanations concerning the new dollars.

The well-known dictum of the classic author of Marxism-Leninism that ideas become a material force only when they seize hold of the masses could receive a completely unexpected confirmation in the way that the situation around the forthcoming introduction of new $100 bills is developing.

Not everyone, it seems, has yet appreciated the scale of the possible imminent upheavals. IZVESTIYA was told at the Central Bank that last year alone banks officially imported into Russia the crazy sum of $20,165,000,000 in cash, that is to say, roughly $135 for every inhabitant of the country. The total money supply inside Russia, according to the assessment of Professor Yakov Mirkin of the Russian Federation Government Financial Academy, is equivalent to $50-60 billion. This figure includes up to $20 billion in hard cash, which is currently in normal circulation, or which Russians have tucked away in an old sock. By way of comparison: Russia's entire annual GDP amounts to slightly more than $160 billion (converted according to the commercial exchange rate).

Formally, no one can, and no one should, force our citizens to exchange old dollars for new. This was confirmed by both the Central Bank and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. But the mass flurry provoked by the idea that is firmly rooted in Russia that no action involving the exchange of banknotes promises anything good for the ordinary man in the street could, according to the estimates of some experts, net the Russian banks several hundred million dollars and seriously reduce "greenback" savings, which are still the most popular among citizens. Because the banks are entitled to exact a commission of up to 2 percent for exchanging dollars for dollars.

Almost all the "greenbacks" held by the population are in $100 bills. If our distrustful citizens decide to exchange all their old dollars for the new type, it is not hard to calculate that from this transaction alone the banks will net $320 million, which will naturally be deducted from citizens' money.

In addition to the banks, the customs will also make big money. Russia has one of the highest duties on the importation of hard currency by corporations in the world — 0.15 percent. The State Customs Committee fixed this rate independently by means of legally binding acts. Thus, supposing that a full $20 billion is again imported into Russia (in new dollars), the customs will make $30 million.

The Confederation of Consumer Societies has assessed the agreement between the Central Bank of Russia and a group of leading commercial banks, including the Savings Bank, the Innovations Commercial Bank, and the "Russian Credit" Bank, to levy a commission of two percent for exchanging banknotes as an illegal cartel agreement, and has appealed to the Duma to carry out an antimonopoly investigation.

In the Central Bank itself IZVESTIYA's correspondent was told that they see no need to react to this kind of "unfounded statement," since instructions, explanations, and numerous briefings, including jointly with the U.S. Embassy, on the subject of the introduction of the new banknotes have entirely cleared up all matters relating to this subject. The exchange of old dollars for new is in any case devoid of all economic sense, a Central Bank spokesman considers, since the old dollars will remain an entirely valid means of payment for as long as they remain in circulation. In the event of violations, new forms will be at the disposal of aggrieved citizens to make complaints and appeals. It is proposed that these forms will be available at every exchange office.

Curiously, the champions of consumer rights, it was explained to IZVESTIYA in the Confederation of Consumer Societies, do not object to the idea of charging interest for exchanging banknotes in itself. In fact, when rubles are exchanged into dollars or vice versa the bank's profits arise from the difference in the selling and buying rate of exchange. In the case of exchanging dollars for dollars, there is no such difference (margin), but expenses (the work time of the employees, checking the banknotes for forgeries, the sorting, packaging, collection, and transportation of the old dollars out of Russia and the new ones into the country) are extremely high.

The Confederation's objections are, first, that the consumer is effectively deprived of the right to choose: When the two-percent commission charge is sanctified by the name of the Central Bank, the Savings Bank, and other big fish, it will scarcely be possible to find a bank that will fix the commission at a lower rate than that proposed from the center. Although, on the other hand, even banks which do not belong to the cartel will hardly dare to fix a higher charge. Second, the consumers' federation believes, the "cartel" method of adopting a decision which affects millions of people is in itself unjust.

The Central Bank, however, is confident that the commission could actually prove to be lower. In the words of a Central Bank spokesman, two percent is a sort of "hypothetical ceiling," along the lines of the currency band, which, incidentally, the ruble never did leave. Moreover, some commercial banks are already offering private persons the chance to invest their money in deposit accounts, on the condition of the money being withdrawn in new banknotes. Moreover, the usual interest rate on their deposit will remain unchanged.

Thus who is right — the Central Bank, confident that the measures adopted are entirely sufficient to protect citizens' savings, or the consumer rights champions, who fear that someone will make a tidy sum as a result of panic selling and ignorance, will become clear in the very near future. As soon as the new dollars with the large portrait of Franklin on the face appear...

Russia: GKI Chief Unfolds Privatization Policy Dilemma to Duma

MK2202104896 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 21 Feb 96 p 1

[Report by Svetlana Lolayeva: "The Head of the State Property Committee Has Offered a Choice Between 'Justice' and Social Spending"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the State Duma yesterday, to the mutual contentment of both sides, the first meeting took place between State Property Committee [GKI] Chairman Aleksandr Kazakov and members of the Committee on Property, Privatization, and Economic Activity. Stating that he was not going to say "anything global," Aleksandr Kazakov nonetheless presented to the deputies a fairly coherent vision of privatization, as well as the roles that the GKI and the Duma would take in this process. The GKI head admitted the need to adjust the course of privatization in connection with changes in the "sociopolitical background in the country." For a start, Mr. Kazakov said, it is necessary to establish "on which field we are playing," defining the spheres where privatization should be "off limits" (national security, vital installations, and obviously unprofitable enterprises) and spheres where, quite the contrary, we should move more actively and boldly. To all appearances, it will be extremely difficult to define the spheres in the second category, which do not fall under restrictions. Mr. Kazakov did not elaborate on his classification scheme to the deputies.

According to the GKI head, the aims of privatization also need straightening out. The change of property, as such, was justified at the first stage, but the main task should be enhancing the efficiency of privatizing enterprises, creating new jobs, and so forth. Aleksandr Kazakov brought up the slogan concerning the transition to a "targeted" privatization strategy proclaimed by the previous GKI leadership, agreeing that "it is enough to complete 15-16 well-elaborated privatization projects a year." The GKI head believes that the period of command directives "from above" is over and that initiative should come from "below"; that is, from the enterprises themselves.

Yet the GKI's aspiration to work on a "case-by-case" basis is hampered by the budget revenue plan. According to Mr. Kazakov, privatization cannot be regarded as a source of budget supply. If priority is given to replenishing the treasury, the global objective — enhancing the efficiency of enterprises — the privatization department chief warned, can be forgotten forever. Making a diplomatic nod toward the lawmakers ("as you, the Duma, decide, so the GKI will do"), Aleksandr Kazakov indicated unambiguously that the deputies should either relieve the GKI of the burden of the privatization revenue plan or stop any talk about the sellout of assets. Otherwise the GKI "will be left with no other option than to hold loans-for-shares auctions" and seek other revenue generating schemes.

Mr. Kazakov attributed last year's auctions to the need to ensure the execution of the budget plan. According to Aleksandr Kazakov, privatization revenues should be directed in a targeted way to enterprise investment projects. Deputy Vladimir Sergiyenko from the People's Power group immediately proposed remitting to industry "half the quarterly revenues of commercial banks" by way of investment.

Mr. Kazakov himself believes that a realistic estimate of privatization revenues is 1.5 trillion rubles, which was included in the budgets of all federation components. Considering that in the 1996 budget privatization revenues are planned in the amount of 14 trillion rubles, and the fact that Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov at a recent ministry collegium session urged that the privatization revenue plan must not be disrupted, Mr. Kazakov rather deftly freed himself of responsibility for addressing this problem, shifting it to the deputies' shoulders. The deputies were again confronted with a dilemma: either make amendments in the budget, substantially cutting privatization revenues — which, given the strained condition of the revenue base, threatens a tough confrontation with the Finance Ministry and narrows the possibilities for populist decisions in budget expenditures — or untie the GKI's hands, giving it complete freedom of action and moderating their critical fervor with respect to "anti-people's privatization."

International Affairs

Ukraine: Kuchma, Christopher Discuss START-II, Bosnia

LD2202115496 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0900 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington — On 21 February, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher held a dinner in honor of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, at which the Ukrainian president and U.S. secretary of state discussed a wide range of issues of cooperation between Ukraine and the United States at the bilateral level and in the international arena, the UNIAN news agency learned from the Ukrainian Embassy in the United States.

The Ukrainian president assessed the U.S. Senate's ratification of the START-II treaty as an important step toward strengthening security in the whole world. He stressed that Ukraine was fulfilling its obligations under the START-I treaty as well as the trilateral statement between the Ukrainian, U.S., and Russian presidents.

Leonid Kuchma and Warren Christopher also discussed issues of mutual interest, in particular, Ukraine's participation in the multinational forces implementing the peace agreement in Bosnia. Both sides expressed readiness to continue cooperation in deepening the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ukrainian president stressed the importance of including Ukraine in restoring Bosnia- Herzegovina's economy, destroyed as a result of the conflict, in view of the fact that our state was one of the countries that experienced the most losses as a result of observing UN Security Council sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. Warren Christopher expressed support for Ukraine's participation in the restoration process in the former Yugoslavia.

Ukraine: President, U.S. Defense Secretary Meeting

LD2202122396 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington — On 21 February, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma visited the Pentagon, where he met U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry. In the course of the conversation the Ukrainian president and U.S. defense secretary discussed the issue of cooperation between the two states in the military field, as well as the issue of creating a Europe-wide security system, UNIAN learned at the Ukrainian embassy in the United States.

The Ukrainian president and U.S. defense secretary examined the course of implementation of the trilateral statement between the Ukrainian, U.S., and Russian presidents of 14 February 1994. At this point, Perry praised Ukraine's fulfilment of its obligations in accordance with the trilateral accords. The Ukrainian president proposed that aid be increased to Ukraine in accordance with the Nunn-Lugar program from the aspect of resolving problems of the socioeconomic constituent of nuclear disarmament in Ukraine. [rewording for clarity] As is well known, the total aid according to this program comes to $350 million.

Kuchma and Perry agreed on the necessity of more actively seeking additional fields for bilateral cooperation, expanding and deepening it, for example, in the fields of export control and conversion, specifically redirecting defense research to the elaboration of energy-saving and ecologically safe technologies.

The Ukrainian president stressed that our state facilitates the establishment of proper export control over the transfer of arms, military equipment, goods and wares and dual-use technology. He noted that Ukraine is ready to join the founders of the Nassenaarska [as received] accord [Nassenaarska domovlenist].

Leonid Kuchma and William Perry also discussed the issue of cooperation between Ukraine and the United States within the framework of NATO. The U.S. defense secretary praised Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace program and stressed that his country welcomes the process of expansion and deepening of relations between Ukraine and NATO in accordance with the Partnership for Peace program and beyond it. [adding the word and for clarity] In his opinion, such relations confirm that Ukraine is becoming a fundamental element of the European security system. He also expressed certainty that the trilateral Ukrainian-American-Russian military exercises, which are to take place in Ukraine in the spring, would be successful.

The Ukrainian president focussed on the necessity of avoiding a new division of Europe. At the same time he noted that the issue of NATO expansion should be resolved by the alliance and the country joining it. Not a single state can have the right to veto NATO expansion, except for its members. Kuchma stressed that Ukraine was endeavoring to avoid a situation whereby it could end up playing the role of a buffer state between NATO and member countries of the Tashkent agreement on collective security.

Perry expressed satisfaction at the participation of a Ukrainian battalion in the multinational forces implementing the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and emphasised that the United States is ready to facilitate and render assistance in resolving technical issues linked to the Ukrainian battalion's participation in NATO peacemaking operation.

Ukraine: Kuchma Questioned on Sale of Planes to Colombia

WS2202094596 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0358 GMT 22 Feb 96

[By Yaroslav Bihun, "Special to INTELNEWS"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Washington, Feb 21 — Halfway through his second visit to Washington, President Leonid Kuchma is basking in the glow of an ever-improving relationship with the United States. But he was reminded that embarrassing news from home can cast long shadows.

On the morning before his Feb. 20 arrival in Washington, an article in the Los Angeles Times alleged that Ukraine-built Antonov-32B aircraft were being used by Colombian drug lords. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry in Kiev had already denied the reports.

Nonetheless, journalists raised the question at White House and State Department briefings, and Kuchma had to respond to a reporter's question on the topic while being welcomed by President Bill Clinton in the Oval Office Feb. 21. Kuchma said the planes belonged to a company and not the Ukrainian government. The leased planes, he said, were the responsibility of the Colombian government. He said that even though, as far as he knew, Ukrainian- owned aircraft were not involved, he ordered an investigation of the matter and suggested that international measures might be appropriate. Following the White House meeting, a joint statement emphasized that the bilateral relationship had reached "the highest level since the two countries established diplomatic ties" and that Clinton "reaffirmed the critical importance the United States attaches to an independent, democratic and prosperous Ukraine" and that the U.S. "will increase its assistance to help Ukraine overcome the transitional period."

Kuchma also got some good news from International Monetary Fund Director Michel Camdessus, with whom he met an hour after his arrival here. Camdessus said the IMF would approve the next tranche of credit to Ukraine totaling $900 million as soon as Ukraine's Parliament passes the 1996 state budget. Economics Minister Roman Shpek, who has spent last week in Washington preparing for Kuchma's visit, said the president's initial meetings point to an understanding of the economic, political and social situation in which Ukraine finds itself on the part of international lending institutions and the United States.

During a meeting with Vice President Al Gore just prior to his meeting with Clinton, the two sides signed a bilateral Commercial Space Launch Agreement, which would allow Ukrainian rockets to be used in the launching of U.S. commercial satellites. Much time was also spent discussing the closing of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, according to Ukrainian National Security Adviser Volodymyr Horbulin. And it was suggested during the meeting with Gore that Kuchma and Gore head a joint committee on that subject, Horbulin told reporters. "I feel that the talks with Mr. Gore and Mr. Clinton were productive as never before," Horbulin said, noting that the discussions were very productive and to the point. Kuchma also had meetings with World Bank President James Wolfenson, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Defense Secretary William Perry. His three-day visit, which ends Feb. 22, also includes meetings with Congressional business and legal leaders, and a banquet in his honor, at which he will receive the Freedom Award from the leading American human rights organization Freedom House.

Ukraine: Foreign Ministry Denies Drugs Trade Involvement

LD2102194896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1625 GMT 21 Feb 96

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE" news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, February 21 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukraine is rejecting all charges of her involvement in drug trafficking from Latin America to the United States, "IF-U" was told in interview today by Yuriy Sergeyev, chief of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's information department.

The American newspaper "Los Angeles Times" carried on February 16 an article saying that the Ukrainian Government is assisting drug traffickers through the supply to Mexico, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia of Ukrainian-made AN-32B planes, which are efficiently used for drug trafficking to the USA.

According to Sergeyev, "one cannot help noticing that the article fails to furnish any proof, but, instead, serious and categorical enough charges are made in a hypothetical wrapping".

The diplomat stressed that the author "peremptorily identifies persons involved in narcotics business in the Latin American countries with whole nations and states, and every kind of business with those countries, including on the part of Ukraine, with aiding and abetting the narcotics mafia".

In his view, such a "deception of public opinion" is carried on "most likely, at someone's very serious and well-funded order".

"The question is who and why needed to choose Ukraine out of all countries having trade-economic relations with the Latin American countries", Sergeyev said. "May be the reason is that in developing efficient trade-economic relations with Argentina, Brasilia and other nations in the region, Ukraine has found herself within someone's zone of economic interests?" he inquires.

In the opinion of the Ukrainian diplomat, "an attempt is at hand to oust Ukraine from that market" in such a rude and uncivilized manner.

National Affairs

Ukraine: Kuchma's Staff Chief Accuses Moroz of Discrediting Council

LD2102145496 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1130 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — The remarks made by Oleksandr Moroz, Ukrainian Socialist Party [SPU] chairman and Supreme Council speaker, at the third all-Ukrainian SPU conference discredit the Supreme Council, creating a distorted impression about the true situation in the Ukrainian parliament, Dmytro Tabachnyk, head of the presidential administration, told a news conference on 21 February. He expressed confidence that Moroz' views did not reflect the position of the parliamentary majority.

Tabachnyk dismissed the speaker's statement that the SPU and himself would press the president to change the sociopolitical course "imposed by the ruling elite" as "ungrounded sensationalism".

"Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz is part of the country's leadership and therefore bears full responsibility for the socioeconomic course pursued in Ukraine," he said.

Commenting on Moroz' allegation that "the constitutional treaty was signed under the pressure of threats and blackmail," the head of the presidential administration recalled that the speaker had voted in favor of the constitutional treaty. "One wonders what his true position is," Tabachnyk said.

Ukraine: Right Wing Boycotts CIS Interparliamentary Assembly

LD2102162996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1447 GMT 21 Feb 96

[By Mikhail Melnik, Raisa Stetsyura]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, February 21 (Itar-Tass) — Another crisis broke out in the Ukrainian parliament on Wednesday [21 February] as the right-wing national democrats refused to consider the Ukrainian Supreme Council's joining the agreement on the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly (IA).

The question has already been introduced for discussion five times with the same result. National democrats insist on removing the matter from the agenda and discussing economic legislative documents instead.

Ukraine's joining the IA should be considered after the new Ukrainian constitution is adopted in June, according to them.

Another argument put forward by the right-wingers reads as follows. Communists have come to power in Russia. If Ukraine ratifies the CIS Interparliamentary Agreement, the communist ideas will immediately spread here. And this will mean loss of soveregnity.

Leader of the socialist faction Ivan Chizh believes, that if the parliament fails to ratify the agreement, the socialists will initiate the dissolution of the Supreme Council. Leader of the Ukrainian communists Petro Symonenko laid the blame for the boycott on Leonid Kuchma, who opposes the Supreme Council's joining the IA.

Parliamentary speaker Moroz started consultations with faction leaders.

Ukraine: Communist Party Head Defends Policies

WS2202122296 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY
in Ukrainian 15 Feb 96 pp 6, 7

[Article by Petro Symonenko, first secretary of Ukraine's Communist Party [KPU] and head of the Ukrainian Supreme Council faction "Ukraine's Communists for Social Justice and Power for the People"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *It seesm communists, including the KPU representatives in the Supreme Council, have been blamed for everything. It is claimed that they want to reverse the development of society — back to "totalitarianism," "unwarranted leveling," and "social parasitism" — to restore the so-called "command- administrative system." Society is threatened with new repressions and with the fact that if communists return to power, they will expropriate assets what were earned by the people honestly, deprive the people of freedom of speech, introduce censorship, and close the way for foreign investments and entrepreneurship to Ukraine.*

Among the most active KPU defamers, there are many who during the existence of the Soviet Union occupied high posts in the party and state structures, who proved to be "true Leninists," "ardent internationalists," and "steady fighters against bourgeois nationalism." At the time, they made a career; thanks to their membership in the ruling party, they took everything they wanted; and when an antisocialist coup d'etat took place in the country, they betrayed their party spitefully. Well-known Russian writer Oleksandr Zinovyev, a dissident recently thrown out of the Soviet Union, was right to describe the same chameleons who are the core of the current ruling clique as well: "The victory of the communists (results of Russian Duma elections are implied — P. S.) does not threaten the ruling clique in terms of the restoration of communism, because the current leadership, generally speaking, does not care at all about the type of social system; it is only afraid of this victory in personal terms. The victory of the communists endangers our leaders, because they can lose everything they have grabbed due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia, and communism; they are at risk of being put before the court of history and of being disgraced, because their mean role in the history of our country could be revealed."

They are particularly eager to take advantage of the concept of statehood. Communists are blamed for "ignoring Ukraine's national interests," for "lack of patriotism," and for "opposition to the spiritual revival of the Ukrainian nation;" they are called "enemies of the Ukrainian state." The KPU stance on the national issue, the revival of the union of fraternal peoples, is being falsified.

These accusations have no foundations. [passage omitted]

Everyone knows what led to the criminal destruction of the Soviet state; the disintegration of the single economic complex set up by joint effort; the thoughtless destruction of economic, scientific, and other links between the former soviet republics; the dismantlement of the single transportation, energy, and other systems; and the quick withdrawal from the "ruble zone." In his address to the Ukrainian Supreme Council in October 1994, incumbent President Leonid Kuchma said: "In the long run, the inconsiderate policy of protecting national interests (or even the erroneous understanding of these interests) during the breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of our young state has led to the loss of many our markets. There are estimates according to which a more than 35-percent drop in production over 1991-93 was caused by factors that are linked to the mistakes in the foreign economic activities of our state."

Mykola Savulskyy, the then deputy finance minister, said the following: "The situation became more complicated due to an agreement — addressing a shift to bilateral trade based on world prices — signed by the Ukrainian and Russian leaders in Dagomys in the summer of 1992. As regards Ukraine, it made a grave mistake, which ended in purchasing energy resources at prices which considerably exceeded world prices."

Communists warned repeatedly that such a policy would make Ukraine face a real threat of losing its economic and political independence. But no one considered their opinion. **Meanwhile,the Ukrainian economy, according to L. Kuchma's definition, has become semicolonial.** International political and financial organizations, particularly the IMF and the World Bank, interfered — with undue familiarity — in the affairs of our country and imposed on Ukraine their rules of privatization, and their guidelines for financial, foreign currency, and credit policies. All these facts are well known.

We are convinced, and the bitter experience of the past years proves this, that if our economy is not pulled out as soon as possible from the deep crisis caused by the antinational policy of capitalist restoration, by "shock therapy," by mass privatization, and by robbing the working people — given the ever-increasing isolation from Russia and other former Soviet Republics — one should not speak about the genuine statehood of Ukraine. **"The West does not need a strong Ukraine."** Western ruling circles regard Ukraine as one of the factors in their confrontation with Russia; they want to push — as we see, openly and not without success — the [Ukrainian] ruling clique into anti- Russian positions. Ukraine can obtain and preserve its genuine independence only in a union of independent states — built on new principles — in which single national economic and scientific complexes, single transportation, energy, and space systems, joint customs, currency, and information space, as well as joint efforts in diplomatic and defense areas will be restored; at the same time, Ukraine will keep its state sovereignty and all power to resolve the pressing issues of the Ukrainian state and its people.

Our party assesses the situation realistically. **It is impossible to restore the Soviet Union which existed before it broke up in December 1991. Life requires that the union of fraternal peoples be restored on the principles of complete independence and equality of independent states which will voluntarily unite in the name of joint objectives. Time will show if the union is a federation, a confederation, or some other organization. The peoples of fraternal countries who are bound by a common multi-century fate must resolve this issue.** They themselves will choose the most favorable form of their mutual cooperation. [passage omitted]

New falsifications of the complicated history of our great country, the intensification of national-chauvinistic propaganda, the whipping up of Russophobe sentiments by the press, television, and radio, including the state-owned ones, are aimed at splitting the fraternal peoples.

Of particular concern is **the reorientation of the foreign political course**, which is pursued contrary to official documents and to the detriment of the basic interests of sovereign Ukraine and its people: the shifting of emphasis to the ever-increasing approach toward the West and Ukraine's further estrangement from Russia; the expansion of cooperation with NATO; an almost unconcealed wish to joint this military-political group; and a refusal to join both the CIS collective security system and the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS states, a union of law-makers which in essence performs purely coordinating and conciliatory functions, in which all law-makers are equal and decisions regarding principal issues are adopted **unanimously** by means of consensus.

Already today Western politicians and "experts," who are abundant in presidential, governmental, and Supreme Council structures, dictate — with undue familiarity — which laws and decisions Ukraine should adopt, how and what kind of "reform" should be implemented, and which budget should be passed. American and NATO generals arrive on countless inspections and check how it disarms "directly in Ukraine." Perpetual military exercises with the participation of U. S. and NATO contingents are held on Ukrainian territory and close to its borders. Top Ukrainian officials report to European structures on the course of the constitutional process and on bringing national legislation into conformity with "European standards." [passage omitted]

A true fraternal, free, and equal union of our peoples can be built, if the peoples launch a joint effort and when principles of social justice become firmly established in each fraternal republic. But already today **communists, who have never been indifferent to the fate of their dear fatherland, are working untiringly to ensure and to strengthen the state independence of Ukraine** and to save its economy — the only reliable basis of state sovereignty — from ruin; they must do everything to advance the national science and the national culture, to strengthen the position of both the Ukrainian language and the languages of all nationalities who live in our country. **At the same time, we will launch efforts to make the fraternal people closer to one another in all aspects;** we will decisively oppose the pressure of chauvinistic forces and their wish to spread national narrow-mindedness and artificially separate Ukraine from fraternal republics and their peoples.

Ukraine: Chernobyl Victims Demand Compensation Payments

WS2202094996 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0358 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lugansk, Feb 21 — Sixteen members of the "Chernobyl Union" have begun a hunger strike to protest alleged payment delays in pension and other compensation payments.

Members of the union's Krasniy Luch branch began the strike on Monday in the office of the local executive committee. The union's local leader and strike participant, Volodymyr Stalmakov, told Kiyevskiye Vedomosti, "My comrades and I do not demand the impossible. It's just that the state owes people who during a time of danger and crisis were willing to risk their lives and health for the salvation of their fellow compatriots."

Ukraine: Radionuclides Found in Flour Supplied to East Russia

AU2102125596 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 20 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "A Radioactive Present to 'Muscovites'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **A quality control test of the flour in one of the three train carriages that arrived at Magdagachi Station in Amurskaya Oblast in the Far East of the Russian Federation revealed radionuclides of cesium-134 and cesium-137 isotopes in it.** This was stated by the press service of the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations. The concentration of radionuclides in the flour was found to be 300 times greater than normal.

It was also stated that such a dangerous commodity had arrived from Ukraine: The flour had been produced in Kharkiv at the Novopokrovskyy Bakery Combine.

Ukraine: Chemical Weapons Sunk Off Crimean Shores Pose Danger

WS2102124496 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 14 Feb 96 pp 1,7

[Article by Mykola Mahdych: "Chemical Weapons Sunk Off Crimean Shores Will Let Us Hear About Them"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A gigantic underwater chemical weapons depot was sunk near Sevastopol shores in the 1940's. Since then, not only mullets and gobies have been ending up in fishermen's nets. There is talk that specific sites of sunken bombs with mustard gas and lewisite are marked on fishermen's maps. Still, only the Black Sea Fleet has precise documents. It will leave and carry away the secret about the sites and scale of the chemical danger.

More than one generation of fishermen on the northern shores of the Black Sea have been pulling out kegs and ammunition stuffed with poisonous substances since the war. The initial curiosity quickly ended. The fishermen's "telegraph" immediately spread rumors about suspicious objects. Those who tried to tinker with the "catch" developed burns on their hands and other exposed body parts. Taught by bitter experience, fishermen preferred to get rid of "gifts" as quickly as possible, throwing them out.

But there is more than just rumor; there is documented evidence about a gigantic submerged depot for chemical weapons as well. The Museum of Heroic Defense and Liberation of Sevastopol keeps the memoirs of Captain 1st Rank N.T. Rybalko, who headed the Baltic Sea Fleet chemical service from 1938 to 1945. Describing the situation which developed in the summer of 1942, the chief chemist recalls that in June he suggested getting rid of stored chemical weapons to fleet commander F.S. Oktyabrskiy. Since there could not be any talk about evacuation by sea or air, they decided to sink the ordnance: "For several nights chemical ammunition was shipped out to a haven in Cossacks Bay, where it was loaded on the schooner Papaninets which sailed with this cargo to a designated place in the open sea with a depth of at least 50 meters.... By 29 June the operation had successfully been completed."

"Veterans of our service have confirmed, independently of Rybalko's memoirs, that such an operation was indeed carried out in the summer of 1942." This is what Cpt. 1st Rank Volodymyr Papura, chief of the Black Sea Fleet chemical service, says.

Two areas were marked on the fishermen's maps printed in the 1960's — an "explosives dump" and the mysterious "dirty soil." The second zone corresponded to the place in which the Papaninets schooner was presumably unloaded.

The fishermen's maps abound in similar marks near the Zmiyinyy Island, Kerch, and Caucasian shores. It is significant that metal barrels made in the Soviet Union, mines, and shells have been fished out in the aforementioned areas, after contact with which fishermen got poisoned and burnt and developed sores. However, hardly all places with "dirty soil" were marked on the maps.

...On 13 June 1942 (this date elicits certain thoughts, taking into account Rybalko's memoirs and the itinerary from the Caucasian shores to Sevastopol), Georgia ambulance transport ship was sunk at the approach to Sevastopol's Southern Bay near the Minnaya harbor. In 1947, a clean-up operation began in the bay, and the Georgia was taken care of. Divers who examined the vessel brought to the surface mines and shells which hissed in the air and spit out some liquid. At the beginning of 1948, the Georgia, which was lifted on pontoons, were tugged to Cossacks Bay and sunk to a depth of 20 meters.

In December 1956, the transport ship was disturbed again. Divers again hauled ammunition from the Georgia's cargo decks located at the stern for experts to examine. After contacts with the liquid oozing from mines, shells, and bombs, sailors developed burns and sores characteristic of lewisite or mustard gas. After investigation, it was recalled that similar cases had occurred two or three years earlier: several divers became poisoned while lifting bombs from the bay's bottom. Later, 250-kilogram bombs were delivered empty — the toxic chemical agents leaked into the sea.

Eyewitnesses confirmed that smaller intact bombs had been shipped further out to sea and dumped. It was impossible to pick up all of the ammunition either from the bay's bottom or from the submerged Georgia; after several cases of poisoning among sailors, the fleet's commanders ordered a halt to the work. Nor was it possible to remove the steamship from the bay; it proved to be undoable to lift the stern. It was cut off, and only the bow was dumped into the sea.

It is no secret that in the 1980's the navy buried its outdated ammunition and barrels with toxic agents at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean near Vladivostok. At the end of January this year, reports that the Black Sea Fleet had been doing the same began arriving at the State Inspectorate for the Protection of the Black Sea. To an official question from the state inspectorate, the fleet's command responded equivocally: We have not been conducting any such work.

The 50 years that have elapsed since the first "pumping of chemicals" into Crimea's coastal waters have not changed much the characteristics of the dumped toxic agents. Volodymyr Papura is convinced that mustard gas (namely this chemical agent was used most by military units during the war) has been preserved perfectly: In water it dissolves very poorly, neutralizes even worse, coagulates, and transforms into an oily mass at a temperature of 5-10 degrees. At a depth of 50 meters, there are ideal conditions for the preservation of toxic agents.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet units which are leaving Ukraine will take away maps and documents which could shed light on the scale and sites of the chemical danger. And nobody will be the wiser, as the saying goes. And what will be a secret for the broad masses, may become a temptation for those who tend to resolve material and political problems by blackmail. The chemical weapons scattered at a quite shallow depth may become a testy morsel for terrorists.

Economic Issues

Ukraine: Oil Supply to Europe Affected by Transit Tariffs

AU2102132996 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 20 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The 'Druzhba' Lowers Its Atmospheres"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Since the beginning of the year, the amount of crude oil that is pumped by the "Druzhba" [Friendship] pipeline from Russia to Europe across Ukrainian territory has been reduced by 50 percent.** By now, oil supply to Hungary has stopped, and no more than 30,000 or 40,000 metric tons of oil gets through to the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As Lyubomyr Bunyak, general director of the state enterprise in charge of the "Druzhba" main pipelines, stated last Friday [16 February] in Lvov, this is due to the fact that Ukraine has raised its transit tariffs. Starting from 1 January, the price went up to $5.20 for pumping one metric ton of crude oil over a distance of 100 kilometers.

Ukraine: Finance Problems in Coal Industry

LD2002202696 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — According to the Economy Ministry, Ukrainian industry lost approximately 40 trillion karbovantsi as a result of the miners strike, Vasyl Yevtukhov, deputy prime minister for the fuel and power engineering complex, said at a news conference.

Vasyl Yevtukhov noted that 38 trillion karbovantsi were allocated to finance the coal sector in 1995, while only 28 trillion had actually been planned. According to him, the government will continue to assist the sector, but "not for a tonne of coal," that is, it will finance the construction of new mines and equipment for new stopes.

The deputy prime minister said that financial aid of 153.8 trillion karbovantsi for the coal sector was envisaged in the draft state budget for 1996, including 108 trillion from the fund for developing the fuel and energy complex, 2.3 trillion through centralized investments, and 25 trillion karbovantsi for maintaining social facilities. According to him, approximately 70 trillion karbovantsi for restructuring the coal sector should have been envisaged in a separate clause.

Ukraine: Lugansk Official on Resolving Coal Sector Problems

WS1902141996 Lugansk GOLOS DONBASSA in Russian 9 Feb 96 p 3

[Report attributed to H. M. Basakin, deputy head of the Lugansk Oblast State Administration Department for Industry, Energy, and Transportation Issues: "If We Seriously Conduct Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **H. M. Basakin, deputy head of the Lugansk Oblast State Administration Department for Industry, Energy, and Transportation Issues, speaks about his attitude toward the development of the coal sector and about the 1995 results affecting Lugansk Oblast miners.**

The 1995 results are deplorable. Some 24 million tonnes of coal were extracted. This is 4.3 million tonnes — or 14.6 percent — less than in 1994. The extraction of coking coal dropped by 823,000 tonnes. "Rovenkyantratsyt" Production Association alone — out of nine relevant sectoral enterprises — that is headed by H. K. Astrov improved its performance. Only "Industriya" in Rovenky and "Matrosskaya" in Lysychansk mines — out of six independently operating mines — fulfilled their annual plans.

The current situation in labor collectives is very tense, because when there are no wages, there is no motivation. This situation caused a reduction in coal extraction, the intensification of strike sentiment, and an increase in the amount of accidents, due to worn-out equipment.

As they say, we have come to a dead end. The most important task is to revive the sector. The government, power bodies in provinces, and miners' collectives are currently targeting their effort to resolve this task.

The Lugansk Oblast State Administration has thoroughly studied the Ukrainian president's draft edict "On Restructuring the Coal Industry." Our vision of this problem was presented in a letter — signed by H. P. Fomenko, acting Lugansk Oblast State Administration head — addressed to Coal Minister S. V. Polyakov. I am going to briefly comment on the tenets of this document.

The presidential draft does not consider a number of important problems. It does not reflect the establishment of normal starting conditions. What do I imply by this?

First of all, unpaid miners wages must be settled. Debts for unpaid wages to all oblast coal associations in 1995 totaled 15 trillion karbovantsi [K]. If debts for unpaid wages are not settled, it will be difficult to rely on labor collectives' support of reform.

Second, a preferential credit line must be opened to purchase equipment for the previously prepared stoping faces. There are plans to install appropriate equipment in 65 stoping faces in oblast mines during the first six months. Some K21.3 trillion are needed for this purpose. If we launch new mining faces, we will increase coal extraction and strengthen the independence of coal companies that are currently being set up.

As for the technical aspect, to reduce the number of accidents and traumas, mine equipment must be brought into conformity with safety rules. Over K10 trillion are required for this purpose.

As regards financial issues, the terms of debt payment must be changed and debts of mines must be discharged. As of 15 January, debts of coal enterprises were worth over K40 trillion.

In terms of the management structure, it is necessary, in our opinion, to strictly specify the membership of both joint-stock companies and state holding companies as well as to determine conditions which make it possible for mines to become members — as main production links — of the above-mentioned companies. If this is not done, coal sector enterprises will become unmanageable at one or another stage of reform and, as a result, coal extraction will immediately decrease. A study of the experience of Rostov Oblast miners convinced us of this.

One can disagree with the tenet of the draft edict which grants the right to joint-stock and holding companies to independently sell their products at contract prices. If the draft decree does not mention the need to declare coal prices — according to current law — free prices could lead lead to the introduction of dumping prices and to abuses. Therefore, a mechanism to set prices, to create a competive environment, and to protect Ukrainian manufacturers must be set up.

A package of issues, including the transfer of miners' social infrastructure sites to the balance sheet of local soviets and the establishment of a state social insurance fund for the mining sector workers, should be drafted more thoroughly. The social protectionof mine collectives which are being closed down must be of a preventive nature.

Finally, I must say the following: The coal industry must be subject to reform, but this reform must not be conducted merely for the sake of reform. This is serious and lengthy work to preserve and develop the sector for the benefit of the people and the state.

Ukraine: Dispute Over Agricultural Subsidies Viewed

WS2102152496 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 14 Feb 96 p 6

[Article by Iryna Titova: "The Sowing Campaign Begins Today. In Parliament."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Money for financing the agricultural sector should be envisioned in the budget. This is so far unavoidable. However, it is a question of how much money should be envisioned. During today's Government Day [in parliament], the parliament should decide whether to legislatively secure issues concerning assistance for the agricultural sector or not. An additional 298 trillion karbovantsi [K] from the budget is required to satisfy the appetite of the agroindustrial complex. The Ministry of Finances has stated that it cannot, and is not going to support all proposals, and that it is going to remove articles on financing production of sunflower seed, sugar beet, and vegetable oil, as a result of which it may "recover" K100 trillion from the agroindustrial complex.

It is hard to hold on under pressure from agriculturalists. They have one argument: If we do not sow money, we will not reap the harvest. Before this year's sowing campaign, as Agriculture and Foodstuffs Minister Pavlo Haydutskyy has stated, the most difficult situation of the past four years has developed. There is as little as 34,500 tonnes of mineral fertilizers, given the required 2 million tonnes. The agricultural sector has only 13 percent of the required supply of fuel. The countryside has not yet received the promised K2 trillion for spare parts, which may result in losing nearly half of future crops. According to preliminary estimates, K200 trillion is needed for seed and fuel alone. However, parliament Deputy Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko believes that even K375 trillion is too little for the countryside. At last Wednesday's [7 February] joint meeting of the Supreme Council Presidium and the Cabinet of Ministers, modulating his voice, he pointed out the main secret to the participants: Not K300 ($1.5 billion, as suggested by the apologist of the sovkhoz and kolkhoz system and another former agriculture minister, Yuriy Karasyk), and not even K375 trillion, but K600-700 trillion is needed, and immediately. Otherwise, one may give up the agricultural sector for lost in a year or two. True, the consequences of this assistance for the entire national economy are kept quiet. As it is, to provide the requested money means to bring the country a new round of hyperinflation.

The agricultural issue is interesting also because it must always be resolved urgently. For example, there is currently talk about a catastrophic decline in production and sales of animal husbandry products. Production of meat has decreased four-fold, production of milk — two-fold, and eggs — three-fold. However, the main problem has not been resolved for a year: The processing industry, using the Law on Monopolies, is continuing to purchase from producers goods at prices that do not cover the latter's expenditures. The agroindustrial complex is now requesting subsidies to support the processing industry, threatening that otherwise the budget will fall short some K95 trillion. The agricultural lobby demands considerable concessions with regard to taxes, including deferment of VAT on critical imports, abolishment of agricultural producers' payments to the Employment Fund, and preferential payments to the Social Insurance Fund. All in all, this will reduce budget revenues by K225 trillion. Last year's results speak best about the efficiency of investments in the agroindustrial complex and its privileges: 25 percent of all agricultural companies ended last year with a total loss amounting to K25 trillion and 54-percent solvency.

At the joint meeting of the Supreme Council Presidium and the government, at which the issue of forming food reserves and supporting the agricultural sector was preliminary raised, confusion ensued. Having listened to statements about the needs of the agroindustrial complex, in which the agriculture minister, the deputy speaker, and the Supreme Council Agricultural Commission chairman virtually overwhelmed the participants with figures backing them with such arguments as "an increase in production of food is envisioned in the government's plan" and "the agricultural sector is a priority direction of the economy," Viktor Suslov, chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Finances and Banking, requested financial substantiation of the proposals. This ended the debate: The topic was deemed unprepared. Economics Minister Roman Shpek could not stand this, saying that first we must balance the budget. The government has found possibilities to earmark K2 billion for production of fertilizers. The money can be taken from the reserves of the National Bank of Ukraine, provided that it will be repaid unconditionally. In Russia we have purchased mixed fodder in installments against state guarantees. The prime minister has spoken in favor of targeted assistance to the agricultural sector, because otherwise everything will be wasted again.

What will the agricultural lobby present today, during Government Day? Will the slim ranks of those who are advocating the continuation of a tough line be able to resist their attack? The issue of reforms will evidently be irrelevant. As Oleksandr Tkachenko has explained, "we are for the Czech way, and not the Romanian one." What a surprise...

Belarus

Belarus: Prime Minister Concludes Visit to Bulgaria

WS2202095696 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The official visit to Bulgaria by a Belarusian governmental delegation has ended.

Yesterday, during the first half of the day, Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir visited the largest Bulgarian company — the Elektron consortium — and later met with Bulgarian National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov. As a sign of respect, the Belarusian prime minister was awarded with a medal from the Bulgarian parliament.

In the second half of the day, a meeting with Zhelyu Zhelev was held, at which the Belarusian prime minister and the Bulgarian president discussed methods of further cooperation between our countries.

A number of agreements were signed during the visit which inaugurated new cooperation between Belarus and Bulgaria.

Belarus: Lukashenka Pledges To Bring Order to Financial Market

LD2102220996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1905 GMT 21 Feb 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Alyaksandr Lukashenka plans to put forward a proposal in parliament to make the national bank accountable to himself, not the legislature, Lukashenka told the bank's staff while presenting Tamara Vinnikova, new NBB head, last Friday. (Vinnikova was in charge of Belarusbank, a shareholding savings bank, until her recent appointment - IF).

The president pledged to bring order to the country's financial market saying nothing could prevent him from achieving just that.

In the meantime, the parliament which dismissed Stanislav Bogdankevich as NBB head passed a resolution instructing Deputy Bank Head Nikolai Kuzhmich to take in charge. IF NOTE: Bogdankevich was dismissed by the president last September. Under the country's constitution, the head of state presents a candidate for the post of NBB head for parliamentary approval.

Former Parliament Speaker Stanislav Shushkevich told Interfax that the presidential decree on the appointment of a new NBB head was "a slap in the face of the constitution and deputies." He said no one but the parliament has the prerogative of appointing a NBB head or "power" ministers.

His view was echoed by Deputy Speaker Vasiliy Novikov who described the president's move as being a sign of disrespect for parliament. He said the move could turn out to be counterproductive.

Novikov said the deputies who may have backed the president's choice may now vote against it. He said "the deputies are patient, but there is a limit to everything."

Bogdankevich himself qualified the latest decree as being a sign of renewed confrontation with the Supreme Soviet. "We hoped the president will pay respect for the existing laws," said Bogdankevich who now heads the Civic Accord faction in parliament.

Belarus: Lukashenka Dismissal of KGB General Kez Explained

WS2202093996 Minsk BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by Syarhey Aniska: "Kez Has Done His Work; Kez Can Go"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] **By presidential edict No. 75 of 15 February [1996], General Valery Kez, first deputy of the Security Council state secretary, was relieved of his post and placed at the disposal of the KGB chairman to be discharged from military service due to his length of service.** [passage omitted]

Alyaksandr Ryhoravich Lukashenka's victory predetermined General Valery Kez's rise and nomination as KGB chairman first deputy chief. But soon a wall of alienation began to grow between Lukashenka and Kez.

Soon after some notorious developments — when opposition deputies withdrew from the Supreme Soviet oval hall — Kez heard an alarm signal. Due to his functions, he was present in the Supreme Soviet oval hall, but he did not support the involvement of the "Alfa" group in this event. The presidential entourage could not forgive him for such free thinking. The countdown for Valery Kez' political career began precisely at that time.

Then the general's dismissal — practically unknown to the public — followed. During the subway workers' strike, he categorically disagreed with a presidential order to include KGB officers in activities to suppress strikers. Aleksandr Lukashenka offically told the general that he was dismissed from his post, but under the pressure of Security Council State Secretary Viktor Sheyman, former Internal Ministry Minister Yuriy Zakharenko, and acting Prosecutor General Vasil Kapitan, Lukashenka was forced to withdraw his decision.

But the heads of the power ministries supported their colleague only once. Backstage intrigues to remove General Kez from his post became more intense also because General Kez knew all the hidden reasons for the merging of banks and for "Torgekspo" activities [not futher explained]. It is clear that an individual who possessed such explosive information was undesirable in a top KGB post.

Valery Kez' nomination as first deputy of the Security Council state secretary implied in fact his withdrawal from all KGB sources of information and the appointment of a new (trustworthy) KGB head. During two months of work in the Security Council, the general was not a just simple observer. He used available information data, collected and submitted compromising materials on some Security Council officials to Security Council State Secretary Viktor Sheyman. A final and fateful mistake of Valery Kez affected his further career service. If Viktor Sheyman agreed with the general's conclusions regarding corruptibility of some of his subordinates, he would have been held personally responsible for the developments in his department. The state secretary refused to accept the general's materials and made him understand that they could not work in harness with each other.

It is not excluded that in the immediate future we will witnesses interesting developments. Valery Kez will hardly agree with his discharge and will likely try to make public some details of developments over the past two years. In all probability, the presidential entourage and the Security Council have no interest in the scandal and will try to part with the uncompromising Valery Kez peacefully.

Belarus: Lukashenka Seen Devising Split Within Communist Party

WS2102155496 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1358 GMT 21 Feb 96

[Article by Uladzimir Hlod: "Will a Rift Appear in the Party of Communists?" — from the "Analytical Bulletin" feature No. 70, 14-20 February]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] It is well-known that President Lukashenka does not coddle his opponents. He always tries to defeat them irrespective of who they are: Individuals, parties or groups of the population. For example, he acted like this in regard to Zyanon Paznyak and the Belarusian Popular Front, Stanislaw Shushkevich and intellectuals, Myacheslaw Hryb and the Parliament of the previous convocation, Henadz Karpenka and Stanislaw Bahdankevich, businessmen and so on.

A new object of abuse seems to have appeared. This is the leadership of the Party of Communists. A signal to the beginning of the campaign was a conversation of Alyaksandr Lukashenka with an unknown party veteran during the second round of the election to the Supreme Soviet, which was not noticed by many observers. Then the President declared that he had a lot of compromising materials about the party leaders. Later the President's assistant Syarhey Posakhaw gave an interview to INTERFAX agency which was publicised by the media. The very title of the material, i.e., "Will There Be a Rift In the Belarusian Party of Communists," was surprising. What rift can we speak of if the party had successfully carried out the election campaign to the Supreme Soviet and local Soviets? Secretaries Vasil Novikaw and Syarhey Kalyakin took important positions in the Parliament. According to numerous sociological research, communists enjoy the greatest confidence of the population. Then why did the idea of a rift appear?

The answer to this question should be sought in the first lines of another interview distributed by the same agency ten days before, an interview with the President. The latter was wondering why such antipodes as communists and liberals had common interests. The President specified that he meant a joint letter by Syarhey Kalyakin and Viktar Hanchar to NARODNAYA HAZETA and ZVYAZDA with a request to publish Stanislaw Bahdankevich's speech delivered to the Parliament. The possibility that antipode factions may act together appears to have frightened the President and his entourage. An alliance of communists, agrarians and liberals deprives the President of control over the Supreme Soviet. This urged Mr Posakhaw to the following, rather weird, statement, "In the English Parliament a saying has been popular for several years that if there is friendship in the Parliament, then there are barricades in the streets. I am convinced that this compromise between the Left and the Right was achieved not on a principal basis." The President's right hand does not like the fact that good will and respect are strengthening in the Parliament. Probably, because this background emphasises the President's violence and intolerance. And also because the expectations that communists and agrarians would form one bloc with the pro-President Concord which would control the situation in the Parliament, have not come true. There is another significant aspect: Independent MPs who were expected to join Concord, joined other factions. Hence the accusations by the assistant to the President of the communist leaders who refuse to support "absolutely all initiatives by the President" and who "appear to continue anti-President policies."

Vasil Novikaw and Syarhey Kalyakin seem to have been given an ultimatum: Either they change their positions in regard to the President, or some forces will attempt to split the party into two, one of which will be obedient to the President. The fear of a possible rift in the Party of Communists appeared in late 1995 when one could hear in the lobby even the names of possible General Secretaries, i.e., Syarhey Posakhaw and Aleh Sluka, both of who are President's assistants. At a press conference held by Syarhey Kalyakin he commented on this in the following way, "Mr Posakhaw does not have any influence in the Party, and Mr Sluka is not even known by the Party." This delusion may be very dangerous. President's power is notoriously known, and communists may make a mistake if they are not be serious about these attempts.

On February 16 I asked Vasil Novikaw to comment on Syarhey Posakhaw statements. He said, "This is a personal opinion of a regular member of the Party. I believe that in the near future similarly regular members of the Party will respond to him in a due manner." Well, we will see that after a while.

Belarus: Controversies Over Joint Venture With Ford Reported

WS2102102396 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0833 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On February 19 the joint venture Lada-OMC, the dealer of Ford Motor in Belarus and one of the founders of a Belarusian- American joint venture for assembling Ford cars in Belarus, arranged a press conference in view of counteraction from the managers of the Minsk Tractor Works (MTW) against the plans to use the MTW's experimental station at the settlement of Abchak near Minsk for the development of the joint venture's production capacities there. It should be noted that reporters never heard either specific arguments why the MTW's claims on the experimental station were unfounded, or the opinion of MTW representatives because they had not been invited to the press conference. Reporters were told about the essence and the procedure for realising the Belarusian-American project, its advantages for Belarus, and about concerned organisations' views on the reasons hindering the promotion of this advantageous project.

Negotiations with Ford Motor were launched in summer of 1994 and resulted in signing a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding (in Detroit on 14 December 1995), which started the project and, in particular, the establishment of a Belarusian-American joint venture. On behalf of the Belarusian government the Memorandum was signed by Deputy Prime Minister Valeryy Kokaraw. Among the founders of the joint venture were Ford Motor, Lada-OMC and the Belarusian government. According to the Lada-OMC general director, Alyaksey Vahanaw, the above was the result of a tender invited by Ford Motor. The Belarusian project for Ford assembling, which had been elaborated by Lada-OMC, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and some other state departments concerned, was evaluated to be slightly better than 4 similar projects filed by the Moscow Motor Factory (AZLK), the Nizhniy Novgorod Motor Factory (GAZ), the Izhevsk Motor Factory and the Moscow Scientific and Production Amalgamation Energiya.

Touching on the problem arising from the MTW's claims the Lada-OMC general director said that it was by no mere chance that the Abchak site had been chosen. Four establishments in the country were proposed to an international group of experts. Two of them were situated on the area of the Belarusian Motor Works (BelAZ) in Zhodzina, one on the area of the Minsk Engine Works in Stalbtsy and one at Abchak. The experts fixed upon the latter. In this respect Richard Kazlowski, the general director of the joint-stock company Belpramprayekt, supposed that the MTW had raised objections because its representatives were not even invited to the examination of the Abchak production area, preceding decisionmaking. But, in general, Mr Kazlowski defined the MTW's claims on the Abchak production area as unfounded, especially as last year the MTW managers considered it possible to place them at the disposal of Coca-Cola, and then to organise the pre-sale preparation of tractors.

After the joint venture is registered, which should follow a relevant enactment by the Cabinet of Ministers, construction will start at Abchak in April of this year, the installation of technological equipment in November, and first Belarus-assembled Fords are to appear in March of 1997. According to Alyaksey Vahanaw, around 15,000 cars may be assembled before the end of the next year. The joint venture intends to assemble the most popular and most acceptable for price model — Ford Escort with 1.3 and 1.6 liter engines, 9-12 seat vans, and lorries on the basis of Ford Transit, fire and armoured vehicles, ambulances etc. The output of usual cars alone is expected to amount to 100,000 vehicles annually by the year 2000. By that time Belarusian enterprises are to have ensured the supply of over 60 percent of the components for assembling, which, in the unanimous opinion of the participants of the press conference, will preserve the existing jobs and create new ones. The components produced by Belarusian enterprises, as Mr Vahanaw assured reporters, will be delivered to Ford factories in Poland, Germany, Belgium, the UK, the USA, the RSA, New Zealand and in Russia in a more remote future. The Abchak factory will be built by Belarusians. According to an agreement with Ford

Motor, the shipment of components and finished products to and from the factory will be a function of the Belarusian party. All financial proceeds from car sales will only enter only via Belarusian banks. The number of Ford service centres is expected to increase by 15-20. The Belarusian Metallurgical Plant may be given orders for the production of cord, and the development of body production. As a result, Belarus will receive tens of thousands of well-paid jobs.

Mr Vahanaw also stressed that there was no conflict between the MTW and Ford Motor. The Belarusian-American project became, according to him, a hostage to some groups' political and economic interests. The Lada-OMC chief did not rule out the possibility of pressure from the would-be competitors of Ford Motor on the CIS markets, and pressure from certain political forces within the country which do not want to allow the present authorities to have a strong economic trump card. He also mentioned pressure on Ford Motor from forces in Russia which are spreading information about Belarus' violation of the Belarusian-Russian customs agreement thanks to which Belarus can now represent an interest to such a large producer as Ford Motor. Now, in Mr Vahanaw's opinion, the question is whether there will be investments in Belarus in general. Having undermined the Republic's prestige on the very first large-scale project which may bring in over $300 million, Belarus may wait for another for a long time. Reporters hoped to hear the opinion of a government official, but the chief of the Department of Foreign Economic Relations at the Ministry of Industry, who was to attend the press conference, never appeared.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan: Toqayev Meets Primakov, Discusses Ties

*LD2102151496 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian
1200 GMT 21 Feb 96*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov's official visit to Kazakhstan started today. Our correspondent in Almaty reports:

The visit began with talks in the Kazakh Foreign Ministry where the heads of the two countries' Foreign Ministries discussed a wide range of issues of bilateral relations and international and regional problems. And an interview specially for this program took place here as well.

[Begin recording] [Primakov] Of course, we evidently need to bring our positions on the Caspian closer together somehow. This is a very important issue for both Russia and Kazakhstan. With regard to the general situation, the situation in Tajikistan needs to be stabilized. The conditions are not such in Tajikistan that the model of an Islamic state might be foisted upon it.

[Kazakh Foreign Minister Toqayev] A very interesting conversation took place about integration as an objective phenomenon in the post-Soviet space. We agreed to continue consultations on the Caspian. And as for Tajikistan, we fully understood the need to resolve this situation by political means. [end recording]

Kazahk President Nursultan Nazarbayev also received Primakov today. They discussed the prospects for the development of integration within the CIS and Boris Yeltsin's official visit to Almaty, which is to take place in April.

Kazakhstan: Primakov: 'No Disagreements' in Bilateral Relations

*LD2102133996 Moscow ITNTERFAX in English
1054 GMT 21 Feb 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, Feb 21 (Interfax) — Russia's Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov told journalists upon his arrival in Almaty Wednesday that the Russian and Kazakhstan leaders have no disagreements on matters of bilateral relations.

During a one-day official visit, Primakov is to have talks with his Kazakh counterpart Qasymzhomart Tokayev and meet with President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Prime Minister Akezhan Qazhygeldin.

He said that the talks would focus on broadening bilateral cooperation, and that relations between Almaty and Moscow were based on equality and mutual benefit and were good and stable.

He said Russia and Kazakhstan viewed different problems from the same angle, and that there was no need to hold special discussions or take special decisions.

At the end of the visit Primakov will give a press conference, after which he will fly out to Tashkent.

Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev on Ways To Strengthen Ties With Primakov

LD2102160496 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1423 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov is in Almaty today on a one-day visit. Our correpondent Viktor Glukhovtsev reports:

[Glukhovtsev] Yevgeniy Primakov's one-day stay in Almaty was tightly scheduled: he had meetings and talks with at the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry, a thorough discussion of economic relations with the Kazakh Prime Minister Abezhan Kazhegeldin, and a talk with President Nazarbayev.

The last was conducted in private but after the talk Nursultan Nazarbayev gave an exclusive interview for Mayak's listeners.

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] We discussed problems that our states have with each other. The second question — we must find a final solution to the problem of transporting oil and gas from Kazakhstan through Russian territory. Then there will no longer be any speculation as to through which states — Iran, Turkey, etc — the oil and gas pipeline to the Mediterranian should be laid down. This would be to the advantage of Russia and of Kazakhstan. There were problems relating to mutual trust between our countries and states. Trust must work in such a way that today's generation of Russians and Kazakhs retain the relations that have been built up between our peoples over many centuries. We discussed problems pertaining to the relations between our departments and the problem of intensifying integration. At present, we are preparing an agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia on intensifying economic integration, i.e. to move on from a customs union to a payments union, a transport union, and a power union. When we removed customs barriers, customs tariffs, the commodity circulation between Russia and Kazakhstan increased over six months by 47 percent. This is a clear indication of what is advantageous for our countries.

We also discussed other urgent problems for our countries to bring our countries closer together and to build up trust. [end recording]

The following is what Primakov said at a meeting with journalists.

[Begin Primakov recording] We are worried about the possible destabilization of the situation in Tajikistan. This could have an effect on the whole Central Asia region at least. This directly concerns Russia's interests and we have a common view that it is necessary to do everything possible to stabilize the situation in Tajikistan. [end recording]

Tajikistan

Tajikistan: Rakhmanov Message on 'Id al-Fitr Holiday

LD2102175596 Dushanbe KHOVAR in Russian 0915 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmanov has congratulated the people of the republic on the Ramadan holiday and wished them peace and well-being.

"Every year, we mark the noble holiday of 'Id al-Fitr with the hope that peace and stability will come to our country," the head of state said in his congratulatory message, "for the sacred Islamic religion also calls for peace. [passage omitted]

"It is a pity that the tragic events committed during the sacred month of Ramadan by groups of the irreconcilable opposition defiled the holiness of the holiday. The brutal murder of Haji Fathullokhon Sharifzoda, the head of Muslims of Tajikistan, and the members of his family, the murder of 21 border guards and peaceful citizens, and the attacks on villages near the border have once again shown us the real face of these people who pose as 'fighters' for Islam, but who in fact do not follow the elementary requirements of this sacred religion. They forget that it is impossible to deceive and to divert our people from the path they have chosen using threats and false propaganda. [passage omitted]

"May God send all compatriots and Muslims of the universe happiness, tranquillity, and peace on this sacred day," President Rakhmanov concluded.

Tajikistan: Muslim Leader Condemns Clashes, Backs Government

LD2002144996 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0520 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today we have a holiday: Eid-ul-Fitr, the holiday of Ramadan. We greet all of you on this occasion. [passage omitted]

Here is a holiday greeting from Haji Khudoyberdi Egamberdizoda, the acting mufti of the Republic of Tajikistan:

[Begin Egamberdizoda recording] On behalf of the muftiate, I greet all the people of the republic on this honored and blessed Eid-ul-Fitr. [passage omitted]

Brothers, the honored month of Ramadan is coming to an end. During this month many Muslims kept the fast. There should be much servitude and reading of the Koran. Despite this, some tragic events took place in our republic, and all of the people feel sorrow at this.

First, Fathullokhon Sharifzoda, the mufti of the Republic of Tajikistan, was murdered on the first blessed day of Ramadan, and this makes not only the employees of our office but also all Muslims of the republic feel sad. A noble man was murdered, and this was not good.

Second, there were the events that took place in Sicharogh [village of Komsomolabad district, central Tajikistan, where Tajik opposition forces attacked a convoy and killed more than 20 people on the night of 11-12 February], events which were very shocking. Not only we, the Muslims of the republic, condemn this but others from abroad also condemn these brutal acts. Of course, this caused anger among all the people. Many people felt sorrow at this. Many of those who were murdered were observing the fast. One should pray and do good things and committing murder instead of this is a grave crime. I think a man who is a Muslim would never have committed this deed. [passage omitted]

On this blessed day of Eid-ul-Fitr, I wish a prosperous year to all Muslims of our Tajikistan, and to other Muslims. I ask all the people of Tajikistan to work hard on the land, because spring is coming. If we do not work with the land and do not reap a harvest from the land, then of course we cannot do a good job. How long can we rely on others [for food]? That is why I ask all the people of Tajikistan, because spring is coming, to work productively on the land. Let God make the farmers' work prosperous. Let our republic be tranquil, and let there be mutual understanding among Muslims.

We will add to this in particular that, to tell the truth, although our leaders are making great efforts to take care of the people, some scoundrels are robbing the imported grain, and of course this is not the fault of the leaders. We pray for our leaders too. Let God save them from misfortune and unhappiness, and give them reward in this world and in the next for their work and service for the people. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Tajikistan: Opposition Ready To Continue Negotiating

LD2102163496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1450 GMT 21 Feb 96

[By Oleg Kuzmin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TEHRAN, February 21 (Itar-Tass) — Tajikistan's chief opposition negotiator Akbar Turajonzada said on Wednesday [21 February] he was ready to continue the negotiating process.

"We are ready to continue talks and search for compromises. However, many aspects depend on the government stance," Turajonzada told Tass.

The opposition negotiator said the Ashgabat round of inter-Tajik talks was undermined by the government. He branded as unacceptable official Dushanbe's appeal to the opposition for cessation of hostilities and waiting for next presidential elections in five years.

"It is unacceptable for us. According to the opposition, a council for national reconciliation should be created to divide power in the republic," he said in a interview for the Iran Times daily.

Russian observers "did not hamper talks," he said. However, "they took a passive stand without launching initiatives which might push forward the negotiating process," he told Tass.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan: Kamilov, Primakov Hold Talks, Sign Cooperation Pact

LD2202122796 Tashkent Radio Mashal in Uzbek 1000 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Yevgeniy Primakov, foreign minister of the Russian Federation, is on a visit to our country. Our correspondent (Gafurjon Jamalov) comments on this:

[Jamalov] Good day, dear countrymen. You know that the minister of foreign affairs of Russia, after his appointment to this post, has been making a number of working visits in order to develop relations with the republics of the CIS and the Central Asian republics, and in particular relations between Uzbekistan and Russia.

It is known that Primakov was in Kazakhstan yesterday and held talks and exchanged opinions on cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan, in particular on the customs union and other important subjects.

Today Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov visited our country. A bilateral conversation between Abdulaziz Kamilov, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov took place. The head of our country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, having greeted his counterpart on Uzbek soil, expressed his opinions on the further development of relations between Uzbekistan and Russia. Primakov emphasized that Russia is proceeding along the path of further broadening and developing relations between Russia and CIS states, in particular with the Central Asian republics, and expressed his opinions on new areas of cooperation. During the conversation they also exchanged opinions on the problems in the Central Asian region — in particular the events taking place in Tajikistan — together with relations between the two states.

It is necessary to say that at the end of these talks one important document was signed: This is a program for cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 1996. Kamilov and Primakov, ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries, signed this program, or document.

The Russian foreign minister's visit to our country is continuing.

Uzbekistan: Iranian Minister Arrives on Visit, Comments

LD2102220896 Tehran IRNA in English 1950 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tehran, Feb. 21, IRNA — The minister of Islamic guidance and culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mostafa Mirsalim, stated in Bukhara on Wednesday that the Silk Route was not only restricted to the history in the past, but it also belongs to the present time in linking the different nations of the region.

Mirsalim offered the statement at his arrival in Uzbekistan for an international conference for the revival of the Silk Route. He went on to say that the conference on the Silk Route was a very good excuse for the different nations in the region to assemble and prove to the world that the Silk Route did not belong to the past only.

The Islamic guidance minister stated that the promotion of cultural relation between Iran and Uzbekistan for strengthening cultural ties was beneficial to both countries.

The Silk Route conference is being held in the ancient and historical city of Bukhara with the cooperation of UNESCO and UNCTAD [UN Commission for Trade and Development] for a period of two days starting February 2, 1996. [as received]

Countries adjacent to the Silk Route will be participating at the conference in addition to representatives from the United Nations. The nations attending the conference will study ways of promoting cooperation and historical patterns of bringing about peace to the region.

Armenia

Armenia: Ter-Petrosyan Receives U.S. Envoy, Discusses Karabakh Talks

NC2102174796 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1700 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan received Ambassador Presel, the U.S. representative at OSCE Minsk Group, on 21 February. They discussed the efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict during the meeting. Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan, and U.S. Ambassador to Armenia Peter Thompson were present at the meeting.

Armenia: Nagorno-Karabakh's Kocharyan Meets U.S., French Envoys

NC2102160096 Yerevan SNARK in English 0232 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, February 21 (SNARK) — NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] President Robert Kocharyan and U.S. Envoy to the OSCE Minsk group met on February 20 late in the evening in the NKR President's residence in Yerevan.

SNARK was informed by the Press Office of the NKR Mission in Armenia that the discussion centered on issues of political settlement of the Karabakh problem.

Earlier President Kocharyan received France's Ambassador to Armenia France d'Arteng. Matters of mutual interest were considered. The parties gave favorable assessments to France's efforts to help the OSCE Minsk group and discussed ways of France's active involvement in the negotiation process of the Karabakh problem.

Armenia: Armenian Parties Demonstrate on Karabakh 'Independence Day'

NC2102194496 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1518 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, February 21 (NOYAN TAPAN) — A rally dedicated to the 8th Anniversary of the Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] Liberation Movement was staged Tuesday [20 February] in Yerevan.

"If Armenia does not recognize the Karabakh Republic, no one is going to recognize it", Chairman of "Artsakh-Armenia" Union Lenser Aghalovyan said, addressing the rally. According to him, Russian Ambassador to Armenia Andrey Urnov thinks the same way.

According to Suren Zolyan (one of Scientific-Industrial and Civil Union's Leaders), Armenia's diplomacy has been defeated on the issue of Artsakh. If before that there had been only two countries — Turkey and the UK — insisting that Karabakh was an integral part of Azerbaijan, today their number has increased, according to Zolyan.

Chairman of Armenia's Democratic Party Aram Sargisyan said that the West is trying to resolve the Karabakh problem according to Bosnian scenario. "The problem of Artsakh will be in danger until it is completely settled", Sargisyan said, adding that DPA [Democratic Party of Armenia] has already appeared with the initiative of running a pan-Armenian assembly on Artsakh. He announced that 22 organizations have already agreed to attend the assembly.

Deputy Chairman of the Constitutional Law Party Hayk Babukhanyan noted that unlike Armenia Azerbaijan has achieved great progress on the diplomatic arena. He opined that both democratic and communist Russia does not want Artsakh to secede from Azerbaijan.

National Self-Determination Union's Leader Paruyr Hayrikyan reminded those attending the rally [of] a history of Palestinian-Israel stand-off, when Israel announced that it did not need UN resolutions, since it was the winner in that war. Nevertheless, international resolutions seem to be stronger. Paruyr Hayrikyan suggested cooperating with other countries in diplomatic sphere so as not to repeat Israel's mistake.

Stepan Stepanyan, member of the Armenian Communist Party's Bureau said that there is no communist in Armenia, who would like to see Mountainous Karabakh within Azerbaijan. He stressed that Russian communists share this viewpoint. Stepanian linked the resolution of the Karabakh conflict to the establishment of new union, in which Armenia and Karabakh will be full-fledged participants.

Member of the National Democratic Union's Board, deputy of the National Assembly of Armenia Davit Vardanyan noted that Armenian parties should unite to improve Armenian people's living conditions. Vardanyan said that they are ready to cooperate with Russia, however, he said, there is no exaggerating Russia's role.

Armenia: Karabakh Communist Favors Confederation With Azerbaijan

NC2102191396 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1518 GMT 21 Feb 96

["Karabakh Communists Think That Future of MKR Is Within Russia"—NOYAN TAPAN]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, February 21 (NOYAN TAPAN) — On February 3 an organizational committee was founded in Stepanakert which virtually set the beginning for activities of the Communist Party of Karabakh. Last September a group of Karabakh communists elaborated new statute and program of CPMK [Communist Party of Mountainous Karabakh]. The party's all republican conference is to take place this April to approve the new program. According to verified data, thousands of people are presently ready to join the party.

What are the tasks and purposes of CPMK, what kind of effect will the appearance of the new party have on the settlement of the Karabakh crisis? These and other questions were asked to head of the organizational committee, former first secretary of CPSS's [Communist Party Central Committee] Stepanakert city committee Hrand Melkumian.

Q. What is the main purpose of establishment of the renewed CPMK?

A. The main objective is to promote Karabakh leadership in solving the Karabakh conflict. We are convinced that the mixed character of Karabakh's political palette will speed up the peace process, promote searching of a way out of the current standstill. No other aims yet.

Q. To your mind, what will be the effect of the communist party's revival on the situation in the region?

A. It is known that left-radical and first of all communist movements are day after day spreading in lots of countries, in particular, CIS. I think that we should not be aside of these processes. Contacts with the above-mentioned forces of Russia are more than necessary today, especially due to the fact that like all the post-Soviet countries communist movement never disappeared in Karabakh. I suppose that the revival of the Communist Party will not negatively influence the situation in the region.

Q. What is CPMK's position over the settlement of the conflict in Karabakh, in particular, future status of Mountainous Karabakh?

A. CPMK is confident that Karabakh's future is within Russia. The most optimal version, to my mind, is confederation union with Russia. Through centuries our ancestors have pinned their hopes on great northern neighbor. Let me remind that in 18th century Karabakh's dukes were first to appeal to Peter I requesting to become a part of Russia. Nobody has canceled the Gyulistan agreement of 1913 as a result of which dukes' dream came true.

Q. Does CPMK exclude all possibilities of Karabakh being within Azerbaijan?

A. 70 years of experience showed that within this state Armenians of Karabakh are at the best destined to assimilation and at the worst — extermination. However we are realists. We understand that historic circumstances can again turn their back against us. Under current development of events the most admissible form for cohabitation of Karabakh and Azerbaijan is the confederation. To agree to a lower status means to sentence ourselves to death. Apparently, this would be the first case in history when the winner admitted terms of the loser.

Q. Any party aims at seizing power. As far as we know CPMK's leadership adheres to other principles...

A. This is really so. We think that struggle for political power in our situation would lead to internal political instability, promote scattering of our scanty national forces.

Q. Lots of experts think that the crisis of the communist doctrine which led to break-up of the USSR and the socialist camp, in fact, started from the crisis of the economic system. Experience shows that socialist economy cannot compete with more flexible capitalist system. How can you comment on this point of view?

A. To my mind nihilism of those experts is not just. We should not forget that Armenian people strengthened and developed its statehood under conditions of the socialist system, achieved great height in industry, agriculture, energy system. Armenia's all big enterprises were constructed in the Soviet period. To deny it all means to suffer at least from political blindness. At the same time, we do not deny certain inefficiency of the traditional socialist production method. Proceeding from this, CPMK's renewed program emphasizes importance of multiform economy and existence of private property.

Q. What was the reaction of the Karabakh leadership to the establishment of the organizational committee in Stepanakert?

A. I do not know yet. In any case it should not be against it like it is in all democratic countries. I think, forces promoting solution of the Karabakh problem will only help the Karabakh leadership.

Armenia: Russian Communists on Relations With Armenian Party

NC2102220196 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 0713 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, February 21 (NOYAN TAPAN) — According to RAIS information agency, Presidium of Russian Communist Party's Central Committee made a statement Tuesday [20 February], reading:

"Some publications have recently appeared in Russian and foreign press which in a deliberately distorted form present relations of the Russian Communist Party and fraternal Communist Parties of CIS, particularly Armenian Communist Party".

"Communist Party of Russia is indignant at the tone and content of an article published in the 'NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA' daily on February 13 and states that the information contained in the article is a fabrication designed to defame Russian communists in eyes of publicity of Armenia and Russia".

"Central Committee's Presidium of Russian Communist Party confirms that relations between Armenian and Russian parties, their leaderships are based on principles of friendship and respect, equality and trust, unity of viewpoints on all key issues. It was and it will be so".

[NOYAN TAPAN] The above-mentioned article reads that First Secretary of Armenian Communist Party's Central Committee Sergey Badalian said that positions of Russian and Armenian Communist Parties coincided as far as the Karabakh problem is concerned. The article noted that Sergey Badalian's statement caused indignation of Russian communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, and in this connection removal of CPA's leadership was discussed.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan: Oil Company Chief on 'Karabakh' Field's Earning Potential

MM2202101296 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 96 p 9

[Unattributed report: "Petrodollars Flooding In"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijan's maximum profit from the implementation of the contract for the joint development of the "Karabakh" oil field signed in November last year by the republic's State Oil Company with three foreign companies — Russia's Lukoil, the U.S. Pennzoil, and the Italian oil company Agip — has been assessed at $12 billion. This announcement was made by State Oil Company President Natik Aliyev.

The head of the Azerbaijani company said that one advantage of the deal is the use for the first time in the republic of progressive deep-well drilling in the promising field in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian 40 km east of Baku. He said that the field's oil and gas reserves are estimated at around 85 million tonnes and 18 billion cubic meters respectively.

The "Karabakh" field is expected to produce its first oil in 2003.

Azerbaijan: Writer Chronicles Problems of Communist Parties

964F1132A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 10 Feb 96 No 6, p 7

Article by N. Aliyev: "The Communist Party of Azerbaijan—From Creation to Collapse?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The plenum of one of the leading rayon committees of the CPA [Communist Party of Azerbaijan] gives one the feeling that the party is coming up upon its last days.

The largest of Azerbaijan's two parties with communist orientation—the Communist Party of Azerbaijan was created on 27 November 1993. After six to eight weeks it was registered with the Ministry of Justice. The second communist party, which was created somewhat later, was not registered until the end of 1995, in spite of the fact that it submitted its application to the Ministry of Justice much earlier. As far back as two years ago our newspaper addressed the subject of the antagonism between the two Communist Parties, anticipating that this might end in the collapse of the communist movement in Azerbaijan. Indeed, the existence of two parties adhering to a single ideology played into the hands of republic's anticommunist forces. Sayad Sayadov (initially leader of the Party of Revolutionary Revival and then the Azerbaijan Communist Party with the platform of the CPSU and finally the Communist Unified Party of Azerbaijan) and Ramiz Akhmedov (leader of the CPA) have felt and continue to feel mutual animosity toward one another. This is most likely what impeded the unification of the two Communist Parties in 1993 and 1994.

Be that as it may, the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, headed by Ramiz Akhmedov, in 1994-1995 made a huge leap forward, participating in various meetings and forums in Russia. During the year—from the end of 1993 until the end of 1994—S. Sayadov did not attend a single such meeting, stating that he had to figure out what the parties participating in them were about.

In the meantime R. Akhmedov signed a trilateral communique with the communist parties of Armenia and the Russian Federation. The CPA first became associated and then became a full-fledged member of the Union of Communist Parties-CPSU. A delegation from the CPA participated in the work of the Second Congress of Peoples of the USSR. The chairman of the CPA Commission on Communications with the Public, Gennadiy Tretyakov, and Supreme Council Deputy Rasim Agayev (at that time a member of the Political Council of the Labor Party of Azerbaijan) at the Congress were elected to the management body of this organization—the Congress Committee. Azerbaijan

Communists are establishing contacts with more than 20 parties with a left-wing orientation throughout the world.

The activity of the two Communist Parties, particularly the CPA (because of its active participation in the integration processes on the territory of the former USSR) right before the elections to the Milli Mejlis could not but evoke a reaction from the democratic opposition. Indeed, beginning in December 1994, there was a kind of "campaign" by democrats against the Communists. The parties Ana Torpag, Ana Veten, the Democratic Congress, and others repeatedly made harsh statements, warning of the "impending communist threat." For example, at the beginning of January at a meeting of the board of the Ana Torpag Party they discussed the question of the activity of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Those in attendance noted that the activity of the CPA for restoring the USSR contradicts the Constitution of Azerbaijan and the law "On Political Parties," and the fact that "the authorities are not expressing their attitude toward the CPA causes confusion." At the meeting it was decided to request that the higher agencies pay attention to the activity of the Communist Party. Incidentally, at that time and afterwards the Communists parried these attacks rather easily.

At first glance the party seemed to be developing quite dynamically up until August of last year when there was a sudden decision on the part of the Supreme Court to ban the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. But three weeks after the decision of the Civil Collegium of the Supreme Court, when there was practically no doubt that the Communists had withdrawn from the election campaign and the anticommunist bloc was celebrating its victory, the Presidium of the Supreme Court just as unexpectedly overturned the decision of the Civil Collegium.

One must assume that a considerable role in the restoration of the CPA was played by the reaction from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Agrarian Party, the Russian All-National Union, etc. The Russian left-wing forces managed to organize such an immediate reaction mainly because of personal contacts and above all contacts of the Commission on International Relations of the CPA, Gennadiy Tretyakov.

Be that as it may, the ban and then the restoration of the CPA revealed many negative processes within the party. All this inevitably had to be manifested at the 35th Congress of the Communist Party on 23 September of last year. The fact is that, in the opinion of many party functionaries, the Communist Party of Azerbaijan had actually been inactive. Certain members of the Presidium of the CPA from time to time expressed protest against such a policy conducted by the party leaders. The group of those who were dissatisfied began to work little by little, trying to overthrow R. Akhmedov and those close to him—Israil Magerramov, Aziz Azizov, and others. But by the time of the congress the intraparty opposition was still too weak.

Nonetheless, the by now quite "ripe abscess" partially erupted at the party forum in September of last year. But after the congress when, contrary to the will of many party members, the party list submitted by Ramiz Akhmedov was approved, the Central Electoral Commission refused to register the CPA for participation in the November elections. The situation within the party became increasingly explosive and out of control.

The alignment of forces in the party was affected also by the registration by the Ministry of Justice in November of last year of a rival to the CPA—the Communist Unified Party of Azerbaijan [CUPA]. The leader of the small CUPA Sayad Sayadov, feeling that fairly good prospects were opening up for his party, stepped up his activity. The CUPA announced a group of new members in its ranks. It says in the party's address that "those who wish may send their entry fee of 1,000 manat and also a voluntary material assistance to a specific address."

Additionally, there is information the CUPA is joining the Party of Revolutionary Revival [PRVA]. But despite the apparent seriousness of these statements, S. Sayadov's actions in many cases can evoke only a smile. The Party of Revolutionary Revival, which he wants to unite with the CUPA, was created by Sayad Sayadov himself. He was also its general secretary for a very long time. Now, having taken charge of the "Unified Communists" S. Sayadov states that the PRVA has "expressed a wish" to merge with the CUPA.

Ramiz Akhmedov's group prepared very carefully for the plenum of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan that took place at the end of January. It was not without reason that the date for this function was repeatedly pushed back. R. Akhmedov tried to garner support from rayon committees, for which he visited the rayons of the republic several times. Incidentally, as subsequent events showed, he was not especially successful in this.

In the opinion of observers the crisis could have been resolved in several ways. The first was to expel R. Akhmedov and his group from the party leadership. The second, if that attempt was not successful, was that it was possible to create a new party with a communist orientation and it could have been decided beforehand that Yagub Mamedov would be in charge of it. In this case, in the opinion of observers, R. Akhmedov would have been a "general without an army." Incidentally, although there is no new party so far, R. Akhmedov has already been deprived of the support of a number of party organizations. In addition, if another person takes over the helm of the CPA, there will be greater chances of unification of the CPA and the CUPA.

Be that as it may, the plenum that took place on 28 January was a kind of point of departure for the CPA—the statements of R. Akhmedov and several others, the resignation of Gennadiy Tretyakov which followed this, the accusations of provocation, etc., put centrifugal forces into action within the party. Several rayon committees of the CPA had already expressed their active disagreement with R. Akhmedov's actions.

An example is the plenum of the Khatainskiy Rayon Committee of the CPA that took place on 7 February. About 30 people gathered in a small room of a club in Khatainskiy Rayon. There were several issues on the agenda and undoubtedly the most crucial of them was the discussion of the recent plenum of the CPA. The leader of the rayon committee, Telman Nuruloayev, presented his "guests" from the Central Committee—Israil Magerramov and Aziz Azizov. T. Nuruloayev was one of the people who was called a provocateur at the plenum and there was nothing surprising in the fact that Khatainskiy Rayon was hostile toward the representatives of the party leadership.

When the speeches of the rayon committee members began, the rayon committee members began, the dam broke. Those present at the plenum on 28 January expressed in their speeches a deep dissatisfaction with what had taken place. There was very harsh criticism directed against I. Magerramov and others. "How is it that people we do not know suddenly become enemies and all the critical speeches are interrupted. What kind of plenum is this?"—the speakers were surprised. Members of the Khatainskiy Rayon Committee spoke one after another and expressed support for their leader T. Nuruloayev. Some even stated that they intended to leave the CPA as a sign of protest.

The Khatainskiy Committee is one of the most active and, if one may use this word—"conscious." What happened here makes it possible to predict the reaction of many other rayon committees. The collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was largely impacted by the rejection of criticism and democratic principles. It seems that the Communist Party of Azerbaijan borrowed the same bad features that were inherent in the CPSU.

There is the sense that the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, which was still in existence a month ago, no longer exists. Ramiz Akhmedov and his people will not leave voluntarily. But the rayon committees do not intend to put up with this....

Georgia

Georgia: Nadibaidze: Georgia Not To Demand Part of BSF

LD2202120696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1118 GMT 22 Feb 96

[By Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI February 22 (ITAR-TASS) — "Georgia will not raise now the problem of turning over part of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF] to it," Georgian Defence Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze said today, addressing a press conference in Tbilisi. According to Nadibaidze, Georgia just cannot afford to have naval ships. "It is easier to keep an army brigade, than a patrol ship," he said.

The Georgian Defence Minister believes that in the future it will be, perhaps, reasonable to create a common system for protecting sea borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and cited as an example the already created common air defence system, which, in his opinion, proved to be effective.

A week ago Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli Menagharishvili said at a press conference in Tbilisi that in the future Georgia might raise the question of turning over to it part of the Black Sea Fleet.

Georgia: Abkhaz, Armenian Forces Clash; Two Killed, Four Wounded

LD2202114396 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1115 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zugdidi, 22 Feb — An IBERIA correspondent has learned from the Zugdidi administration that there has been an armed clash between Armenian and Abkhaz formations in the village of Atara Armyanskoye, as a result of which two were killed and four wounded. This is not the first time when Abkhaz armed formations have attacked Armenian armed formations. As for the latter (the former Bagramyan battalion), it is not subordinate to the so-called Abkhaz president Vladislav Ardzinba, and is currently busy protecting solely Armenian villages.

Georgia: Abkhaz Parliament Speaker Rules Out Federative Union

LD2202105996 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 0930 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zugdidi, 22 February — Well-informed sources have told an Iprinda correspondent at the regional office of the UNHCR in Zugdidi that the Abkhaz speaker Sokrat Jinjolia told a meeting of Abkhaz deputies the following: "The time for establishing federative relations between Abkhazia and Georgia is up...[agency punctuation]. The issue is out of the question now." He went on to say that Georgia must take an understanding approach to the draft conflict settlement offered to [Abkhaz separatist leader] Ardzinba, which provides for the creation of a federative union. In conclusion Jinjolia stressed that Abkhazia's stance would remain unchanged despite a possible reshuffle in the Russian leadership and that the current position [of the Abkhaz leadership] was based on the interests of the Abkhaz people.

Georgia: Abkhaz Leader Ready To Meet With Shevardnadze

LD2102173796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1624 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SUKHUMI, Feb 21 (INTERFAX) — Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba is ready to meet with Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze in order to discuss issues related to settling the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

"Probably, the time will come when we shall be able to meet in Sukhumi and Tbilisi, however it would be desirable now to meet on a neutral territory minding that we are two conflicting parties," Ardzinba told a press conference in Sukhumi Wednesday.

According to Ardzinba, it is possible to hold such a meeting in Russia with the consent of its leadership.

Speaking about the draft protocol on the Georgian-Abkhazian settlement worked out by the Abkhazian party, Ardzinba said that Sukhumi "put forward a new initiative based on the existing realities."

Georgia, he said, "should take into consideration proposals of the Abkhazian party and understand that this is the minimum of concessions which we could make as a result of numerous consultations and negotiations."

Georgia: Abkhaz Minister Urges Withdrawal of Peacekeepers

LD2102165696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1518 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 21 (INTERFAX) — If peacekeeping forces are withdrawn from the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, Abkhazian armed forces will be able "to independently guard the border with Georgia along the Inguri River," said Abkhazian Foreign Minister Leonid Lakerbaya.

The latest statements by top-ranking representatives from the Russian Defense Ministry on withdrawal of peacekeepers from Abkhazia if the negotiation process with Georgia is dragged out are an attempt to exert pressure on the Abkhazian party, he told INTERFAX Wednesday. "Once again someone is trying to force us to join Georgia on conditions set down by Tbilisi," Lakerbaya said.

Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev "is not authorized" to solve the issue of withdrawal of peacekeepers privately, Lakerbaya said. "There is a president, the Federation Council, and State Duma in Russia and if Russian authorities believe that the peacekeeping forces should be withdrawn, then it's up to them to decide," he said.

However, the Abkhazian leadership believes that the peacekeeping mission in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is a reliable guarantor of peace in the region and creates conditions for a political dialogue, Lakerbaya said.

If the peacekeeping operation is stopped, then armed confrontation between the parties will resume, he believes.

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